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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of two chapters. The first chapter studies children’s skill
formation technology while endogenizing the maternal age and child investments. I
estimate the effect of a mother’s age at childbirth on her child’s health, skill level,
educational attainment, and adulthood earnings. There is a tradeoff between delay-
ing childbirth to provide a more secure economic environment for mother and child
versus the potential negative biological consequences for a child of having an older
parent. I quantify this tradeoff. The results indicate that a five-year decrease in the
maternal age of educated women, ceteris paribus, results in over 0.50 std increase in
the childs skill level due to an increase in the childs ability to acquire skills. However,
if one adjusts child investment according to individuals wage profile conditional on
reduced maternal age, the average childs skill level decreases by 0.07 std. This reduc-
tion in childrens skill highlights the impact of lower inputs that children of younger
mothers receive. The negative effect of foregone wages may be reduced through policy
approaches. My policy analysis indicates implementing a two-year maternity leave
policy that freezes mothers wages at the level before childbirth would reduce average
maternal age at the first birth by about two years, while also increasing the average
childs skill level by about 0.22 std and future earnings by over 6%.
In chapter two, I study the impact of females’ perceptions regarding their future
fertility behavior on their human capital investments and labor market outcomes.
I exploit a natural experiment to study the causal effect of fertility anticipation on
individual’s investments in human capital. I use the arguably exogenous variation in
gender mix of children as an exogenous shock to the probability of further fertility. I
document that having two children of the same gender is associated with about 5%
lower wages for the mother compared to having two children of the opposite sexes.
Mothers with same-sex children perceive themselves as more likely to bear one more
i
child, and so less attached to the labor market, so invest less in human capital, and
this is reflected in wages today.
ii
To my family.
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Chapter 1
CHILDHOOD INVESTMENTS, ABILITY, AND ENDOGENOUS MATERNAL
AGE
1.1 Introduction
A remarkable change in the age of motherhood has occurred gradually in American
society, as well as in other developed countries, over the last four decades: the trend
is to postpone childbirth until a later age. In the US, the mean age of mothers at
first birth has steadily increased from 21.4 years in 1970 to 26.6 years in 2016 (OECD
(2018)).
One reason for this trend is the increase in female labor supply.1 Postponing child-
birth allows females to build human capital, which has returns in the labor market
and presumably in investing in children. There is an extensive literature in economics
emphasizing the role of parental investment in child outcomes (Del Boca et al. (2013);
Cunha et al. (2010)).2 Since parental financial resources increase with parental age
(Powell et al. (2006)), mothers who delay parenthood will have more financial abil-
ity to invest in the childhood of their children.3 Thus, children might benefit from
1Womens returns to experience have increased significantly since the 1970s (Blau
and Kahn (1997) and Olivetti (2006)), and the labor force participation rate for US
women has increased from 33.8% in 1950 to 56.7% in 2015 (OECD (2018)). There has
been also a dramatic increase in married womens hours of labor market work during
that period (Olivetti (2006)). Caucutt et al. (2002) argue that increasing returns to
labor market experience have led highly-educated women to delay their fertility and
take advantage of stronger prospects in both labor and marriage markets.
2Also see Dahl and Lochner (2012) for the role of family income; Blau (1999) for a
more conservative estimate of the effect of family income on children’s outcomes; and
Cooper et al. (2013) for a literature review on the relationship between household
financial resources and childrens outcomes.
3It is a well-known fact that the real wage of individuals increases over the life-
1
being born at a later maternal age. However, there are potential negative conse-
quences of postponement on child outcomes. Namely, the risks of Down syndrome,
childhood cancer, and autism increase with the maternal age (Durkin et al. (2008);
Johnson et al. (2009), Yip et al. (2006)), as does the risk of a low birthweight infant
(Restrepo-Me´ndez et al. (2015); Goisis and Sigle-Rushton (2014)). Delayed mother-
hood is associated with higher risk of diabetes in the child (Byrnes (2001); Cardwell
et al. (2009)). Older maternal age is also associated with mental retardation that
occurs in the absence of Down syndrome but accompanied by other neurological con-
ditions that affect the central nervous system, such as epilepsy, cerebral palsy, or birth
defects (Tearne (2015); Yeargin-Allsopp et al. (1995); Drews et al. (1995)). Postpon-
ing childbirth is also associated with reduced intelligence in the child (Bacharach and
Baumeister (1998)).
Thus, women face a crucial trade-off when deciding at which age to bear a child:
on the one hand, postponement of childbirth is beneficial to their children because
individuals receive higher wages as they accumulate human capital, which means
women will have more resources to invest in their children at later ages. On the
other hand, postponing childbearing might have a negative impact on the child, as
described above. Women have to balance these positive and negative effects when
deciding on the timing of childbirth and their subsequent investments. In this paper,
I develop a life-cycle model and estimate it using data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), which provides information on the parents decisions on the timing
of fertility, labor supply, and child investments as well as data on childs outcomes. I
cycle, at least for the first half of the work-life-cycle. The life-cycle wage profile is
usually hump-shaped with a maximum at around age forty (Che´ron et al. (2013)).
Theoretically, individuals accumulate human capital through work experience (learn-
ing by doing), and this leads to an increasing wage profile (see Polachek et al. (2008)
for a theoretical framework, and Lagakos et al. (2018) for an empirical cross-country
study).
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estimate my mixed-integer stochastic dynamic programming model using the method
of simulated moments. First, the model is solved by backward induction given a set
of parameters. Then, it is simulated for individuals over their life cycle. I define
a set of moments that capture the relationships between different variables in the
sample. These moments can be computed for both simulated and observed data.
Model parameters are chosen such that simulated moments replicate data moments.
Using the estimated model, I analyze both negative and positive potential impacts
of postponed childbirth on a childs skill level and investigate the extent to which
negative effects can be compensated for by additional parental investment during
childhood. I further conduct policy counterfactual analyses to evaluate the impact
on child development of implementing a maternity leave policy in the US.
Investment in the child has at least two components: child goods (money in-
vestment) and the time that the mother spends with the child (time investment).
There is a trade-off between the two; the more hours the mother spends with her
child, the fewer hours she can work, and the less financial resources she has for child
goods. However, the trade-off between money investment and time investment has
a dynamic nature due to the mothers wage life-cycle; as her wage increases, the set
of feasible pairs of time and money investments expands. Thus, a mother can make
more investments of both types by delaying her motherhood. Moreover, the trade-
off between the two types of investments is endogenous; the individuals wage profile
depends on her human capital stock, and the human capital accumulation process is
determined by intertemporal labor supply decisions. Females fertility decisions might
affect their participation in the labor market, as they need to make time investments
in their children after childbirth, and it might negatively impact their human capital
accumulation (future wages). Lower future wages lead to lower capacity for both
their own consumption and child goods expenditures. Hence, the timing of fertility
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and decisions concerning child investments and labor supply are endogenously and
intertemporally determined.
In order to study the dynamics of child development and the role of maternal
age in this process, it is necessary to endogenize all of the individuals decisions on
the timing of fertility, labor supply, leisure, consumption, and child investments. My
model builds on a rich history of dynamic life-cycle models.4 In this model, an
individuals human capital stock determines the wage evolution over her life-cycle.5
In each period, individuals make labor supply decisions and might increase their
stock of human capital by working in that period. They also decide on the timing of
childbirth and receive utility from the skill levels of their children. If a woman decides
to conceive a child in a particular period, she has to drop out of the labor force for that
period. Thus, the opportunity cost of having a child is higher in early periods because
of the forgone human capital that could have been accumulated through working in
that period, loss of which will affect her wages in all subsequent periods (Imai and
Keane (2004)). Moreover, the opportunity cost of having a child is higher for highly-
educated women because of higher forgone wages. When a child is born, the woman
chooses to optimally allocate her time among leisure, work, and childcare, and to
allocate her money between consumption and expenditure on the child. If she has a
4See Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) for a dynamic life-cycle model of female labor
supply; Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) for a discrete choice model of fertility, labor
supply, and wages; and Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Lee (2005) for a dynamic life-
cycle model of occupational choice, education, and labor supply for men. My work
is also related to that of Imai and Keane (2004), Heckman et al. (1999), and Shaw
(1989) who developed a life-cycle model of labor supply, consumption, and human
capital accumulation. Also see Attanasio et al. (2008) for a life-cycle model of female
labor force participation and savings. Finally, see Hotz and Miller (1988), Gayle
et al. (2006), and Sheran (2007) for a life-cycle model of female labor supply and
fertility. None of the studies mentioned here, however, considered the dynamics of
child development.
5See Wmann (2003) and Folloni and Vittadini (2010) for a summary of extant
studies on the effect of human capital on wage.
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child earlier in her life-cycle, the child is more likely to have higher productivity in
acquiring skills, but the net present value of forgone wages is higher, which indicates
that there would be fewer resources available to invest in the child to increase the
childs skill level. This trade-off leads more-educated women to have children later in
their life-cycles.6
My estimation results show a negative effect of advanced maternal age at childbirth
on the child’s productivity. I find that, everything else constant, lowering maternal
age of educated women by five years increases the average child’s skill level by about
11% (0.50 std), and 15% (0.24 std) increase in the child’s future earnings due to a
higher child’s ability to acquire skills. However, if I adjust child investment according
to individuals’ wage profile conditional on reduced maternal age, the average child’s
skill level decreases by 1.6%. This reduction in children’s skill highlights the impact
of lower inputs that children of younger mothers receive from their parents due to the
wage life-cycle implied by a lower maternal age.
The negative effect of foregone wages may be reduced through policy approaches
such as maternity leave. Implementing a nationwide maternity leave policy has been
the subject of heated debate among both policymakers and researchers in the US,
in part because the United States is an outlier in maternity leave provision (Rossin-
Slater (2017a)). The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) entitles eligible workers
to take only 12 weeks of unpaid parental leave, a short period of time compared
to most other developed countries; for instance, Germany and France have three-
year maternity leave periods.7 Previous studies have investigated the impacts of
maternity leave policies on fertility rate, the mothers labor market outcomes, and the
6They face other trade-offs as well: conceiving a child earlier means lower oppor-
tunity cost for every hour spent with the child instead of working due to lower wages
at early stages of the work-life-cycle.
7Klerman et al. (2012) reports that only 60% of workers in the US were eligible for
the FMLA in 2012.
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childs health (Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009); Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck (2014); Rossin
(2011)). However, the potential impacts of maternity leave policies on the timing of
birth and child development, have not been investigated. My policy analysis indicates
that implementing a two-year maternity leave policy under which the mothers wage is
frozen at its pre-pregnancy level lowers the mean maternal age by about two years and
increases the mean childs test score by about 5% (0.22 std). This increase in mean
child skills is due to both higher productivity (better health status) as a result of the
reduction in maternal age and an increase in child investments as a result of the lower
wage penalty following childbirth. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the
change in the mean test score of children translates to an increase of about a 6.6%
(0.10 std) in their future earnings. With regard to the impacts of maternity leave
policies on mothers’ labor market outcomes, the predictions of my simulation analysis
are in line with the findings of a handful of papers that have investigated the impacts
of six weeks of paid leave in California on labor market outcomes (Rossin-Slater
(2017b); Baum (2003)). My policy analysis shows that implementing a two-year paid
maternity leave policy that freezes wages to the level before the leave would increase
the labor force participation of educated and non-educated mothers of six-year-old
children by about 20% and 34%, respectively.
I also study the impacts of implementing a childcare subsidy program on mothers
and children. My policy analysis indicates that although subsidizing childcare services
does not significantly change the maternal age, it can significantly increase the human
capital of both mothers and children. My analysis suggests that under a free childcare
program, the labor force participation of educated and non-educated women would
increase by about 45% and 40%, respectively. This finding is remarkably close to the
finding of Barros et al. (2011), who evaluate the causal impact of a childcare program
on the maternal labor market outcomes taking advantage of a lottery carried by the
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municipal government in 2007 in Brazil.
This is the first study to investigate the effects of timing of birth on childrens
cognitive development while taking into account the impacts of endogenous parental
investments in children. Researchers have generally focused on the effects of different
types of investments on the childs skill level. In their models, the life-cycle generally
starts when a child is born. They take the timing of childbirth as a given and study
how the childs cognitive ability react to monetary investments, the time that parents
spend with their children, childcare usage, and other inputs received from parents.
Cunha and Heckman (2008) emphasize the importance of investments during child-
hood and show that investments made in the early years are more important than
those made in later years. Del Boca et al. (2013) argue that parents time inputs are
more productive for their childrens cognitive development than money expenditures.
However, if one does not take into account the impact of maternal age, her estimate
of child’s skill formation technology might be misleading. To estimate the impact of
child investments on child’s skill level, researchers use the variations in children’s test
scores and child investments. Older parents tend to to have more resources to invest
in their children, however, part of these greater investments only compensate for the
negative effect of a later childbirth. Hence, by overlooking the impact of maternal
age, one might underestimate the impact of investments on the child’s skill level. I
”correct” previous estimates of investment’s impact by endogenizing the timing of
birth and taking maternal-age effect into account.
Current child development models cannot evaluate the role of mother’s age at
childbirth on their child’s skill level, as current literature neglects the maternal age
effect. Despite this, some studies have assessed the effect of parents’ age at childbirth
on the child’s skill level through a reduced-form approach (Goisis et al. (2017); Leigh
and Gong (2010); Barclay and Myrskyla¨ (2016)). The problem is that, though these
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researchers try to control confounding factors by adding explanatory variables such
as parental characteristics such as education or income, they overlook the time and
monetary investments that parents make in their children (and the fact that these in-
vestments are endogenous with respect to parental age); thus, the estimates from their
models might be impacted by the positive selection to delayed parenthood. Overlook-
ing child investments might lead a researcher to underestimate the magnitude of the
negative maternal age effect. Older parents tend to invest more in their children due
to greater parental resources, and there is a dynamic complementarity between child
investments and child’s skill in producing the next period’s skills. My simulation
experiment shows that neglecting such child investments leads one to significantly
underestimate the magnitude of the negative health impacts of greater maternal age
on child outcomes. In this paper, I address this problem by taking into account both
mother’s age at childbirth and investments made by parents in the child. Moreover,
I improve upon the reduced-form approach used in previous papers by decomposing
the negative and positive effects of delaying childbearing on the child’s outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data for the empirical
work, provides some descriptive statistics, and presents suggestive evidence concern-
ing the impact of postponement of childbirth on child outcomes. Section 3 describes
the model. Section 4 discusses some estimation issues. Section 5 presents the esti-
mation results. Section 6 analyzes the effects of some counterfactual policies, and
section 7 provides the conclusions. Details on the model and supplementary results
are presented in the Supplementary Appendix.
1.2 Maternal Age and Child Development: Reduced-form Evidence
In this section, after describing the datasets that I use, I show some evidence
obtained using reduced- form regressions for the role of the mothers age at childbirth
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in determining the childs skill level and also the physical characteristics of the child.
1.2.1 Data
Throughout this paper, I utilize the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
combined with its four Child Development Supplements (CDS), and five Transition
into Adulthood Supplements (TAS). PSID is a longitudinal household survey. The
study began in 1968 with a nationally representative sample of over 18,000 individuals
in about 5,000 families in the US. PSID provides researchers with panel data on
education, marriage, wealth, employment, income, health, expenditures, childbearing,
and child development of the initial sample of individuals and their descendents. The
CDS includes data on children and their extended families, which can be used to
study the dynamics of human capital formation in children. Specifically, CDS collects
extensive child-specific developmental data. The first wave of CDS in 1997 included
up to two children per household who were between zero to twelve years old. These
children were followed over three waves, ending in 2013-14. The CDS sample size
in 1997 was approximately 3,500 children in 2,400 households. The first follow-up
study, i.e. CDS-II, was conducted in 2002-03, when the children were between the
ages of eight and 18. The next follow-up survey with these children, i.e. CDS-III,
was conducted in 2007-08. No new children were added to the study until 2013-2014
(Hofferth et al. (1997)). In 2014, CDS was conducted with a new sample including all
children in PSID households aged 0-17 years, with a sample size of 4333. The other
supplement to the PSID, i.e. the Transition into Adulthood Supplements (TAS), is a
follow-up survey of the original CDS children that was conducted when those children
reached adulthood, i.e. age 18. TAS was initiated in 2005. Hence, in the first wave
of TAS, the oldest CDS respondents were 18 to 20 years of age. TAS continued to
follow up the CDS sample in their adulthood in 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015.
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I use PSID and CDS, which provide me with data on children and their family
characteristics, and include information on parents’ investments in their children. I
use the childrens test scores on Letter-Word (LW) Identification test as a measure of
child skill levels. The LW test is a subset of the Woodcock-Johnson Revised (WJ-
R) test of achievement. LW test aims to measure reading identification abilities of
children (Woodcock and Johnson (1989)). This measure of skill level has been used by
previous papers in the literature (see Del Boca et al. (2016)). With the TAS dataset,
I link each childs LW test score to their future educational attainment and wages,
and show that the LW test score has a predictive power for the future educational
attainment and wages of the child and therefore is a relevant measure of the child’s
skill, at least with respect to future educational attainment and wages.
1.2.2 Mother’s Age at First Birth (AFB)
Figure (1.1) shows the distribution of mothers age at first childbirth (AFB) for
non-college graduates and college graduates. A great deal of variation exists with
respect to mothers age at first birth, both among educated and less-educated females.
It is also clear that college graduates, on average, tend to have their first child at a later
age; both mean age and median age at first birth increase with the mothers education
level. While the median age for mothers with at most a high school education is 21,
it increases to 28 for those with a graduate degree. Furthermore, while the fraction of
mothers who conceived their first child after age 27 is 0.13 and 0.21 for mothers with
fewer than 12 and 12 years of schooling, respectively, it increases to 0.47 and 0.59 for
college graduates and women with a graduate degree, respectively.8 For the purpose
8Table (A.2) in the Supplementary Appendix reports the mother’s mean age and
median age at first childbirth for different education levels.
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of this model, I focus on women who did not conceive a child before age 18.9,10
Table (1.1) reports summary statistics for the subsample selected for the empir-
ical work.11 On average, college graduates have their first child later compared to
non-college graduates. College graduates also have higher mean hourly wage, mean
husbands hourly wage, and mean hours of market work. They also spend more time
with their children, and their children outperform the children of non-college gradu-
ates in terms of LW test scores.
1.2.3 Mother’s Age at First Birth and Child Outcomes
Using the PSID dataset, I provide some evidence on the impact of mother’s age
at birth on the following child’s outcomes: (1) the probability of a low birthweight
infant, (2) the child’s skill level, and (3) child investments.12
Mother’s Age at Birth and the Risk of Low Birthweight (LBW)
Note that birthweight is a child outcome that occurs immediately after birth and is not
impacted by later parental investments. Therefore, I use birthweight data to identify
an immediate effect of maternal age on child outcomes. Using the PSID dataset, I
examine the role of mothers age at childbirth on the probability of low birthweight
(LBW) of the child. LBW infants face many complications in their lives, some of
9In my dataset, about 90 percent of women did not conceive a child before age 18.
10Figure (A.1) in the Supplementary Appendix shows the distribution of the
mother’s age at first childbirth for the subsample selected for the estimation (women
who have not conceived their first child before age 18). Figure (A.2) in the Supple-
mentary Appendix shows the distribution of completed years of schooling for the same
subsample against the alternative group (women who had their first child before the
age of 18). It shows that women who conceived a child before age 18 are, on average,
less-educated than those who did not.
11Table (A.1) in the Supplementary Appendix reports summary statistics for the
full sample, which are similar to those of the selected subsample.
12According to the World Health Organization (WHO), an infant is low birthweight
if it weighs less than 2,500 grams (5 pounds, 8 ounces) at birth (WHO (2014)).
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which persist into adult life. LBW infants are more likely to suffer from weaknesses
in attention and hyperactivity, anxiety and depression, and poor social skills (Hack
et al. (2009)). These behavioral complications affect the cognitive outcomes of LBW
infants. Ribeiro et al. (2011) reports attention problems and language development
in LBW children, while Conley and Bennett (2000) reports that a LBW child is
substantially less likely to graduate from high school by age 19; specifically, the
probability of graduation is reduced by 74 percent, as compared with his or her
siblings.
Table (1.2) reports the result of a linear probability regression of LBW on mothers
age while controlling for child gender, race, year fixed-effects, mothers education level,
paternal age at delivery, marital status, and family income. In order to capture a
potential non-linear relationship between maternal age and the probability of LBW, I
consider two specifications: first, a linear specification, and second, a quadratic form
in which I add the square of maternal age as an additional regressor. Columns 1
and 2 of Table (1.2) present the linear and quadratic regression results, respectively,
before controlling for family income. Columns 3 and 4 report the results when also
controlling for family income at delivery. Both the first and the second power of
the mothers age at delivery are significant at the five percent level. These results
suggest that the risk of LBW in infants with respect to maternal age at delivery
can be represented by both a U-shaped and a linear-shaped relationship.13 There
is a higher probability of LBW associated with adolescent pregnancy. Meanwhile,
there is also a higher risk associated with delaying motherhood for most maternal
13The results still might be driven by selection based on unobservables, so I will be
cautious in their interpretation. Figure (A.3) in the Supplementary Appendix depicts
a binned scatterplot showing the U-shaped association between LBW and maternal
age. The left part of the curve might be due to selection, as adolescent childbearing
is concentrated among teenagers of low-income families, and low-income youth are at
higher risk for nutrition problems that increase the risk of LBW.
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ages, and this risk increases as the mothers age increases. Delaying pregnancy by
one additional year is associated with about 0.47 to 0.60 percentage points higher
risk of LBW (5 to 7 percent, compared to mean).14 I also could use the variation
in maternal ages between siblings to investigate the impacts of maternal age on the
risk of LBW. Table (A.3) in the Supplementary Appendix shows the results of a fixed
effect regression, in which the variation in maternal ages between sibling is used to
estimate the impact of the mother’s age at birth on the risk of LBW. The results
are similar to the linear regression model of Table (A.3); delaying pregnancy by one
additional year is associated with about 0.66 percentage points higher risk of LBW.
One might be concerned that this result is driven by LBW deliveries occurring
above the age of 35, in which case the result would be misleading because there are
no differences between maternal ages 20-25 and 25-30. To address this concern, I
repeated the probability regression of LBW on mothers age with dummy variables
representing five-year bins for the mothers age at first birth as follows: ages 15-20,
ages 25-30, ages 30-35, ages 35-40, ages 40-45, and ages 45-50. Maternal ages between
20 and 25 were omitted, as this group provides the baseline for comparisons. Table
(1.3) reports the results of this regression. The hypothesis that the previous regression
results were driven by LBW at extreme maternal ages is rejected. Instead, the results
suggest that an increase in maternal age from 20-25 to 25-30 is associated with a 4.3
percentage point (58%) increase in the risk of LBW.
One might also be concerned that the above-mentioned regression results are
driven by selection based on the socioeconomic status. Table (1.4) reports the same
regression analysis as before, but this time utilizing within-group variation in moth-
ers age at delivery and the LBW status of her child. Panel A of Table (1.4) shows
14Table (A.4) reports the results when I do not deal with the issue of missing data
on incomes.
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that when considering the relationship between maternal age at delivery and the risk
of LBW within educational strata, there remains a significant positive relationship
between maternal age and LBW. The best fit for non-college graduates is a U-shaped
specification, while the best fit for college graduates is a linear one.15 Figure (1.2) sep-
arately shows the predicted probability of LBW at each maternal age for non-college
graduates and college graduates, based on coefficients from the regression results of
Panel A in Table (1.4). The predicted probability of LBW increases with maternal
age for both groups, but is lower for college graduates, which might be due to better
average health status among that group. Panel B of Table (1.4) shows that a similar
pattern occurs when investigating the relationship within family income levels.16
In addition, I observe a negative association between infant birthweight and the
mothers age at birth. These results are reported in the Supplementary Appendix.17
I furthermore provide in the Supplementary Appendix, a brief literature review on
the effect of mothers age at delivery on the childs intelligence, risk of Down syndrome,
risk of any chromosomal abnormality, and risk of autism.
15Figures (A.4) and (A.5) in the Supplementary Appendix depict binned scatterplots
assuming quadratic and linear associations between LBW and maternal age within
education levels, respectively. Tables (A.5) and (A.6) provide the regression results
from quadratic and linear forms, respectively.
16Tables (A.5) and (A.6) provide the regression results for quadratic and linear
forms, respectively. Figures (A.6) and (A.7) in the Supplementary Appendix depict
the binned scatterplots assuming quadratic and linear associations between LBW
and maternal age within income levels, respectively. For the above-median income
families, the relationship tends to be an upward linear trend instead of U-shaped.
This might suggest that the left part of the U-shaped curve in previous figures is due
to selection into adolescent pregnancy based on income, as most teenage pregnancies
occur among low-income families.
17Table (A.7) and Figure (A.8) in the Supplementary Appendix show the relation-
ship between maternal age and the natural logarithm of the child’s birthweight while
controlling for the same set of variables used in previous regressions for the risk of
LBW. The results suggest a negative association between birthweight and maternal
age. See Black et al. (2007) for the impacts of birthweight on adulthood outcomes.
14
Mother’s Age at Birth and Child’s Skill Level
To investigate the impacts of AFB on child skill level, I use a linear specification as
follows:
Yi,tk = β1age
p
i + γZi,tk + αWi + ui,tk ≡ BXi,tk + ui,tk , (1.1)
where Yi,tk is the child outcome of interest for family i at child’s age t
k, agepi is the
maternal age at first birth for family i, β1 is the coefficient of interest, Wi is a vector of
child fixed-effect controls such as gender and race; Zi,tk is a vector of family controls
such as the mother’s education, father’s age at childbirth, mother’s marital status,
and family income; and E(u|X) = 0.
The first column of Table (1.5) shows the result of OLS regressions of the log test
score of the first child on the mother’s age at childbirth using only data from one-
child families.18 The first column reports the regression result when I control only
for the child’s age; i.e. age-specific dummy variables are used to control for the effect
of the childs age on their test score. The coefficient of the mothers age is positive,
but statistically insignificant. The second and third columns present the results when
controlling for other confounding factors: the mothers and fathers education, and
the mothers and fathers wages, respectively. After controlling for the mothers and
fathers education, the coefficient of interest becomes negative (changing from 0.001
to -0.005). When controlling for additional confounding factors, the coefficient of
the mother’s age at childbirth becomes greater in absolute value; the coefficient of
18Regression results including all families are reported in the Supplementary Ap-
pendix. Here, I restrict the sample to one-child families to avoid any sibling effects
and/or parental skill effects. For a given mother, parental skills might be different
when rearing the first child vs the second one. Mothers can accumulate parental skills
by ”practicing” parenthood when rearing the first child. Duncan et al. (2018), using a
reduced-form approach, find that each additional year of delaying a second childbirth
after the first one is associated with a 0.02 to 0.04 standard deviation increase in
school achievement of the second child, which might be due to accumulating parent-
ing skills over the first child. However, it also might be due to increasing parental
resources over the mother’s age.
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interest changes to -0.014, and it is statistically significant at 5%.19 This suggests
that postponing motherhood for one additional year is on average associated with a
1.4 percent decrease in the childs test score, ceteris paribus.20
Note, however, that the estimate presented in Tables (1.5) are biased. If we have
omitted variables that contribute to the effect of the mothers age at childbirth on
the childs skill levelsuch as parental investments in the childand if these variables
are correlated with the mothers age at childbirth, then estimates of the reduced-form
OLS regressions will be biased. For example, if older parents spend more hours with
their children, then under the maintained assumption that these time investments
positively impact the childs skill level, the omitted variable bias causes the coefficient
of interest in Table (1.5) to be underestimated (in terms of magnitude). In what
follows, I show some evidence that the omitted variables are in fact correlated with
the mothers age at childbirth.
Mother’s Age at Birth and Child Investments
One approach to demonstrating the relationship between mothers age at childbirth
and the amount of time she invests in her child is to regress the time spent by the
mother with her first child on age at first birth and determine whether the coefficient
19In Table (1.5), I keep the number of observations fixed across regressions in dif-
ferent columns. Alternatively, I could utilize all observations in all regressions in
different columns. In that case, going from the first column to the last, the number of
observations declines as I add more confounding factors. This is because of missing
observations on wages when a mother does not work in a given period. Table (A.8)
in the Supplementary Appendix shows the mentioned alternative regression results.
There might be a concern regarding selection due to the missing data on mothers’
wages, so I prefer to keep the number of observations fixed across different regressions.
Tables (A.9) and (A.10) report the regression results if I also include households with
more than one child (so sibling effects might exist), when the number of observations
are fixed and when the number of observations varies, respectively.
20In other words, delaying childbearing for one more year is on average associated
with 1
70
standard deviation decrease in the child’s test score.
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is positive. I use the weekly number of hours that the mother spends with her child
as the dependent variable. Table (1.6) reports the result of this regression. As the
first column shows, the coefficient of the mothers age at childbirth is 0.22; it is both
positive and statistically significant at 1% after I control for race, the childs age, and
family size. As I control for the mothers education in the second column, and for the
mothers wage and hours of market work in the last column, the coefficient of interest
does not change significantly; it slightly decreases to 0.19 and remains significant at
the 1% level.21,22
These results show that there is a systematic relationship between time invest-
ment in children and the mother’s age at childbirth. This might suggest that it is
important to simultaneously model the timing of fertility and the investments made
by parents during the childhood, as these two factors are both related to each other
and important with respect to the childs skill formation.
In the next section, I develop a structural model that enables me to investigate
the role of childbearing age in the child’s skill formation.
1.3 Model
In this section, I develop a life-cycle model that will be used in my empirical work.
Note that I model the problem from the woman’s perspective. Each individual lives
until age 60 (so she lives for 42 years within the model). The model assumes that
21Given the five-year gap between the childbearing ages of educated and non-
educated women, the results of the above regression can be translated as follows:
a simple calculation shows that, everything else constant, the time that an educated
woman actively spends with her first child during their childhood, is on average 750
hours more than for a non-educated woman. (For this calculation, we assume that
the development phase of children takes 15 years.) Note that time investments are
very important for developing the child’s cognitive ability, as argued by Del Boca
et al. (2013), so I expect that this substantial difference in time investment between
older parents (educated women) and younger parents (non-educated women) make a
remarkable difference in terms of child’s skill level.
22I keep the number of observations fixed through all regressions in Table (1.6).
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a women can conceive a child until age 40, and she becomes infertile thereafter.23
Each individual decides whether or not to have a child and the timing of childbirth,
and she can have only one child. When a child is born, parents make human capital
investments in the child over each period during the childs developmental phase. The
developmental phase in this model begins when a child is born and lasts for M(= 16)
years.24 Therefore, parents invest in their child for the first “M” years of the childs
life. At age 17, the child leaves her parents and becomes independent. I model this
problem as a finite horizon problem with discrete time, and each period in the model
equals a year.
It is worth mentioning that I do not model the educational decisions of (potential)
mothers here. However, I consider their educational decisions as exogenous in my
analysis, and assume that if she chooses to continue her education in college, then
she will remain in college for four years and will not conceive a child until age 22.
1.3.1 Timing of Events
The initial condition is as follows: the model considers women with no child at age
18 (I do not model adolescent pregnancy) who have already decided whether or not
to continue their education in college.25 A fraction of these individuals are married,
the rest are single, and the probability of being married depends on the educational
decision, i.e. whether to go to college or not.26 Furthermore, they have no work
23According to the data, less than half a percent of mothers conceived their first
child after age 40.
24I use the Letter-Word (LW) identification test score as a measure of the child’s
skill level. I have the children’s LW test scores up to age 18. However, it seems that
LW test scores in the dataset do not significantly change after age 16. Thus, I assume
the development stage lasts for 16 years. Similarly, Del Boca et al. (2013) assume
development stage of 15 years.
25According to the data, less than 10% of mothers conceived their first child before
age 18.
26This probability is set according to the data.
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experience.
At the beginning of each period, first, exogenous shocks to marital status are
realized. With some probability, single women may get married and married women
may get divorced; these probabilities depend on current marital status, the woman’s
age and education level, and the presence of children.27 Next, nonlabor income shock
and wage shock are realized. Both of these shocks are exogenous and i.i.d. across
individuals and over time.
After observing these two shocks, if a woman is fertile and not in college, she
decides whether or not to try to conceive a child. If she tries, then with probability
pii,t, she becomes pregnant and will be out of the labor force for at least one period
(current period). The probability of getting pregnant, pii,t, depends on the woman’s
age, t. I also allow for conception error: she faces a probability λ(s) of getting
pregnant whether she intends to or not, where s denotes the woman’s education
level. Then, if she is not pregnant, she chooses her labor supply. After employment
status is established, she decides about consumption, leisure, and if there is a child
whose age is under M years, also about child expenditures and the time to spend with
the child. Figure (1.3) shows the timing of events in period t.
1.3.2 Utilities
I assume that utility is intertemporally separable, and the instantaneous utility
is separable in consumption and leisure (see Del Boca et al. (2013)).28 The utility
of a woman in period “t,” ui,t, is derived from household consumption, c
HH
i,t , and the
amount of leisure time, li,t. If a child exists at the beginning of period “t,” then the
27See Klaauw (1996), Keane and Wolpin (2010), Francesconi (2002), and Adda et al.
(2013) for studies that endogenize marriage decisions in a life-cycle model of female
labor supply. They do not model child development, however.
28See Blundell et al. (2016a) for an intertemporally separable but instantaneously
not separable utility function in consumption and leisure.
19
woman also has utility from her childs skill level, ki,t. The women’s age is indexed
by “t.” I assume a log linear utility function; hence, when no child exists, utility is
defined over consumption and leisure as follows:
u0(cHHi,t , li,t) = α1log(c
HH
i,t ) + α2log(li,t),
As stated before, when a child exists, the woman also has a utility derived from her
child’s skill level. I assume that when the developmental phase is done (i.e. after the
first “M+1” periods of the child’s life), the child leaves her home and begins the next
stage of her development. Thus, the flow utility derived from the child’s skill level
after the child leaves home is discounted by a multiplier φ, which is a free parameter
to be estimated. Therefore, I have the following utility when a child exists:
u1(cHHi,t , li,t, ki,t, t
k) = α1log(c
HH
i,t ) + α2log(li,t)
+ α3[Ii,tk≤M log(ki,t) + φ(1− Ii,tk≤M)log(ki,M+1)],
where Ii,tk≤M is an indicator variable equal to one if the child’s age is less than M ,
and zero otherwise. I normalize the impact factors, i.e, α’s, such that
∑3
j=1 αj = 1.
Therefore, a woman receives the following (flow) utility at period t:
u(cHHi,t , li,t, ki,t, bbi,t, t
k) = bbi,tu
1(cHHi,t , li,t, kt, i, t
k) + (1− bbi,t)u0(cHHi,t , li,t), (1.2)
where bbi,t is is an indicator variable equal to one if there exists a child at the beginning
of the period t and zero otherwise, and uj(.) is defined in the previous equations
∀j = 0, 1.
1.3.3 Child’s Skill Formation
Let tk denote the child’s age. I assume that the child’s skill level at tk + 1, ki,tk+1
is produced by the current level of the child’s skill, ki,tk ; the time that the mother
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actively spends with the child, τi,tk ; and the money investment in the child, ei,tk . I
use a Cobb-Douglas functional form to specify the child’s skill formation:
ki,tk+1 = f(Ri,tk , τi,tk , ei,tk , ki,tk) = Ri,tkk
γ
1,tk
i,tk
τ
γ
2,tk
i,tk
e
γ
3,tk
i,tk
, (1.3)
where Ri,tk is a function of the mother’s age at birth and innate ability, and the child’s
age; i.e. Ri,tk = g(age
p
i , IQ
p
i , t
k). I use the following functional form to specify the
relationship between the child’s productivity and her mother’s characteristics:
log(Ri,tk) = log(Atk) + 1(age
p
i ) + 2(age
p
i )
2 + 3(IQ
p
i ) + υi,tk , (1.4)
In this specification, agepi is the mother’s age at childbirth; 1 and 2 together
define the effect of maternal age at delivery on the productivity factor; IQi is the
mothers innate ability; and 3 captures the effect of the mothers innate ability on
the productivity factor. Finally, υi,tk is the productivity shock, which I assume is
i.i.d. N(0, σ2R). I use a Cobb-Douglas functional form to specify the skill formation
technology. Other empirical studies have used linear, constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) or Cobb-Douglass functional forms to specify the child’s skill production
function (see for example Cunha and Heckman (2008), Bernal (2008), Del Boca et al.
(2013), and Lken et al. (2012)). I do not use a linear functional form for two reasons.
First, it imposes the restriction that early and late investments are perfect substitutes;
and second, I want to allow the inputs to interact in producing the output.
Assuming a log-linear production function would help make a complicated problem
more tractable. Nonetheless, I also use the Cobb-Douglas functional form to specify
the production function; this enables me to get closed-form solutions for expenditures
and time investments in the child. However, note that choosing a Cobb-Douglas func-
tional form to specify the childs skill production function, in combination with the
log linear utility function, implies that time and monetary investments are indepen-
dent of the childs skill level. This might not be true in reality; parents may consider
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the childs skill level when making decisions about human capital investment in their
children.
I do not use a linear function to specify the productivity term because, based
on the medical evidence, the marginal effect of the mothers age at childbirth on the
childs innate ability might not be constant; instead, the marginal detrimental effect
of maternal age may be higher as maternal age increases.
I model the effect of the parents age at childbirth on the childs innate ability by
including the parents age in the productivity term. Indeed, I assume that human
capital corresponds to any stock of knowledge, experience, and skills but has nothing
directly to do with innate ability.
One might expect that including other regressors such as the mothers health status
might attenuate my estimate of the maternal age coefficient. First of all, the reduced
form regressions presented in the previous section suggest that maternal age plays a
role in the childs skill formation, and here, I aim to investigate that role. Hence, the
production function includes maternal age. Moreover, the results of Table 2 suggested
that adding more and more variables makes the coefficient of the maternal age greater
(in absolute value) and more precise. Note that I do not intend to (and do not need
to) exclude the effects of other factors that affect the childs productivity, as long as
these factors are driven by the mothers age or happen to occur as mothers get older.29
29As an example, consider the effect of the mothers health status on the childs
productivity, which is omitted in my specification. Suppose that the mothers health
status is negatively correlated with her age and might affect the childs productivity
in some way. Now, if health status were exacerbated as the mother grows old (for
example, some mutation might happen in the reproductive cells that negatively affects
the childs productivity, and of course, that mutation is positively correlated with the
mothers age), then I do want the coefficient of age in the productivity function to pick
up such effects of health as well. Note that the individual faces a trade-off between
childbearing versus continuing to participate in the labor market. As long as they
do not have the power to avoid such negative effects of delayed childbearing on child
outcomes, it is not important what factor actually makes older parents more likely to
have a child who might have lower productivity. Interpreting the age coefficient this
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1.3.4 Skills and Wages
Wages depend on education level and actual experience, which may depreciate
when out of work; the depreciation rate potentially depends on education level, as in
Blundell et al. (2016a).
I assume that individuals accumulate skills by working. For any given period,
if they work, then their skills will be increased by one unit. Therefore, I have the
following equation:
xi,t = xi,t−1 + Ihi,t≥h − (1− Ihi,t≥h)δs,txi,t−1, (1.5)
where xi,t denotes human capital, which, in this model, I assume to be the number of
(effective) years of work experience accumulated up to period t; Ihi,t≥h is an indicator
variable equal to one if the individual works at least h hours; and δs,t is the depreci-
ation rate of skills due to unemployment or career interruptions associated with the
years that the individual does not work, which I allow to depend on education level, s
(time invariant), and the woman’s age, t, at which she drops out of the labor market.
I allow the depreciation rate to depend on education level. This allows the model to
capture the fact that while out of the labor force, less-educated individuals with rou-
tine jobs may loose less than educated individuals in more skilled (abstract) jobs.30
I allow the depreciation rate to depend on the woman’s age because in the first few
years of the work-life-cycle, individuals might build their career, develop a network of
professional contacts, show their commitment to work, and improve their reputation;
way, I might leave the age effect as a black box; I do not know if it is because health
status becomes worse as people get older, because some mutations in genes are more
likely to happen as more time passes, et cetera. I am interested in investigating the
implications of this fact on both individuals decisions and child outcomes.
30I assume that the depreciation rate is constant across individuals. I know that
it might be different across occupations; some women might select into child-friendly
occupations, and the depreciation rate for skills might be lower in those occupations
(see for example Adda et al. (2017)). However, I do not focus on this issue here.
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thus work interruptions during this phase might have a detrimental, irreversible im-
pact on the individual’s human capital in its broad sense. In contrast, dropping out
of the labor market for one/a few years later in the work-life-cycle may have only a
mild negative impact on the individual’s human capital. The above-mentioned spec-
ification of human capital allows the impacts of work interruption to decrease during
the work-life-cycle, i.e. ∂δs,t
∂t
< 0. Finally, I assume that a lower bound is needed for
working hours in order to obtain an increase in the work experience of individuals. I
set h to correspond to working four hours per workday.31
Following the Mincerian approach, I assume that the wage offer received depends
on education level and skills. However, I specify the wage equations separately for
educated and non-educated females:
log(wi,t) = η0,s + η1,sxi,t + η2,sx
2
i,t + ω
s
i,t, s = H,C, (1.6)
where subscript s denotes the individual’s education level indicating non-college grad-
uates if it takes H, and college graduates if C; η0,s is a constant; ω
s
i,t is the log wage
shock, which is i.i.d. N(0, σ2w,s); and η1,s and η2,s define the return to work experience
for group s.
With the above-mentioned specification, I allow the return to experience to in-
crease with education and decrease with the level of work experience. As I assume
that if a woman decides to conceive a child, she has to drop out of the labor force
for one period, this specification implies that the opportunity cost of childbearing
is higher for more-educated women than for less-educated women. Moreover, the
31Indeed, h is the cut-off level for the lower bound of hours needed in every given
period in order to change the years of work experience effectively. Note that without
this threshold, the solution to labor supply is sometimes not well-defined because one
might work for an infinitesimal amount (that converges to zero) just to take advantage
of greater future wages through higher experience, so the solution does not exist. I
set h to 20 hours per week. I assume that to get one unit of experience, the individual
needs to work at least half as much as an average full-time worker.
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opportunity cost of conceiving a child might be higher at the beginning of the work-
life-cycle. The reason for the higher cost is that if a woman drops out of the labor
force for one period early in her working life, even though the forgone wage is rela-
tively low, her wages in all subsequent periods will be lower as a consequence of being
out of the labor force and not accumulating human capital.32
1.3.5 Marriage and Divorce
I do not model marriage and divorce in this paper as choices of individuals. In-
stead, I incorporate them in the model as exogenous events.33 I assume that the
probability of getting married, Πmi,t(agei,t, bbi,t, si), depends on woman’s age, the pres-
ence of children, and her education level. If an individual is married in a given period,
the probability of getting divorced, Πdi,t(agei,t, bbi,t, si), again depends on the woman’s
age, the presence of children, and the education level. I use data to estimate these
probabilities non-parametrically– i.e. I use the crude marriage (divorce) rates while
conditioning on marital status, the woman’s age and education level, and the presence
of children.34
1.3.6 Husband’s Earnings
I assume that the husband always works, so instead of his skill level, I use his
age as a determinant of the earning equation. His earnings also depend on the wife’s
education level. That is, I allow the model to have assortative mating based on
education level as observed in data (Chiappori et al. (2009)); hence, the spousal
32See Huggett et al. (2011) for heterogeneity in wage profiles, and Adda et al. (2013)
for specifying human capital accumulation based on hours of market work.
33Chiappori et al. (2002) analyze the impacts of the marriage market and divorce
legislation, which vary by state and over time, on household labor supply. Here, I
abstract this issue.
34I assume that marriage probability does not depend on the individual’s choices
such as labor supply decisions, nor on their years of work experience.
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earnings are as follows:
log(wspi,t) = η
sp
0,s + η
sp
1,sage
sp
i,t + η
sp
2,sage
sp
i,t
2 + ωs,spi,t , (1.7)
where subscript s denotes the wife’s education level indicating non-college graduates
if it takes H and college graduates if C; and ωs,spi,t is the wage shock, which is assumed
to be i.i.d. N(0, σs,spw
2).
1.3.7 Conception
Based on medical evidence, the probability of conception decreases with the
woman’s age. Rosenthal and Khatamee (2002) estimate that at age 20, a woman
has 90% chance of conceiving a child, but the probability declines to 70% at age 30,
6% at age 45, and almost zero after age 50. Therefore, I assume that in any given pe-
riod, if the woman decides to conceive a child, she does so with probability pit, where
t denotes the woman’s age. I assume that all women are capable of conceiving, but
allow the probability to decline with age (see Rosenthal and Khatamee (2002)).35 I
use the probability function estimated by Rosenthal and Khatamee (2002) to specify
pit; this function is depicted in Figure (A.9) in the Supplementary Appendix. More-
over, I allow for conception error because in reality, some pregnancies are unwanted.
This means that if a woman decides not to have a child in the next period, she still
faces a probability of getting pregnant. This probability depends on her education
level; it is λc if she is a college graduate and λh if she is a non-college graduate, where
λc and λh are free parameters to be estimated. For this estimation, I use data on
the fraction of unwanted live births in the US, conditional on the woman’s education
level, to recover λc and λh. Table (A.11) in the Supplementary Appendix provides
35I am aware that in the US, about 8% of women 15-29 years old have impaired
fecundity. Some of them, however, can conceive a child after treatment (Chandra
et al. (2005)).
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some information about pregnancy intention in the US between 2006 and 2010.
1.3.8 Nonlabor Income
For the nonlabor income process, because I see a large number of observations
with no nonlabor income in a given period, following Del Boca et al. (2013) I consider
nonlabor income a truncated version of a latent variable process in levels. Specifically,
I assume the following process to model the latent non-labor income in period t:
I∗i,t = µ
nonlb + ωnonlbi,t , (1.8)
where µnonlb is the mean and ωnonlbi,t is the disturbance term that is i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
nonlb).
36
The observed (actual) nonlabor income is as follows:37
Ii,t = max (0, I
∗
i,t). (1.9)
1.3.9 Childcare Costs
I assume that if a mother wants to participate in the labor market in a given
period, then the family should pay a fixed childcare cost equal to cc in that period
unless the child is school-age. I also assume that cost does not depend on hours of
36The estimates of the mean and standard deviation of this process for one-child
households are as follows: µnonlb = −14.12 and σnonlb = 376.16.
37I assume that if a woman gets pregnant unintentionally (note that in this model
women can conceive a child out of wedlock), and she is single (so has no husband’s
income), then she will receive a one-time transfer equal to “TR” in the period of
pregnancy. In this model, if a woman is single at period “t,” and the nonlabor income
in that period is zero, then she never chooses to intentionally become pregnant in that
period. This is because I assume logarithmic preference, and in the optimal solution,
consumption cannot be zero. If she wants to get pregnant, she cannot work for that
period; then, having no husbands income, no labor income, and no nonlabor income,
there is nothing to consume. Naturally, there is a probability of unintentionally
getting pregnant even if she is single and has no nonlabor income. For the problem
to be well-defined in that situation, I assume a one-time transfer equal to “TR.”
However, it turns out that changing the value of TR has no impact on the individuals
decisions, it only helps the process have well-defined solutions. Hence, I can fix TR
at an arbitrary level
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market work. Moreover, I assume that hours spent in day care (or family care) centers
has no impact on the child’s human capital accumulation process.
1.3.10 Budget Constraint
Each individual faces the following budget constraint in each period:
cHHi,t + ei,t + ccIhi,t>0Ii,tk<8 = hi,twi,t + h¯w
sp
i,tmi,t + Ii,t, (1.10)
where cHHi,t is household consumption. If the woman is single, I simply assume that
it is equal to the individual’s own consumption, ci,t; if she is married, it is double,
2ci,t. Therefore, by deciding her own consumption, she decides about household
consumption as well. In the above equation, ei,t denotes expenditures on a child’s
skill; cc is the fixed childcare cost if the mother works in the labor market; Ihi,t>0 is an
indicator equal to one if the mother works, and zero otherwise; Ii,tk<8 is an indicator
equal to zero if the mother has no children or her child is school-age, and 1 otherwise;
hi,twi,t is the woman’s labor income, and h¯w
sp
i,t is the spousal total earnings; Ii,t is the
nonlabor income; and mi,t is an indicator variable for marital status, equal to one if
married and zero otherwise.38
Each individual faces a time constraint, as well. This constraint can be written
as follows:
TT = li,t + hi,t + τi,t, (1.11)
where TT is the total available time in each period; li,t is the leisure time; hi,t is the
hours of market work; and τi,t is the time that the mother actively spends with her
child.
There is one more nontrivial constraint for this problem:
hi,tbi,t = 0,
38I assume that the husband works for h¯ hours in each period no matter what.
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where bi,t denotes pregnancy decisions. This constraint ensures that the woman can-
not work during the period in which she gets pregnant.39
Finally, the model has nonnegativity constraints for choice variables hi,t, ci,t, li,t, τi,t,
and ei,t.
1.3.11 Recursive Formulation
If a child exists, then a woman optimally chooses her labor supply, leisure, con-
sumption, and child inputs to maximize her lifetime utility depending on marital
status, nonlabor income, and the current level of the childs skill. If no child exists,
she makes a pregnancy decision (if still fertile), and labor supply decisions as well.
This problem can be formulated recursively. For simplicity of representation, suppose
that there is no uncertainty about fertility decisions– i.e., pi(agew) = 1– and there is
no conception error– i.e., λ = 0. With these assumptions, the value function for the
individual’s problem is as follows:
Let V 0(t, St) denote the value of having no child at period t while the vector of
state variables is St, and let V
1(t, St) denote the value of having a child at period
t while the vector of state variables is St. I measure both V
0(t, St) and V
1(t, St) at
the beginning of period t, after all shocks are realized.40 Then, I have the following
Bellman equations:
V 1(t, St) = max
cHHt ,et,τt,lt,ht
{u(cHHt , lt, kt, bbt, agec) + βEt[V 1(t+ 1, St+1)]} (1.12)
V 0(t, St) = max
cHHt ,lt,bt,ht
{u(cHHt , lt, kt, bbt, agec)+β[btEt(V 1(t+1, St+1))+(1−bt)Et(V 0(t+1, St+1))]},
(1.13)
39Regression results in Table (A.12) in the Supplementary Appendix suggest that
this is not a very bad assumption.
40Note that in this model, they can have only one child.
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where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and Et is the conditional expectation operation,
which takes expectation with respect to the period t information set. This expectation
is taken with respect to future wage shocks, marital status shocks, and nonlabor
income shocks; bt is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual decides to conceive a
child at period t and zero otherwise. Finally, St = (mt, s, xt, age
p
t , kt,Ωt) is the vector
including state variables: mt is the marital status; s is the level of education; xt is
the work experience at the beginning of period t; agept is the age of the mother at
childbirth41; kt is the skill level of the child
42; and Ωt is a vector including all shocks
(the wage shock for the wife and the husband, the non-labor income shock, and the
pregnancy shock).
Note that the last Bellman equation is valid when the individual is fertile (i.e.
t ≤ 40), and thus able to decide whether or not to conceive a child. If t > 40 and
no child exists, then since she can no longer get pregnant, the Bellman equation is as
follows:
V 0(t, Si,t) = max
ci,t,li,t,hi,t
{u(cHHi,t , li,t, ki,t, bbi,t, tk) + βEt[V 0(t+ 1, Si,t+1)]}. (1.14)
41agept ∈ {∅, 18, 19, ..., 40}, where ∅ indicates that there is no child, so the age of mother when a
child is born, is not defined.
42It equals nothing if no child exists.
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1.3.12 Model Solution
Having the recursive formulation of the problem, since I have a finite horizon
problem, I can solve the problem by starting with the final period and moving back-
wards. I begin by solving the last-period problem of the individual numerically and
then going on recursively to find the value function for the individual for any possible
values of the state vector. In what follows next, I briefly discuss the solution to the
individual’s problem modeled in the previous subsection.
Child Investments
According to equation (1.3), by assuming a Cobb-Douglass form for the skill formation
technology, it is obvious that whenever a child exists, I can never have any corner
solutions to the household input choice problem during the investment period (i.e.
the development stage).43 However, the model allows for corner solutions for labor
supply– i.e. the hours worked may be zero in any given period. I can write the
conditional factor demands for child inputs (expenditures on the child and the time
spent with the child), where I condition on the labor supply choices, nonlabor income,
and the husband’s income (if she is married). These conditional factor demands also
depend on the child’s existence and the child’s age when a child exists. The conditional
factor demand for child inputs at child’s age tk, is as follows:
τ ∗i,tk(hi,tk) = (TT − hi,tk)
ϕ2,tk
α2 + ϕ2,tk
, (1.15)
e∗i,tk(hi,tk) = (hi,tkwi,tk + h¯w
sp
i,tk
mi,tk + Ii,tk − ccIhi,tk>0Ii,tk<8)
ϕ3,tk
α1 + ϕ3,tk
, (1.16)
43If any factor takes zero in any given period, then because of the Cobb-Douglass
technology function, the child’s skill level will be zero at all the subsequent periods,
and by log linear utility function ui,t → −∞ whenever ki,t → 0.
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where
ϕj,tk = βγj,tkξi,tk+1, j = 2, 3 (1.17)
The sequence {ξi,tk}M+1tk=1 is defined (backwards-) recursively as
ξi,M+1 = ψα3
ξi,M = α3 + βγ1,Mξi,M+1
...
ξi,m = α3 + βγ1,mξi,m+1
...
ξi,1 = α3 + βγ1,1ξi,2
where ψi = φ(β + β
2 + · · ·+ β60−agepi−M).
It is worth mentioning that ξi,m is the marginal utility of (log) child quality to the
household in period t, i.e., ξi,m = ∂Vm(Si,tk)/∂ln(ki,tk).
Labor Supply
I derived the solutions to child inputs conditional on hours of market work. Now, the
optimal solution to the labor supply is conditional on the existence of a child and on
the pregnancy decision as well.
Working more than the cut-off level, h, increases the individual’s work experience
by one unit, but any changes to hours of market work, as long as the individual works
more than the cut-off level has no additional impacts on her work experience and so
future wages. Also, any changes to hours of market work, as long as the individual
works less than the cut-off level does not change her future work experience and so
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future wages. However, changing hours of market work from below the cut-off level to
above it effectively increases the individual’s work experience and so changes future
wage possibilities. In other words, the decisions on labor supply at the extensive mar-
gin, i.e. whether to work or not, affect future wage possibilities through the return
to work experience, but at the intensive margin, the future return to hours of market
work is constant no matter how many hours she work (as long as it is at least equal
to the threshold). Hence, the individual makes decision on discrete choices here. In
other words, there are two corner solutions here: 1) h = 0 so she does not work, and
2) h = h so she works the least hours needed to get one more unit of experience in
period t. There are four cases in regard with the child existence and the fertility status:
First Case: a child exists whose age is less than M : The individual maxi-
mizes her life-time utility by choosing hours of market work, hi,t:
max
hi,t
α1log(hi,twi,t + h¯w
sp
t mi,t + Ii,t − ccIhi,t>0Ii,tk<8) + α2log(TT − hi,t − τ(hi,t))
+ α3φlog(ki,t) + βEt[V
1(t+ 1, Si,t+1)], (1.18)
where V 1 is the value function described in the previous section. Remember that I
already derived the optimal child inputs conditional on hours of market work and
I compute the value function recursively by starting from the last period and going
backwards in time. So for every single value of hi,t, I can compute the individual’s
life-time utility.
Now, to derive the first order condition (FOC) for this maximization problem,
one should note that the continuation value, V 1(t+ 1, Si,t+1) is not continuous at the
cut-off level, h, because the work experience (which is a state variable of function
V 1) is a step function with respect to hi,t. If hi,t ∈ [0, h), then V 1(t + 1, Si,t+1) =
V 1(t+ 1, ., ., xi,t− δs,txi,t, ., .), which means that the state variable ”work experience”
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will be depreciated by the trophy rate δ; and if hi,t ∈ [h, TT ), then V 1(t+ 1, Si,t+1) =
V 1(t+ 1, ., ., xi,t + 1, ., .), which means that the state variable ”work experience” will
be one unit more tomorrow.
Hence, the continuation value, V 1(t+ 1, Si,t+1) is a step function in hi,t and there
is a kink at h. This means that V 1(t + 1, Si,t+1) is not differentiable with respect to
hi,t at the kink point, which is h, but it is differentiable with respect to hi,t over both
intervals (0, h) and (h, TT ), and the derivative is zero over both intervals. Hence, in
order to find the optimal solution to hi,t, I consider three cases:
1) hi,t 6= h: in this case, since the V 1(t+ 1, Si,t+1) is differentiable with respect to
hi,t, I can derive the FOC by taking derivative of the life-time utility, i.e. expression
(17), with respect to h, which yields the following (after I solve it for hi,t):
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hˆ1i,t =
wi,tTT (α1 + ϕ3,t)− (α2 + ϕ2,t)(hi,twi,t + h¯wspt mt + Ii,t)
wi,t(α1 + α2 + ϕ3,t + ϕ2,t)
, (1.19)
where h1i,t is the interior solution to the maximization problem. So the life-time utility
of the individual is equal to:
α1log(hˆ
1
i,twi,t + h¯w
sp
t mi,t + Ii,t − ccIhi,t>0Ii,tk<8) + α2log(TT − hˆ1i,t − τ(hi,t))
+ α3φlog(ki,t) + βEt[V
1(t+ 1, Si,t+1)],
Where the state variable of work experience in the state vector, xi,t, should be updated
correspondingly with respect to the value of hˆ1i,t.
2) hi,t = h: in this case, the life-time utility of individual is simply equal to the
following:
α1log(hwi,t + h¯w
sp
t mi,t + Ii,t − ccIhi,t>0Ii,tk<8) + α2log(TT − h− τ(hi,t)) + α3φlog(ki,t)
+ βEt[V
1(t+ 1, Si,t+1)],
44The derivation is shown in the Supplementary Appendix.
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Where the state variable of work experience in the state vector, xi,t, should be updated
correspondingly with respect to the value of hi,t = h, so xt+1 = xi,t + 1.
3) hi,t = 0: in this case, the life-time utility of individual is simply equal to the
following:
α1log(h¯w
sp
t mi,t + Ii,t) + α2log(TT − τ(hi,t)) + α3φlog(ki,t) + βEt[V 1(t+ 1, Si,t+1)],
Where the state variable of work experience in the state vector, xi,t, should be updated
correspondingly with respect to the value of hi,t = 0 and the depreciation rate. The
optimal solution to the labor supply can be found easily by comparing the life-time
utility to the individual under three cases described above.
To put it in a nutshell, the optimal choice for labor supply is as follows:
h∗i,t = arg max
hi,t∈{0,max {0,hˆ1i,t},h}
α1log(hi,twi,t + h¯w
sp
t mi,t + Ii,t) + α2log(TT − hi,t − τ(hi,t))
+ α3φlog(ki,t) + βEt[V
1(t+ 1, Si,t+1)],
where Si,t = (mi,t, si, xi,t, age
p
i,t, ki,t,Ωi,t) is the vector including state variables, and
V 1(t+ 1, Si,t+1), as defined earlier, indicates the value function when a child exists at
the beginning of period t+1 and the state vector is Si,t+1. When solving the problem
backwards in time, in a given period t, I know the value of V 1(t + 1, Si,t+1) for all
possible values that the state vector might have. Note that when hi,t is zero or less
than the cut-off level, the next period’s experience will be discounted by δs,t−1, and
when hi,t is greater than the threshold the next period’s experience will be one more
unit higher than today’s, no matter what the value to hi,t is.
Second Case: a child exists, but older than M : In this case, since the
development stage is already done, then, hours of market work does not play any
role in determining current or future child’s skill levels. Hence, hours of market work
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is determined by comparing the values to corner solutions and the interior solution
while the interior solution is determined only by the trade-off between consumption
and leisure (no dynamics exist in this case). The procedure is similar to the previous
case, but in this case the interior solution, which is derived using the FOC, is as
follows:45
hˆ0i,t =
α1wi,tTT − α2(h¯wspi,tmi,t + Ii,t)
wi,t(α1 + α2)
, (1.20)
Hence, the optimal hours of market work is as follows:
h∗i,t = arg max
hi,t∈{0,max {0,hˆ0i,t},h}
α1log(hi,twi,t + h¯w
sp
t mi,t + Ii,t) + α2log(TT − hi,t)
+ ϕα3φlog(ki,M+1) + βEt[V
1(t+ 1, Si,t+1)],
Third Case: no child exists and the fertility period is over: In this case, there
is no child, and since the individual is older than 40 years of old, she cannot decide
to get pregnant, so no pregnancy decision is made. Similar to the previous case,
hours of market work is determined by comparing the values to corner solutions and
the interior solution while the interior solution is determined only by the trade-off
between consumption and leisure (no dynamics exist in this case). The solution in
this case is similar to the previous case:
h∗i,t = arg max
hi,t∈{0,max {0,hˆ0i,t},h}
α1log(hi,twi,t + h¯w
sp
t mi,t + Ii,t) + α2log(TT − hi,t))
+ βEt[V
0(t+ 1, Si,t+1)],
Fourth Case: no child exists and the individual is still in the fertility
window: In this case, the optimal choice for labor supply can be derived conditional
on the pregnancy choice. First, suppose that she decides to get pregnant. Then, she
cannot work in this period if she actually gets pregnant.46 Hence there is no choice
45The derivation is shown in the Supplementary Appendix.
46For the simplicity of representation, I ignore the uncertainty about the pregnancy
outcome here.
36
to make on hours of market work, and it is equal to zero: h∗ = 0. Now, if she decided
not to conceive a child in the current period hours of market work is determined by
comparing the values to corner solutions and the interior solution while, similar to
the previous case, the interior solution is determined only by the trade-off between
consumption and leisure (no dynamics exist in this case). Hence, the optimal choice
for labor supply can be derived as follows:
h∗i,t = arg max
hi,t∈{0,max {0,hˆ0i,t},h}
α1log(hi,twi,t + h¯w
sp
t mi,t + Ii,t) + α2log(TT − hi,t))
+ βEt[V
0(t+ 1, Si,t+1)],
Pregnancy Choices
The solutions to child inputs described above are derived conditional on existence
of a child; upon arrival of a child, mothers make optimal decisions regarding the
labor supply and child inputs. In a given period, if a fertile individual has no child,
then she has to decide whether to conceive a child, or to delay childbearing for one
additional period, and also make decision on how much to work if not pregnant. To
make optimal childbearing decisions, she compares the lifetime utility of conceiving
a child in the current period (conditional on making optimal decisions regarding the
child inputs and labor supply thereafter) to the lifetime utility of not conceiving a
child (conditional on making optimal decisions in the following periods). Hence, the
individual makes the decision weather or not to conceive a child in the current period,
t, according to the following maximization:
V 0(t, Si,t) = max {V 0nobb(t, Si,t), V 0bb(t, Si,t)},
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where V 0bb, i.e. the value to decide to get pregnant, is as follows:
V 0bb(t, Si,t) = α1log(h¯w
sp
t mi,t + Ii,t) + α2log(TT )
+ βEt[V
1(t+ 1, Si,t+1)],
where the value of state variables in Si,t+1 is updated; specifically, bbi,t+1 = 1 (i.e.
it changes from zero to one), and agepi,t+1 = t (i.e. it changes from nothing to t).
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Note that in this case, she cannot work so hi,t = 0, and the income comes from the
husband’s work and non-labor income. Moreover, the value to the work experience
decreases due to depreciation, xi,t+1 = (1− δs,t)xi,t .
The value to decide not to get pregnant, i.e. V 0nobb(t, Si,t) in the above-mentioned
maximization is as follows:
V 0nobb(t, Si,t) = max
hi,t∈{0,hˆ0i,t,h}
α1log(htwt + h¯w
sp
t mi,t + Ii,t) + α2log(TT − hi,t)
+ βEt[V
1(t+ 1, Si,t+1)],
Note that the value of all state variables in Si,t+1 is the same as Si,t except (probably)
for the work experience.
1.4 Estimation
In this section, I first explain the model specification. I discuss the functional
forms that I have chosen and the implications of these modeling choices for the final
results. Then I review the sources of heterogeneity and uncertainty in the model
that help me recover the model parameters. After that, I discuss the parameter
identification: I assume that the specification represents the data generating process,
and the issue is how to recover the model parameters using observed data. Finally, I
describe the estimation method.
47It has been equal to nothing while entering this period.
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1.4.1 The Sources of Heterogeneity and Uncertainty
This model has two sources of heterogeneity. Individuals differ in their education
levels, and they face different probabilities of unwanted pregnancies according to those
levels. They also differ in their marital status. I use completed years of schooling
to denote education level in the estimation. To be more precise, individuals differ in
their educational decisions by age 18.
Except for these differences, all individuals face the same problem. Individuals
also face uncertainty regarding wage shocks, productivity factor shocks, and nonlabor
income shocks. All of these shocks are independently distributed across individuals
and over time. Individuals also face shocks to their marital status in each period;
these shocks depend on the woman’s age, the presence of children, and her previous
marital status. Moreover, individuals face uncertainty about the outcomes of their
pregnancy decisions. If a woman decides to get pregnant at age y, she will get
pregnant with probability pi(y), and if she decides not to get pregnant, then she may
still get pregnant with probability λ(s) . Exogenous variations in nonlabor income,
wage, marital status, pregnancy, and education level in the data help to recover the
model parameters.
1.4.2 Model Specification
In this section, I discuss my modeling choices.
I allow the elasticity parameters in the child’s skill production function, i.e. γ1,tk ,
γ2,tk , γ3,tk , to change with age of the child. However, to keep the number of parameters
that I need to estimate as small as possible, I assume the following functional form
for modeling how the elasticity parameters in Equation (1.3) change with the child’s
39
age, tk:
γj,tk = exp(γj,0 + γj,1t
k), j = 1, 2, 3 (1.21)
I use a similar approach for modeling the depreciation rate in Equation (1.5),
δ(s, t) as follows:
δs,t = exp(δs,0 + δs,1t), s = H,C (1.22)
where subscript H denotes non-college graduates, and subscript C indicates that the
individual is a college graduate.
Furthermore, I allow the intercept of the productivity factor to depend on the age
of the child as follows:
Atk = exp(A0,0 + A0,1t
k), j = 1, 2, 3 (1.23)
In this paper, I model the effect of the mother’s age at childbirth on the child’s
innate ability by including the parent’s age in the productivity factor term. I assume
that initial skill is homogeneous because every child is born with almost the same
endowment in terms of knowledge, skills, and experience, but with different innate
abilities. Lower innate ability driven by the age effect might affect the childs ability
to absorb investments (both time and monetary) and to translate them into human
capital. For example, suppose that two children have the same stock of human capital
at period t. If child 1 has a greater innate ability (say a higher productivity factor)
than child 2, and they receive the same amount of inputs, child 1 will have a greater
stock of human capital at period t+1 compared to child 2 because the first child can
better absorb the investment and transform it into human capital.
To specify the productivity factor term, I use a log-quadratic functional form over
childbearing age. Medical evidence shows that the marginal effect of the mother’s age
at childbirth on the child’s innate ability is not constant. The marginal detrimental
40
effect of maternal age is greater as maternal age increases. Moreover, some evidence
shows that it has an inverse-U shape. There are also some risks associated with
pregnancy before age 20. The specification I chose is able to capture such a pattern.
1.4.3 Identification
In this subsection, I discuss the econometric identification issues. First, I assume
that the functional-form assumptions represent the true data generation process of
the population exactly. Then, I show how the model parameters could be recovered
using the observed data in a relatively simple manner. The estimator I actually use for
recovering the primitive model parameters has practical and theoretical advantages
over the proposed identification method below. Nonetheless, the following discus-
sion helps one develop intuition to better understand the key sources of identifying
information given the model I specified earlier.
I begin with the determination of preference parameters, and the parameters in the
skill formation technology. Here, I face some challenges: first, household consumption
and child expenditures are not observed in my dataset. The second issue concerns
missing data in the dataset. For each child in each survey year, I observe the time
spent with the child and the child’s test scores, but I do not observe the child’s test
scores in successive years– i.e. I do not observe “ki,tk” and “ki,tk+1” at the same
time. I can see the child’s skill level only in the next survey, which is five years
later. Therefore, I have observations on “ki,tk” and “ki,tk+5.” This makes it difficult
to estimate parameters for the skill formation technology.
Let’s first restrict our attention to the skill formation technology parameters in
the child’s skill formation function specified in Equations (2) and (3). In the skill
formation technology specified earlier, the observation period for each household is
defined by the age of their child, i.e. period t begins when the child turns age tk.
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Under the maintained assumptions, if the child of household i turns age tk with a
skill level of ki,tk , then, her skill level at the beginning of the next period, ki,tk+1, is
determined by the following equation:
lnki,tk+1 = lnAtk + 1age
p
i + 2(age
p
i )
2 + 3IQ
p
i + exp(γ1,0 + γ1,1t
k)lnki,tk
+ exp(γ2,0 + γ2,1t
k)lnτi,tk + exp(γ3,0 + γ3,1t
k)lnei,tk + υi,tk ,
≡ X(agepi , IQpi , tk, τi,tk , ei,tk , ki,tk ; γ) + υi,tk ; i = 1, 2, ..., N,
where N is the number of observations. The disturbances, υi,tk ’s, are independently
distributed across households and over time. The IQ of mothers is proxied by their
level of education, and for each child, I can observe the education level of the mother
and the mother’s age at birth, agepi . Given the assumptions I made, the skill formation
technology parameters, γ’s, could be estimated using a non-linear least squares (NLS)
estimator as follows:
γˆNLS = argmin
γ
N∑
i
(lnki,tk+1 −X(agepi , IQpi , tk, τi,tk , ei,tk , ki,tk ; γ))2
In order to recover the technology parameters in this manner, I need the standard
full rank condition on the matrix X. The full rank condition requires that not all
mothers have the same education level, not all mothers have the same age at first
birth, and not all mothers choose the same level of investments in their child. These
conditions are easily satisfied in the actual dataset. Moreover, since I specified the
parameters as a monotone function of the child’s age, I need at least two children of
different ages in my dataset in order for the full rank condition to be satisfied.
A challenge that one faces when estimating skill formation technology in the man-
ner just discussed, is that the child goods expenditures, ei,tk ’s, are not directly ob-
servable in the dataset. However, under the maintained assumptions, child goods
expenditures is the only decision variable that depends on the family’s income. As
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previously shown in Equation (1.15), the child goods expenditures is a fraction of the
family income, and that fraction is a function of preference parameters, skill formation
technology parameters, and the mother’s age at childbirth. As family incomes are
observable for each observation period, Equation (1.15) can be used to back out child
goods expenditures given preference parameters. Hence, the skill formation tech-
nology parameters could be estimated using a NLS estimator given the preference
parameters.
Another challenge faced in estimating the technology parameters using a NLS
estimator is missing data in the children’s test scores. The concern here is that child
investments and skill levels are observable, but child supplement interviews have only
been conducted every five years, so for a given child, skill levels cannot be observed
for two successive years. Hence, for family i, both ki,tk and ki,tk+1 cannot be observed
at the same time. The estimation method I actually use is explained in the next
section in detail. Using the derived solutions to child investments under the specified
model, the child skill levels in each period can be simulated for every realization of
exogenous shocks to marital status, wages, and non-labor incomes for a given set of
parameters. Hence, for an arbitrary set of model parameters, it is possible to solve
each individual’s problem, and simulate the path of their child’s skill levels. With
the simulated data, I can compute sample characteristics for the simulated dataset
and compare them to the actual sample characteristics.48 The next step is to change
the set of assumed model parameters and repeat the process, i.e. simulate a dataset
based on the assumed parameters, compute the simulated sample characteristics, and
compare it to the actual sample characteristics. This process is continued until the
48Also, before computing the simulated sample characteristic, I generate the sim-
ulated dataset S times, while each time drawing a random number for the random
shock variables according to their data generating process. In this way, when com-
puting the sample characteristics, I can effectively take the effect of random shocks
out by integrating over the different random shock realizations.
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model parameters are tuned such that the simulated sample characteristics match the
actual sample characteristics.
In this section, I discussed how I could use a NLS approach to estimate the
technology parameters when given the preference parameters while ignoring missing
data issue. Now, I discuss how to estimate the preference parameters using the
dataset when given the technology parameters. There are five preference parameters:
the impact factors for consumption, leisure, and child’s skill level, i.e. α’s; the discount
factor for when the child reaches age 18 and leaves home, i.e. φ; and the time discount
factor, β. After normalizing the impact factors by assuming that
∑3
1=1 αi = 1, only
four parameters effectively remain to be estimated. I already derived optimal solutions
for the labor supply and child inputs conditional on labor supply choices. The labor
supply choices and time investments in children are observable in my dataset, and I
can use this information to back out the preference parameters. I need two individuals
whose ages at childbirth are different and who both chose non-corner solutions for
labor supply in at least one period. This condition is satisfied in my dataset. Hence,
using Equations (14) and (16), which specify the optimal solutions for child time
investment and labor choices, and the actual choices observed in the dataset for these
two hypothetical individuals, I can recover the four preference parameters given the
skill formation technology parameters.
As shown here, even though the consumption and child goods expenditures are
not observed in my dataset, the dataset is rich enough to still enable me to recover
the primitive parameters of the specified model.
The process for nonlabor income is assumed to be exogenous in this model. Sep-
arately, I can estimate this process, described in equations (7) and (8), using cross-
section data on the households’ nonlabor income. Hence, parameters in the nonlabor
income process can be identified outside of the model.
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What remains is the determination of parameters in the wage equations. Al-
though the wage offer process can be estimated outside of the model, the problem
with directly estimating the wage process is that there are nonrandomly missing ob-
servations due to corner solutions for labor supply. Indeed, when the individual is not
working, I cannot observe the wage offer. These missing wage offers are not randomly
distributed because the higher the wage offer, the higher is the probability that the
woman works in that period. In other words, the larger the error term of the wage
process, the higher the probability that the wage offer is observable. Wage offers are
observed only for women who work for wages, so a naive estimator would be biased.
Hence, I cannot estimate the wage process using OLS.49,50 Therefore, I estimate the
parameters of the wage processes simultaneously with other parameters of the model
using the estimation method that is described in the next section. Using the paramet-
ric distribution assumptions about the wage offers, explained in the model section,
I can identify the parameters describing the wage offer distribution alongside other
parameters of the model.
In the next section, I explain the estimation strategy. But first, I will explain
intuitively why I am able to recover the preference parameters and the technology
parameters even without observing expenditures and consumption. According to the
model, expenditures are always a fraction of total income (Equation (1.15)), which is
observable, and this fraction is a function of the model parameters. Hence, because I
observe total income and the child’s skill level, exogenous variations in the wage shock
and nonlabor income help me recover the impact of expenditures on the child’s skill
level– i.e. γ3, provided that the model is correctly specified. Consumption, again, is
49I also used a Monte Carlo simulation to see if I could obtain consistent coefficients
for the wage process using OLS regression when ignoring those nonrandomly missing
data. My simulation results suggest that I cannot.
50This problem is known as incidental truncation in the econometrics literature.
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a fraction of total income, and this fraction is a function of the model parameters.
Therefore, the model reveals the relationship between consumption and income, and
this helps me recover the impact of consumption on the individual’s utility. It is
worth thinking about the two extreme cases. If an individual cares only about her
consumption– i.e. puts zero weight on leisure and the child’s skill level– then she
never decides to conceive a child. On the other hand, if she cares only about the
child’s skill level, then she spends all of her resources on her child, consumes nothing,
and never uses her free time for enjoyment (leisure). Observations on the time that
individuals spend with their children and the evolution of the child’s skill level help
to recover the consumption impact parameter, α1. The next section provides a more
detailed explanation illustrating how the model parameters could be recovered using
the observed data, even though I do not observe consumption and child expenditures,
and even without having observations on childs skill levels for successive years.
1.4.4 Estimator
I consider two education levels, four-year college graduate and non-college gradu-
ate. A fraction of individuals decide to continue their education at college. I set the
fraction of non-college graduates and college graduates according to data from Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID data also show that, for each group of
individuals, some percentage are single at age 18, and the others are married. These
fractions define the initial distribution of heterogeneous individuals in the model.51
In total, the model has 40 parameters to be estimated simultaneously: eleven
parameters of the technology function–i.e. 1, 2, 3, two for A, two for γ1, two for γ2,
51According to the data, 46% of women continue their education in college. Provided
that they have decided not to continue their education in college, the probability of
her being single is 0.85, and of being married is 0.15. In contrast, for a woman that
has decided to go to college, the probability of being single is 0.95, and of being
married is 0.05.
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and two for γ3; four preferences parameters– i.e. α1, α2, φ, and β; sixteen coefficients
of the wage functions– i.e. four for δ, two for η0, two for η1, two for η2, two for η
sp
0 ,
two for ηsp1 , and two for η
sp
2 ; two probability parameters for conception errors, λc and
λh; and five distributional parameters for wage shocks and productivity shocks– i.e.
two for σw, two for σ
sp
w , and σ
2
R; and two parameters for the distribution of initial
child skill. I use the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) estimator to recover the
primitive parameters of the model simultaneously, which is described below.52
The data I use provide detailed information about the households in the survey.
They include some characteristics of parents, such as the ages at childbirth, the
mother’s education, hours worked, their accepted wages, household income, and hours
spent with their child. They also include some measures of the child’s skill level at
different ages during the development period.
In order to implement the method of simulated moments, I first define a set of
moments (sample characteristics) that capture the relationships between different
variables in the sample for each year in which the survey was conducted and also
between surveys in different years. Let this set be denoted by M . To find the
estimator in this method, I utilize the simulation method. This means that, using my
model, conditional on the parameter vector Ω, I can solve the individuals’ problem
throughout their life-cycle and compute the moments I already have defined for this
population. I denote this moment vector by M˜(Ω). The MSM estimator of the
parameter vector Ω can be defined as follows:
Ωˆ = arg min
Ω
(M − M˜(Ω))′W (M − M˜(Ω)), (1.24)
where W is a symmetric positive-definite weighting matrix. I use the bootstrapping
method to define this weighting matrix. Indeed, by resampling the data, I simply
52See Lerman and Manski (1981), McFadden (1989), Pakes and Pollard (1989),
Gourieroux et al. (1993), and Gallant and E. Tauchen (1996) for some references.
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set W equal to the inverse of the covariance matrix of M .53 It turns out that this
estimator is consistent.54
The moment vector that I use includes the average and standard deviation of
mothers’ ages at the birth of the first child (if they have one), for both college and
non-college graduates; the average and standard deviation of test scores at each child’s
age; the average and standard deviation of hours of work for mothers; the average
and standard deviation of child investment hours at each child’s age; the average and
standard deviation of accepted wages and the correlation in wages across parents;
and contemporaneous and lagged correlations among the observed labor supply, time
with children, child’s skill level, wages, and income. In order to compute the standard
errors of the parameter estimates, I use the bootstrapping method. I generate new
datasets using sampling data over individuals with replacement. Then, I implement
the method of simulated moments to reestimate the model parameters using the new
data sets.55 Finally, I calculate the standard errors of the parameter estimates.
1.5 Model Estimates
1.5.1 Parameter Estimates
In this section, I present the results of the estimation of the theoretical model–
namely, the estimated parameters and sample fit of the model. Then, I report the
results of the variance decomposition of the child’s skill level at the end of the devel-
53I did not use the asymptotically optimal weighting matrix because of computa-
tional cost. Also, Altonji and Segal (1994) examined the finite-sample performance of
the asymptotically optimal weighting matrix and concluded that the asymptotically
optimal weighting estimator is seriously biased in small samples.
54See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for a discussion of the properties of this estimator.
55While reestimating parameters using the new bootstrapped datasets, I keep fixed
the random draws for wage shocks, marital status shocks, nonlabor income shocks,
and productivity shocks. I also hold the starting values constant when reestimating
model parameters for the bootstrapped datasets.
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opment phase. Finally, I discuss some counterfactual policies regarding the timing of
birth.
Preference Parameters
Preference parameters and the corresponding standard errors are presented in Table
(1.7). The preference parameters α1, α2, and α3 correspond to consumption, leisure,
and the child’s skill level, respectively. These parameters determine the relative im-
portance of those factors in the utility function. A 1% increase in consumption has
the highest impact on the utility function (log(0.42)), compared to a 1% increase in
household leisure or in the child’s skill level. The leisure impact is equal to 0.27, and
the child’s skill impact is equal to 0.31. To get a better understanding of what these
numbers mean, it might be helpful to think about the following two extreme cases:
first suppose that α3 = 0. In this case, the woman does not care about her child’s skill
level at all. In the context of this model, this means that she would get no enjoyment
from having a child. Therefore, she never decides to conceive a child; no child will
be conceived intentionally. On the other hand, suppose that α3 = 1, which implies
that α1 = α2 = 0. In this case, the woman cares only about the child’s skill level and
the utility is derived only through the child’s skill level. In this case all resources are
devoted to the child and nothing would be consumed by the household, i.e, no leisure
and no consumption occurs at all.
Production Technology Parameters
Production technology parameters are presented in Table (1.8). It seems that of all
inputs, time investment has the strongest effect on skill formation, especially during
the early years of the child’s life. The elasticity of the next period’s skill level with
respect to time investment is much greater than that of money investment and the
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current period’s level of skill. Figure (1.4) depicts the technology parameters against
child age. The results suggest that while the impact of time investments decreases
with increasing child age, the impacts of child goods expenditures and the current
level of human capital become larger.
Table (1.8) also shows the estimate of the effect of the mother’s age at childbirth
on the child’s productivity. Both ˆ1 and ˆ2 are negative. However, ˆ2 is close to
zero, meaning that the second-order effect is relatively small. The estimate of the
first-order effect, 1, is equal to −0.015. If I assume that 2 is zero, then, according to
equations (2) and (3), I can interpret the results as follows: all else held constant, one
year increase in maternal age at childbirth decreases the next period’s skill level by
about 1.5% with respect to the child-age-specific average of test scores. Given that
the development phase lasts for 15 years, the detrimental effect of postponement of
childbirth on child’s skill level seems to be considerable. Figure (A.10) shows how the
productivity of the child changes with the mother’s age at childbirth.
Table (1.8) also reports the standard error of these estimated parameters.
Depreciation Rate Parameters
Table (1.9) provides the estimated parameters regarding depreciation rates. Figure
(1.5) depicts how the depreciation rates of one period of absence from the labor market
change over the woman’s life-cycle by education level. The results suggest that the
deprecation rates decrease with age, and that the rate for educated women is higher
than that of less-educated women. Figure (1.5) shows that for college graduates, the
depreciation rate ranges from over 12% to about 3%, while it ranges from 6% to about
4% for non-college graduates. Previous papers provide a wide range of estimates for
depreciation rates. Blundell et al. (2016b) document that the human capital for UK
women depreciates between 5.7% and 11.0% a year when being out of work. Olivetti
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(2006) finds that a woman with zero labor supply between ages 20 and 29 loses about
50% of her human capital by age 30. Guner et al. (2018) find yearly depreciation
rates of 2.5% for unskilled women and 5.6% for skilled women. Using data from
the German chemical sector, Gerst and Grund (2017) estimate the effect of career
interruption on wages as about 11% per year of interruption. Moreover, Jacobsen
and Levin (1995) find that there is a 14% reduction in women’s wages in the case of
intermittent labor force attachment. Caucutt et al. (2002) finds that if a woman does
not supply any labor when she is young, she experiences about a 10% decline in her
wages ten years later. Kleven et al. (2018) show from the Danish administrative data
that the hourly wages of women drop permanently by about 10% right after the birth
of their first child. Finally, to estimate the human capital depreciation rate, Ejrnæs
and Kunze (2013) exploit arguably exogenous variation in the time out of the labor
force induced by the expansion in parental leave in West Germany; they find that
mothers wages after returning to work decrease by 3.4% and 5.8% per year of leave for
low-skilled and medium-skilled mothers, respectively. None of these studies, however,
examined how the wage penalty associated with career interruption due to a childbirth
changes over the female’s life-cycle. That said, Miller (2011) uses biological fertility
shocks to instrument for age at first birth, and finds that motherhood delay leads to
a substantial increase in wages of 3% per year of delay; this advantage is largest for
college-educated women and those in professional and managerial occupations.
Finally, Table (1.10) provides estimated parameters regarding the earnings func-
tions and unintended pregnancy.
Within-sample Fit
Table (1.11) reports the values of different moments calculated using the data and
compares them to corresponding values from the simulated data using estimated
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parameters. The first two columns correspond to highly-educated women and the
last two correspond to less-educated women.
The first moment in Table (1.11) is the mean age at childbirth. It can be seen that
the model is a good fit for mean age at first childbirth in both highly-educated and
less-educated women. The second row reports the standard deviation of the mother’s
age at first childbirth. The standard deviation of the simulated data is lower than
that observed in the real data. The model is also a good fit on the test scores at the
last period of development. Hours worked per week match well between the data and
the model.
Figures (1.6) and (1.7) show the sample fit of the average child’s test score over
the whole child development phase for children of less-educated and educated women,
respectively.
Figures (1.8) and (1.9) show the sample fit of the distribution of age at first child-
birth for less-educated and educated women, respectively. The simulated distribution
of maternal age at birth matches the data distribution well for both less-educated
women and educated women.
Discussion
In this section, I relate my results to previous papers in the literature. Cunha and
Heckman (2008) and Cunha et al. (2010) provide some empirical evidence that tends
to support the idea that child goods expenditures during early childhood are very
effective, and to a large extent determine future child quality.
Del Boca et al. (2013) examines the impacts of child goods expenditures and time
investments in children by estimating the child’s skill formation technology within a
standard household model. They model the household decisions on child investments
and labor supplies, leaving the age of parents exogenous. Their findings suggest that
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even though early childhood expenditures might be more important than those made
later in the child’s life; however, the effects of child goods expenditures are very
limited at any stage of the child’s life; time investments made by parents have more
effective impact on developing skills in the child. The findings of this paper tend
to support the findings of Del Boca et al. (2013), in which, time investments play a
bigger role compared to the child goods expenditures. However, my findings suggest
that the effect of child goods expenditures could be underestimated in models that
do not account for decision of household with respect to the timing of childbearing.
Households decide on both the timing of birth and child investments, and these
decisions are related to each other. As explained earlier in this paper, educated
women tend to have their first child later in life, and holding education constant, older
parents, on average, make more investments in their children. Moreover, children born
to older individuals may be more likely to be less productive. Neglecting these age
effects may lead one to underestimate the effects of time investments and money
investments. In fact, the returns from investments made by educated parents, who
are, on average wealthier and older, might not be as large as for those made a few
years earlier, when they were younger. Hence, if we ignore the role of parental age
in the childs skill formation technology, we might underestimate the effects of child
investments.
In this paper, as in many previous papers (including those mentioned in this sec-
tion), I did not allow for saving/opportunity in the model developed for my empirical
work. One reason is the computational difficulty related to the huge space of state
variables in this model. I expect, however, that extending the model to incorporate
saving opportunity would not significantly affect childbearing decisions. In the frame-
work presented in this paper, saving opportunity does not relieve the main trade-off
that women face between the childs productivity factor and the resources available
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to invest in the child. They cannot avoid the postponement of childbearing that ac-
companies accumulating financial resources during early work-life-cycles. Moreover,
their wages are relatively low in early periods, which makes it hard for them to save
in order to make future investments in their child. It is more likely that individuals
would rather have an opportunity to borrow in the early periods to smooth their
consumption. If they could transfer their future resources to early periods, then they
would have more resources to invest in the child during early periods to increase her
skill level; hence, they would not be required to delay their childbearing to later ages
at which they would have higher wages.
Nonetheless, it is useful to think about how not including saving could make my
estimates biased. First of all, if saving was allowed, people could invest part of their
savings in their children, and people with higher incomes could save more. When
estimating the impact of child goods expenditures on the child’s skill level, I use the
variation of incomes between families. Since I did not allow saving to play a role in my
model, the impact of child goods expenditures might be overestimated; the variation
in child goods expenditures may have actually been higher than what is implied by
the differences in incomes between families (because saving is used to increase child
goods expenditures). Also, it is possible that neglecting saving opportunities makes
me underestimate the effect of maternal age at delivery on the child’s skill level. I use
variation in the mother’s age at birth to assess the effect of the mother’s age on the
child’s skill level while taking into account the effects of income differential due to the
wage life-cycle. However, if I overlook the effect of saving on child goods expenditures,
I might have not completely accounted for how higher incomes (and savings) made by
older parents can compensate for negative effects. This may introduce a downward
bias to my estimate of the magnitude of the negative impacts of mother’s age on
child skill level. I could enrich the model to include borrowing opportunities, as well.
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However, I know that at early periods, individuals usually do not have high credit
scores, and their access to the credit market is limited. The model presented here can
be considered an extreme case in which the borrowing upper bound is zero. Therefore,
the results are unlikely to change significantly if I extend the model to include saving
and borrowing opportunities, provided there are tight credit constraints in the early
stages of the work-life-cycle.
As discussed earlier, previous papers usually have used a reduced-from regression
to estimate the impacts of maternal age on child cognitive ability or child’s test scores
by controlling for socioeconomic characteristics of parents such as parental education,
single parenthood, and a measure of family income (see for example Goisis et al.
(2017), Barclay and Myrskyla¨ (2016), and Leigh and Gong (2010)). The results of my
simulation exercise reported in Table (A.13) in the Supplementary Appendix suggest
that neglecting child investments significantly biases one’s estimate of maternal age on
child outcomes even after controlling for those parental socioeconomic characteristics,
and the bias leads one to underestimate the magnitude of the negative health impacts
of greater maternal age on child outcomes, ceteris paribus. My results suggest that
neglecting child investments biases my estimate of the maternal age effect on child’s
skill level because older parents tend to invest more in their children due to greater
parental resources, and there is a dynamic complementarity between child investments
and child’s skill in producing the next period’s skills. Hence, the estimate of the
maternal age effect in a log-linear specification is biased if one neglects the child
investments, and this statement is true even after controlling for the mother’s and
the father’s wages, hours of market work, and their marital status.56
56In section 2, I provided a reduced-form estimate of the maternal age effect on
child’s test scores using observational data (see Table (1.5)). As explained before,
those estimates might be biased due to omitted variables, i.e. child investments,
which are positively correlated with maternal ages. To illustrate the omitted variable
bias problem, I use the simulated data in order to estimate the impact of maternal
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1.6 Simulation Experiments
1.6.1 Decomposition Analysis
As explained earlier, previous studies emphasized the impacts of both child goods
expenditures and time investments on the child’s skill level. Other studies highlighted
the effects of maternal age on child outcomes. Hence, females face a trade-off once
deciding when to bear a child: the younger the parents, the greater the expected
productivity of the child, but the lower their resources to invest in the child. One
contribution of this paper is to separate out the two effects by modeling all endoge-
nous choices on the timing of birth, child goods expenditures, and time investments
in the child. In order to decompose the effects of maternal age at childbirth on the
child’s skill from the impacts of child investments, I design some simulation experi-
ments. I use the estimated parameters presented in the previous section throughout
all experiments. The decomposition exercise is as follows:
First: I hold investments in the child fixed at their level in the baseline model,
and change the maternal age of educated mothers to 22.57 Then, assuming that the
maternal age is 22, I simulate the model and evaluate child skill levels at different
ages while using the investments from the baseline model to update the child’s skill
age on child’s test scores through a reduced-form approach similar to what I used
in Table (1.5). Table (A.13) reports regression results of such an exercise. Column
1 of Table (A.13) shows the results when I control for the mother’s education and
marital status, and also the child’s age. The coefficient of the maternal age is equal to
−0.014. Column 2 reports the results when I also control for the family income when
the child was 2 years of old; the coefficient of interest changes to −0.015. Column
3 shows the results when I also control for the mother’s hourly wages, mother’s
hours of market work, and father’s hourly wages. This specification is similar to the
regression results reported earlier in Table (1.5). The coefficient of interest in this
case is equal to −0.017. Finally, Column 4 of of Table (A.13) shows the results when
child investments in the past periods are also controlled for; the coefficient of interest
changes to −0.019.
57This is the median age of first childbirth for less-educated women.
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level in each period. In other words, I assume that investments in the child are not
affected by the change that I made with respect to maternal ages, i.e. the reduction
of maternal age from the baseline to 22.
Second: In the second experiment, I require the maternal age of educated females
to be 22 while allowing child goods expenditures to decrease according to that hypo-
thetically enforced parental age. Then, I evaluate the child’s skill level at different
ages of the child. In other words, I assume that everyone conceives a child at age 22,
and child investments are reduced accordingly with respect to the mother’s wages.
Assuming that the maternal age is 22, the implied mother’s wages during the early
stages of childhood development are lower due to both lower work experience and
higher depreciation rate at age 22.
Third: In the last experiment, in addition to the decrease in money investment, I
also reduce time investments in children according to the results of Table (1.6); with
a five-year decrease in the maternal age, time investments are reduced by 3%.
The difference in child skill between exercise 1 and the benchmark is due to the
five-year difference in maternal age; this demonstrates the intrinsic effect of maternal
age on child skill. The difference in child skill between exercise 1 and step 3 illustrates
the impact of differential investments originating from different birth timing.
The results of the decomposition exercise are shown in Table (1.12). They suggest
that both choices of the parent, i.e. childbearing age and child inputs, are extremely
important for developing the child’s human capital. Comparing the benchmark to ex-
ercise 1 suggests that reducing the maternal age of educated women without changing
actual child investments would increase the final stage human capital of the child by
over 11 percent, which is about 0.5 standard deviations. Also, comparing exercise 3 to
the benchmark reveals that reducing child investments to the hypothetical level that
educated women would have made if they conceived a child five years earlier would
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decrease the final test score of the children by about 1.6% on average, which is about
0.12 standard deviations. From exercises 2 and 3, it can be seen that even though
the five-year decrease in maternal age gives children the advantage of a better health
status compared to the benchmark, their final skill level is still lower. This is because
lower child investments are made by the age-shifted mothers. Hence, it seems that
the investment effects are dominant over health effects for a marginal mother.
In order to get a better sense for the magnitude of the mothers age effect on the
childs skill level, it might be useful to compare the result to the value added by school
teachers. Published estimates of the average standard deviation for gains in student
achievement within a single grade attributable to higher value-added teachers at a
given school range from 0.13 to 0.17 (Hanushek and Rivkin (2010)). Hence, the effect
of a five-year decrease in maternal age on the childs skill level is comparable to the
impact of having a higher value-added teacher for between three and four years.
1.6.2 Policy Analysis
In this section, I analyze the impacts of a wide variety of maternity leave polices,
child care subsidy programs, and transfer policies on human capital of mothers and
their children.
Maternity Leave Policies
Implementing a nationwide maternity leave policy has been the subject of heated de-
bate among both policymakers and researchers in the US, in part because the United
States is an outlier in maternity leave provision (Rossin-Slater (2017a)). The Fam-
ily and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) entitles eligible workers to take only 12 weeks of
unpaid parental leave, a short period of time compared to most other developed coun-
tries; for instance, Germany and France have three-year maternity leave periods. It is
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worth mentioning that less than 60% of private sector workers in the US were eligible
for the FMLA in 2012 (Klerman et al. (2012)). Previous studies have investigated
the impacts of maternity leave policies on fertility rate, the mothers labor market
outcomes, and the childs health (see Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009); Scho¨nberg and
Ludsteck (2014); Rossin (2011)). However, the potential impacts of maternity leave
policies on the timing of birth and child development, have not been investigated.58
I implement an unpaid maternity leave policy under which employers must guar-
antee a woman on maternity leave a return to her old job after two years. It also
freezes her wages at the level before childbirth. In the context of the model, this
means that the depreciation rate is zero. In this case, the only impact of childbearing
on wages would be the forgone wages associated with the year of lost experience right
after childbirth. I analyze the impacts of such a policy on the timing of births, child
investments, and child skill.
I also consider some counterfactual policies in regard to paid maternity leave. I
define two types of paid maternity leave policies: 1) mothers are paid for two years
after birth while not working, but depreciation to a decrease in their future wages
when going back to work, and 2) mothers are paid for two years after birth, and the
wage for each individual is the same as its value before childbirth, which means that
the depreciation rate for being out of the labor market during pregnancy is zero.
Table (1.13) shows the results of the above-mentioned maternity leave policies.
Columns (1) and (4) of Table (1.13) shows the result of an unpaid maternity leave
policy under which the wage is frozen at its level before childbirth. Results suggest
that implementing such a policy could decrease the childbearing age of educated
58Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) is an exception. They evaluate the effects of expan-
sion of paid leave in Austria in 1990 on the likelihood of a closely spaced second child.
They show that increasing paternal leave from one to two years is associated with a
15% increase in the likelihood of having another child within three years.
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and less-educated females, on average, by over 6% (less than 2 years) and about 2%
(less than half a year), respectively, or equivalently, by about 0.3 and 0.07 standard
deviations of maternal age at first birth in the benchmark. It also reduces the variation
of childbearing ages among both groups. As a result, the final test scores of children
increase by about 5% (0.25 standard deviations) and 3% (0.15 standard deviations) for
college graduates and non-college, respectively. Hence, such a maternity leave policy,
which avoids the wage penalty by freezing wages, can increase the children’s human
capital by a sizable amount. This increase stems from both having more financial
resources available to invest in the child and reducing the negative productivity effects
of delayed childbearing.
Columns (2) and (5) show the results for the first paid maternity leave policy,
under which individuals are paid while on leave but the wage is allowed to decrease
according to the depreciation rate. The results suggest the effect of this policy on
the average maternal age is similar to the result of the unpaid maternity leave policy.
The reduction in maternal ages improves the test scores of children. However, the
improvement is not as big as the previous policy. The reason is that under this
paid maternity leave policy, there is a depreciation of human capital associated with
being out of the labor market during pregnancy, and it negatively affects future
wages of mothers and so child goods expenditures. Under the second paid leave
policy, individuals are incentivized to bear in early periods due to elimination of
depreciation associated with being out of the labor market for pregnancy. Columns
(3) and (6) of Table (1.13) show that implementing such a policy, on average, would
lower the average maternal age by about 8% (over two years) and 3% (over half a
year) for educated and less-educated females, respectively, or equivalently, by about
0.4 and 0.12 standard deviations of maternal age at first birth in the benchmark.
Consequently, it would increase the final test scores of children by about 6% (0.3
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standard deviations) and 4% (0.2 standard deviations) for college graduates and non-
college, respectively. This is attributable to both the lower maternal age at birth and
the higher future wages conditional on birth compared to the pre-policy era.
It is worth noting that while impacts of the discussed paid and unpaid maternity
leave polices are qualitatively similar in terms of the maternal age at first birth and
the average children’s test scores, they have completely different implications for the
human capital path of mothers. I focus on the first two previously explained maternity
leave policies to elaborate the issue. When the depreciation rate is zero under the
unpaid maternity leave policy, i.e. the first policy, the mean labor force participation,
work experience, hours of market work, and hourly wages all increase. It is interesting
that the mean time investments goes down in this case, which is compensated with
greater child goods expenditures, however. Of course, both mothers and children
would be better off under this policy. In contrast, under the second policy, the mean
labor force participation, work experience, hours of market work, and hourly wages all
decrease. The reason is that they decide to have a child earlier to take advantage of a
child with higher ability and the transfer at childbirth. But, they face a depreciation
rate associated with the years out of the market when pregnant, which negatively
affects their wages. The optimal decision following the birth under this policy would
be to increase the leisure and time investments in the child, which compensates the
lower child goods expenditures. Again, both mothers and children would be better
off.
With regard to the impacts of maternity leave policies on mothers’ labor market
outcomes, the predictions of my simulation analysis are in line with the findings of
a handful of papers that have investigated the impacts of six weeks of paid leave in
California on labor market outcomes. Using a difference-in-differences design, Baum
(2003) show the FMLA has increased the probability that eligible mothers return
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to work at their pre-childbirth jobs by about %30.59 Their finding is in line with
my finding of the impacts of unpaid maternity leave policy on mothers’ labor force
participation six years after childbirth; columns 1 and 4 of Table (1.13) show that
implementing two-year unpaid maternity leave policy would increase the labor force
participation of educated and non-educated mothers of six-year-old children by about
20% and 33%, respectively.
A few studies has investigated the impacts of California’s paid leave policy, which
provides six weeks of paid leave. Rossin-Slater et al. (2013) provide evidence that
California’s paid family leave increased the work hours of employed mothers of one
to three-year-old children by 10% to 17% and that their labor incomes have risen by
a similar amount. Baum and Ruhm (2016) provides evidence that California’s paid
leave policy increased the likelihood that mothers return to work by a year after birth
and raised maternal hours and weeks of work by 11% to 19% during the second year
of the childs life. These findings are in line with my finding of the impacts of unpaid
maternity leave policy on mothers’ labor market outcomes; columns 3 and 6 of Table
(1.13) show that implementing a two-year paid maternity leave policy that freezes
wages to the level before the leave would increase the labor force participation of
educated and non-educated mothers of six-year-old children by about 20% and 34%,
respectively.
Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck (2014) study the impact of five expansions in leave cover-
age in Germany on German mothers’ labor supply. They find that with regard to the
long-run effects of the expansions in leave coverage, four out of the five expansions in
leave coverage had almost no impact on mothers employment rates and labor income
three to six years after arrival of children. In all of these four reforms the job protec-
59See Rossin-Slater (2017b) for a review on studies on maternity and family leave
policies.
62
tion period is as long as or exceeds the maternity benefit period. By contrast, for the
other reform, which extended the maternity benefit period beyond the job protection
period the result is different; they find this reform discouraged up to 4% of mothers
from returning to work when their child was six years old, and lowered their labor
income by roughly 8%. This finding is consistent with my finding of the impact of
paid maternity leave on mothers’ labor market outcomes (column 2 of Table (1.13)).
Childcare Subsidy Program
I also implement a counterfactual policy under which families receive subsidies for
their childcare costs. Previous studies have investigated the impacts of childcare poli-
cies on fertility rate, mother’s labor market outcomes, and child health (see Bauern-
schuster et al. (2016); Baker et al. (2008); Havnes and Mogstad (2011)). This is the
first study, however, to investigate the potential impacts of childcare policies on the
timing of birth, and through it on child skill level.
Table (1.14) shows the results of the above-mentioned childcare subsidy policy.
The first to third columns provide the results of implementing the childcare policy
when 50%, 75%, and 100% of childcare costs are paid by the government. It turns out
that subsidizing childcare costs does not significantly change the maternal age. Even
though the effect of the mentioned childcare subsidy policy on maternal age at first
birth is not substantial, the policy would increase the final test scores of children by
around one-twentieth and one-tenth of a standard deviation for college graduates and
non-college graduates, respectively; this is because of higher financial resources for
child investment stemming from lower childcare costs and higher participation rates.
As Table (1.14) shows, providing a subsidy on child care costs would decrease the
reservation wage of mothers, so the labor force participation goes up; the observed
accepted wages go down. Consequently, women’s work experiences increase (under
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75% and 100% subsidies), which has positive impacts on the child goods expendi-
tures.60 My analysis suggests that under a free childcare program, the labor force
participation of educated and non-educated women would increase by about 45% and
40%, respectively. This finding is remarkably close to the finding of Barros et al.
(2011), who evaluate the causal impact of a childcare program on the maternal labor
market outcomes taking advantage of a lottery carried by the municipal government
in 2007 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Barros et al. (2011) find that access to free publicly
provided child care services led to a very large increase in the use of care (from 51%
to 94%), a considerable increase in mothers’ employment (from 36 to 46 percent),
and an almost doubling in the employment of mothers who were not working before
the lottery took place (from 9% to 17%).
Transfer Policy to Households
Finally, I investigate the impacts of two types of monetary transfer to the household:
(1) a $250 transfer per week in the form of nonlabor income to each family with a child
in the development stage, and (2) a transfer targeted to children by providing 250
dollars’ worth of child goods to the household each week during the development stage.
Table (1.15) reports the results. Mean maternal age at first birth does not change
significantly under any policy. However, due to the increase in financial resources
provided by the transfer to families, the average test score increases by about 2%
and 4% for children of college graduates and non-college graduates, respectively. The
impact is greater for non-college graduates because they have fewer financial resources.
This transfer policy reduces the inequality between high income families (college
graduates) and low-income families (non-college graduates). The impact of the second
60It is worth mentioning that I set the childcare cost to its lower bond, and that
might explain the mild effect obtained from the childcare subsidy policy.
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policy is larger because the entire transfer is invested in the children; In contrast
to the untargeted policy, families cannot use the targeted transfer to smooth their
consumption or leisure. However, the feasibility of implementing such a policy would
be under question. Under the second policy, the mean test score at the end of the
development stage increases by 11% and 15% for children of college graduates and
non-college graduates, respectively. These results suggest that the impact of a transfer
policy to households is substantially greater for less-educated mothers, which might
be due to them having fewer financial resources to invest in their children if they
work as much as educated women do, and also having fewer hours they can spend
with their children if they increase their hours of market work in order to match the
earnings of educated women.
1.6.3 Child’s Skills, Educational Attainment, and Future Earnings
In this section, I link the Child Development Supplements (CDS) to the Adult-
hood Supplements (TAS) to identify the relationship between the specific measure of
children’s skill that I used in this paper, i.e. Letter-Word identification test score,
and the future educational attainment and earnings of those children.
Table (1.16) reports the regression results that link LW test scores to the future
educational attainment of the CDS sample of children. Figure (1.10) shows the binned
scatterplot that depicts a strong relationship between the LW test scores and the
probability of having a college degree at age 24. It suggests that after controlling
for the mother’s education level and race, and for the gender of the child, a ten
percent increase in LW test score at ages 16-18 corresponds to an 0.63 percentage
point (2.0%) increase in the probability of having a bachelor’s degree seven to twelve
years after taking the LW test. Thus, the LW test score has a predictive power for
the future educational attainment of the child and therefore is a relevant measure of
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the child’s skill, at least with respect to her future educational attainment. Moreover,
using a back-of-the-envelope calculation, I can estimate the monetary benefits of the
previously-mentioned counterfactual policies.
Table (1.17) reports the regression results that link LW test scores to the future
annual earnings of the CDS sample of children. Figure (1.11) shows the binned scat-
terplot that depicts a strong relationship between LW test score and the future annual
earnings of the child. The results suggest that after controlling for the mother’s edu-
cation level and race, and for the birth order, age, education level, and gender of the
child, a ten percent increase in LW test score at ages 16-18 corresponds to increases
of 6.6% and 9.8% in annual earnings based on OLS and fixed-effect regressions, re-
spectively, seven to twelve years after taking the LW test.61 Note that this impact of
the LW test score is in addition to its impact on educational attainment. The results
suggest that the LW test score has a predictive power for the future income of the
child, and thus is a relevant measure of child skill, at least with respect to her skills
later in the labor market.
Now, using some simple back-of-the-envelope calculations, I evaluate the impacts
of the maternity leave policies discussed earlier in this section in terms of a money-
metric measure. I focus only on educated individuals here. First, it is worth noting
that the fixed-effect regression results in column 3 of Table (1.17) suggest that a 10%
increase in LW test score increases annual earnings 7-14 years later by about 9.8%,
and this is in addition to the positive impact of increased LW test score on educational
attainment. Second, from Table (1.16), a 10% increase in LW test score increase the
probability of getting a four-year college degree by about 4.8 percentage point (16%).
Now, I use Zimmerman (2014) to find the causal impact of getting a four-year
61I observe a similar relationship between the LW test score and the future hourly
wages. Figure (A.11) in the Supplementary Appendix depicts such a relationship
when I use hourly wages instead of annual earnings.
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college degree on thd future earnings. Zimmerman (2014) studies the impact of
admission to a low-ranked public university on the future earnings of academically
marginal students. For a marginal admission, he estimated earnings gains of 22%
between eight and 14 years after high school completion. Here, I use Zimmerman’s
finding to set a lower bound for the average return to earnings of obtaining a four-
year college degree. In Zimmerman’s paper, the average return includes students who
were admitted to college but later dropped out. Moreover, his result is based on
data from a non-competitive public university. Hence, it seems that I can set 22%
as conservative estimate, i.e. a lower bound, for the return to completing four-year
college program. Hence, a 10% increase in mean LW test score increases the future
earnings of children, on average, by about 22∗0.16 ≈ 3.5%, and does so only through
increasing the probability of earning a four-year college degree that positively impacts
their earnings. Thus, the 4.96% increase in the LW test scores of children under the
unpaid maternity leave policy can be translated to a 3.5∗0.5 ≈ 1.8% increase in future
wages through the channel of college attainment. Moreover, according to Table (1.16),
that 4.96% increase can be translated to a 0.5∗9.8 ≈ 4.9% increase in future earnings
on top of the impact of higher educational attainment. In total, an 4.96% increase in
the mean LW test scores of children resulting from the unpaid maternity leave policy
can be considered as an increase of about 4.9+1.8 = 6.7% in the mean future earnings
of the children.62 Regarding the paid maternity policy, after a similar calculation, the
62I can also apply some back-of-the-envelope calculations for the monetary cost of
implementing such a maternity leave policy. While implementing this policy is costless
for the government, it may affect the profit of firms because they have to pay the same
wage to mothers who take the maternity leave and come back to work even though
their human capital is not the same as before (due to deprecation rate associated with
being out of work). Thus, one might consider this policy as a redistribution from firms
to working mothers, which benefits children of these mothers (6.7% increase in future
earnings). One way to look at the cost to firms is to see how the wage bills change
after implementing the policy. Implementing an unpaid maternity leave policy would
increase the wage bills (defined as hours of market work times the hourly wage) by
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change in the mean children’s test score can be translated to a 2.9% increase in annual
earnings.63
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, using reduced-form regressions, I presented evidence of the negative
relationship between mother’s age at childbirth and child’s skill level. However, I also
showed that mothers’ ages are correlated with the amount of time that mothers spend
with their children; thus, the reduced-form estimate of the pure effect of mother’s age
at childbirth on child’s skill level is biased. Then, I developed a structural model to
investigate the effect of delayed childbearing on the child’s skill level. I studied the
problem women face in choosing the timing of childbirth while taking into account
possible negative and positive effects of delayed childbearing on the child’s skill level.
I developed a life-cycle model of child development while endogenizing the timing of
childbearing to assess the effect of maternal age at childbirth on the child’s skill level.
The model also helped me determine the effect of the mother’s age versus those of
all the inputs that a child receives from their parents during the child development
process. Knowing that advanced maternal age at childbirth may be associated with
negative effects on the child’s skill level, individuals choose the timing of childbearing,
about 10%. It is worth noting that mothers also benefit from the policy through both
higher wages (so more consumption), and higher child skill levels. These benefits,
however, have not been captured by my cost-benefit analysis here.
63I can also apply some back-of-the-envelope calculations for the monetary cost of
implementing such a paid maternity leave policy. In this case, there is a cost only
during the leave because the firm does not compensate for depreciation rates in the
periods following childbirth, when the mother goes back to work. The post-policy
maternal age is about 25. On average, the government has to pay only once for each
agent, amounting to twice her annual earnings at age 25. If I suppose that each
individual works on average for 30 years, then the cost burden of the policy is equal
to 2 ∗ 1
30
≈ 6.7% of their annual earnings. Again, we should note that mothers also
benefit from the policy through both higher wages (so more consumption), and higher
child skill levels.
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make labor supply decisions, and provide time and money inputs into the child’s skill
formation process during the development period.
In the model presented in this paper, each individual can increase her work expe-
rience by one unit in each period through working in that period. She also decides
the timing of childbirth. Individuals receive utility from the skill level of their chil-
dren. If a woman decides to conceive a child in a given period, she has to drop out
of the labor force for that period. Therefore, the opportunity cost of having a child
at early periods is higher because the forgone human capital will affect her wages in
all subsequent periods. Moreover, the opportunity cost of having a child is higher
for highly-educated women because their forgone wages are greater. When a child
is born, the woman chooses to allot her time optimally among leisure, work, and
childcare and to allocate her money between consumption and child goods expendi-
tures. Therefore, when it comes to the timing of childbirth, women face a trade-off:
if they have a child earlier in their life-cycle, the child is more likely to have higher
productivity in acquiring skills, but the net present value of forgone wages is higher,
which indicates there would be fewer resources available to invest in the child during
early childhood. This trade-off leads more educated women to have children later in
their life-cycles, which is consistent with the studied data.
I estimated the model and found a negative effect of advanced maternal age at
childbirth on the child’s productivity. With everything else constant, delaying ma-
ternity age by five years decreases the child’s skill level by about 11%. However, con-
sistent with the data, the model predicts that even though highly-educated women
delay childbearing, the skill levels of their children at the end of the development
process are, on average, actually higher than those of the children of less-educated
women. This finding highlights the effects of inputs that a child receives from her
parents during childhood.
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In this paper, I showed that implementing a maternity leave policy that freezes
the wages of mothers decreases maternal age at first birth by about two years and
increases the human capital of children by about 5%, which leads them to earn 6.6%
more in adulthood. I also investigated the effects of a childcare subsidy program,
which pays a portion of childcare costs to families. The effect of the policy depends
on childcare costs and the amount of subsidy. Overall, the policy might not be as
effective as the described maternity leave policy in terms of lowering maternal age at
first birth and boosting the human capital of children.
Future work should address the role of credit constraint in the timing of fertility
and child investments. First, there is no opportunity for borrowing and saving in
this model. If I allowed for saving and borrowing, I could investigate the effects of
credit constraints on the timing of childbirth and child skill levels. It would also
be interesting to investigate the effect of uncertainty concerning labor and nonlabor
incomes on the timing of childbearing and child skill levels within the framework
presented in this paper.
In this paper, I analyzed the impacts of implementing a maternity leave policy on
the timing of first birth and child skill levels. From a policy perspective, it is also
important to study the impacts of such a policy on the demand side of the labor
market. The model developed in this paper can be extended to analyze the overall
impacts of a maternity leave policy in a general equilibrium context. Moreover, the
impacts of a maternity policy are heterogeneous across women depending on their
education levels. Hence, it is also interesting to investigate how implementing such a
policy might change women’s educational decisions.
70
1.8 Figures
Figure 1.1: Distribution of Age at First Childbirth by Education Level
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Notes: This graph shows the distribution of age at first birth for women aged 40 or above in 2015.
High school level is defined as 12 completed years of schooling or less. College graduates are defined
as 16 completed years of schooling or more.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History
(1985-2015).
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Figure 1.2: The Risk of Low Birthweight and the Maternal Age
Notes: Low birthweight indicates that the baby is born weighing less than 5 pounds, 8 ounces (i.e.
88 ounces, or 2500 grams).
High school level is defined as 12 completed years of schooling. College graduates are defined as 16
completed years of schooling.
The probability of low birthweight at each maternal age is calculated base on the coefficient estimates
reported in Panel A of Table (1.4).
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History
(1985-2015).
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Figure 1.3: Timing of events in period t
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Figure 1.4: Estimated Technology Parameters by Child Age
Notes: This graphs estimated parameters by child age (from Table (1.8)).
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Figure 1.5: Estimated Depreciation Parameters by Mother’s Age
Notes: This graphs estimated effect of career interruption on human capital by women’s age (from
Table (1.9)).
It shows the estimated depreciation rate of human capital associated with one year being out of the
labor market.
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Figure 1.6: Sample Fit of Average Childs Letter Word Score (Non-college Graduates)
Notes: Data is actual data from sample of non-college mothers with one child. Simulated is the
model prediction at estimated parameters given above.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2014 interviews and 1967-2015
PSID core data.
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Figure 1.7: Sample Fit of Average Childs Letter Word Score (College Graduates)
Notes: Data is actual data from sample of college mothers with one child. Simulated is the model
prediction at estimated parameters given above.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2014 interviews and 1967-2015
PSID core data.
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Figure 1.8: Sample Fit of Distribution of Age at First Birth (Non-college Graduates)
Notes: Data is actual data from sample of non-college mothers with at least one child in 2015.
Simulated is the model prediction at estimated parameters given above.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2014 interviews and 1967-2015
PSID core data.
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Figure 1.9: Sample Fit of Distribution of Age at First Birth (College Graduates)
Notes: Data is actual data from sample of college mothers with at least one child in 2015. Simulated
is the model prediction at estimated parameters given above.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2014 interviews and 1967-2015
PSID core data.
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Figure 1.10: The Letter-Word Test Score and Future College Attainment
Notes:This Graph shows the relationship between children’s Letter-Word (LW) test scores at age
16-18 and their future college attainment, 7 to 12 years later, i.e. when they were between 23 to 30
years of old.
The x-axis variable is LW test score of children in CDS dataset. Children were between ages 16-18
when they took the LW test.
The y-axis variable show the predicted probability of having a college degree in 2015, when the
children were between 23 to 30 years of old.
The binned scatterplot is shown here. The plot shows the regression in column (2) of Table (1.16),
binned into 20 bins.
Source: CDS dataset (2002-2007) combined with TAS dataset (2005-2007-2009-2011-2013-2015).
80
Figure 1.11: The Letter-Word Test Score and Future Earnings
Notes:This Graph shows the relationship between children’s Letter-Word (LW) test scores at age
16-18 and their future earnings, 7 to 12 years later, i.e. when they were between 23 to 30 years of
old.
The x-axis variable is LW test score of children in CDS dataset. Children were between ages 16-18
when they took the LW test.
The y-axis variable is the predicted log annual earnings in 2014, when the children were between 23
to 30 years of old.
The binned scatterplot is shown here. The plot shows the regression in column (1) of Table (1.17),
binned into 20 bins.
Source: CDS dataset (2002-2007) combined with TAS dataset (2015).
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1.9 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Non-college College Graduates
Variable Mean Mean
First child LW test score 34.9 37.9
(15.4) (15.5)
First child’s age 9.9 9.5
(4.1) (4.0)
Mother’s age at first birth 22.4 27.2
(5.5) (5.2)
Mother’s years of schooling 11.7 15.5
(1.43) (1.2)
Father’s hourly wage ($) 17.6 24.6
(10.7) (17.3)
Mother’s hourly wage ($) 12.7 16.7
(8.6) (11.8)
Mother’s hours worked (per week) 16.9 22.8
(17.9) (22.8)
Father’s hours worked (per week) 38.0 39.6
(17.4) (15.1)
Moms’ time with child (hrs/week) 33.6 35.3
(19.0) (18.9)
Note: This Table shows summary statistics of the subsample of obser-
vations for which age at first birth was after 18.
Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2014
interviews and 1968-2015 PSID core data.
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Table 1.2: Linear Regression of Low Birthweight (LBW) on Maternal Age
Probability of LBW (%)
Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother’s age at 1st birth (agepi ) -2.16** 0.47*** -1.71* 0.60***
(1.00) (0.16) (1.01) (0.16)
Age square (agepi
2) 0.05** – 0.04** –
(0.02) – (0.02) –
Mean dependent variable 8.24 8.24 8.24 8.24
Child’s gender dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education level dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Paternal age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marital status dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family income No No Yes Yes
Observations 3169 3169 3169 3169
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: 100 ∗LBWi = β1agepi +β2agepi 2 +αWi +ui, for the quadratic specification in columns (1) and (3).
100 ∗ LBWi = β1agepi + αWi + ui, for linear specification in columns (2) and (4).
Low birthweight (LBW) indicates that the baby is born weighing less than 5 pounds, 8 ounces (i.e. 88
ounces, or 2500 grams).
Income levels are measured at the year in which the first child is born.
In columns 3 and 4, the missing data on income is treated as follows: I plugged in an arbitrary value (-9)
for all missing data cases on incomes, and I included in the regression a dummy variable coded 1 if data
in the original variable was missing (i.e. a value has been plugged in for missing data), 0 otherwise. Table
A.4 in the Supplementary Appendix shows the case when I do not adjust for the missing data on incomes,
and the number of observations decreases.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History (1985-2015)
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Table 1.3: Low Birthweight Risk Regression Using Age Intervals
Probability of LBW (%)
(1) (2) (3)
15 <Maternal age at first birth ≤ 20 2.54 1.78 1.78
(2.46) (2.50) (2.50)
25 < Maternal age at first birth ≤ 30 2.86 3.71* 4.27**
(2.10) (2.15) (2.17)
30 < Maternal age at first birth ≤ 35 10.53*** 11.65*** 12.86***
(2.82) (2.88) (2.95)
35 < Maternal age at first birth ≤ 40 13.51*** 14.84*** 16.68***
(4.34) (4.40) (4.51)
40 < Maternal age at first birth ≤ 45 25.45** 26.52** 27.59**
(11.13) (11.23) (11.23)
45 < Maternal age at first birth ≤ 50 90.94*** 92.89*** 97.84***
(27.91) (27.83) (27.94)
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Paternal age dummies Yes Yes Yes
Marital status dummies Yes Yes Yes
Education level dummies No Yes Yes
Family income No No Yes
Observations 1580 1580 1580
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.03 0.04
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: 100∗LBWi = I15<AFB≤20+I25<AFB≤30+I30<AFB≤35+I35<AFB≤40+I40<AFB≤45+I45<AFB≤50+αWi+ui,
where I25<AFB≤30 is an indicator variable equal to one if mother’s age at first birth is between 20 and 25 and zero otherwise,
and W is the vector of control variables.
Low birthweight (LBW) indicates that the baby is born weighing less than 5 pounds, 8 ounces (2500 grams).
The baseline group for comparison is mothers whose age at first birth are between 20 and 25, which is the omitted dummy
in the above regression. The mean dependent variable for the baseline group is 7.3.
Income levels are measured at the year in which the first child is born.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History (1985-2015).
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Table 1.4: Linear Regression of LBW on Maternal Age
Panel A: By Education Level
Non-college College Graduates
Prob. of LBW (%) Prob. of LBW (%)
Mother’s age at 1st birth (agepi ) -4.10* 0.42**
(2.17) (0.20)
Age square (agepi
2) 0.09** –
(0.04) –
Mean dependent variable 11.30 7.03
Observations 777 657
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.03
Panel B: By Income Level
Below-Median Above-Median
Prob. of LBW (%) Prob. of LBW (%)
Mother’s age at 1st birth (agepi ) -5.26** 1.06**
(2.45) (0.31)
Age square (agepi
2) 0.12*** –
(0.05) –
Mean dependent variable 11.23 8.27
Child’s gender dummy Yes Yes
Race dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Education dummies Yes Yes
Observations 800 800
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.05
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: 100 ∗ LBWi = β1agepi + β2agepi 2 + αWi + ui, for the quadratic specification in column (1).
100 ∗ LBWi = β1agepi + αWi + ui, for linear specification in column (2).
Low birthweight (LBW) indicates that the baby is born weighing less than 5 pounds, 8 ounces
(i.e. 88 ounces, or 2500 grams).
Estimates in Panel A are controlled for family income, and estimates in Panel B are controlled for
education level.
Estimates in Panel A are represented for two levels of education, separately. The first column
reports the result for non-college graduates (i.e. 12 years of schooling), and the second column
shows the results for college graduates (i.e. 16 years of schooling).
Income levels are measured at the year in which the first child is born.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History
(1985-2015).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Regression Results Including Only One-child Families
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Score) ln(Score) ln(Score)
Mother’s age at 1st birth (agepi ) 0.001 -0.005 -0.014**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Mother’s years of schooling 0.040*** 0.030**
(0.015) (0.015)
Father’s years of schooling 0.010 -0.001
(0.011) (0.014)
Father’s hourly wage 0.007**
(0.003)
Father’s hours worked (per week) 0.005**
(0.002)
Mother’s hourly wage 0.006*
(0.003)
Mother’s hours worked (per week) -0.003
(0.002)
Child’s age dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes
Marital status dummies No No Yes
Paternal age dummies No No Yes
Child’s gender dummy No No Yes
Observations 206 206 206
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.88 0.89
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Ln(score)i,t = β1age
p
i + γZi,t + αWi + ui,t,
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Letter-Word Identification Test
score. I only use the data on the first child of mothers.
Child’s age is controlled in all above equations using age-specific dummy variables.
The coefficient of interest can be translated to 170 standard deviation of LW test
score, i.e, Z-score is equal to -0.014.
The coefficient of interest can be translated to 120 of average increase in LW test
score when a child becomes a year older.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2014 interviews.
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Table 1.6: Regression Results: Time Investment Per Week
(1) (2) (3)
Hours/week Hours/week Hours/week
(τ) (τ) (τ)
Age at 1st birth (agepi ) 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.19***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Years of schooling 0.20 0.30
(0.21) (0.22)
Mother’s hourly wage -0.01
(0.05)
Mother’s work hours per week -0.15***
(0.03)
Child’s age dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect dummies Yes Yes Yes
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of children dummies Yes Yes Yes
Marital status dummies No No Yes
Child’s gender dummy No No Yes
Observations 1726 1726 1726
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16 0.17
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: τi,t = β1age
p
i + γZi,t + αWi + ui,t,
The dependent variable is the weekly hours that the mother spends with her
child.
I only use the data on the first child of mothers.
Mean dependent variable is 34.
Child’s age is controlled in all above equations using age-specific dummy
variables.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2014 in-
terviews.
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Table 1.7: Preference Parameter Estimates
Parameter Description Value SE
α1 Consumption impact 0.420 0.0064
α2 Parents leisure impact 0.275 0.0035
α3 Child’s skill level impact 0.305 0.0228
ϕ Child’s skill multiplier after final period 0.026 0.0005
Table 1.8: Technology Parameter Estimates
Parameter Description Value SE
γ1,0 Last periods child quality intercept -2.0625 0.0050
γ2,0 Mother’s time intercept -1.1520 0.0083
γ3,0 Child expenditures intercept -2.8612 0.0111
γ1,1 Last periods child quality slope 0.0960 0.0010
γ2,1 Mother’s time slope -0.0596 0.0016
γ3,1 Child expenditures slope 0.0974 0.0010
1 Parameter in productivity factor equation -0.0150 0.0012
2 Parameter in productivity factor equation -0.0004 0.0001
3 Parameter of prod. wrt mother’s innate ability 0.0710 0.0047
A0,0 Constant term in skill formation technology 1.3813 0.0053
A0,1 Constant term in skill formation technology 0.0803 0.0003
σR Standard deviation of shocks to A 0.0086 0.0002
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Table 1.9: Depreciation Parameter Estimates
Parameter Description Value SE
δH,0 Depreciation rate intercept for non-college grads −2.29 0.1188
δC,0 Depreciation rate intercept for college grads −1.01 0.0459
δH,1 Depreciation rate slope for non-college grads −0.04 0.0017
δC,1 Depreciation rate slope for college grads −0.06 0.0032
Table 1.10: Wage Parameter Estimates and Pregnancy Parameter Estimates
Parameter Description Value SE
η0,C Intercept of the log hourly wages (college grads) 2.816 0.0355
η1,C Return to education (college grads) 0.110 0.0067
η2,C Coefficient of sq. experience (college grads) -0.006 0.0002
η0,H Intercept of log hourly wages (non-college grads) 2.431 0.1035
η1,H Return to education for college graduates 0.050 0.0013
η2,H Coefficient of sq. experience (non-college grads) -0.006 0.0002
σωC Std. dev. of log wage shocks (college grads) 0.549 0.0251
σωH Std. dev. of log wage shocks (non-college grads) 0.853 0.0645
λc Prob. of unintended births (college grads) 0.079 0.0022
λh Prob. of unintended births (non-college grads) 0.193 0.0374
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Table 1.11: Sample Fit
Moment College Graduates Non-college
Data Model Data Model
Mean age at the first birth 26.2 26.5 22.4 21.6
Mean test score at the last period 50.3 50.6 48.5 48.0
Mean wage at 2 years of experience 13.3 14.4 11.3 12.2
Mean wage at 8 years of experience 18.4 19.7 14.1 14.9
Mean hours worked per week 26.7 23.1 24.2 21.8
Mean time with the 1st child 21.9 30.5 21.7 30.9
Fraction of the 1st births after age 27 0.47 0.47 0.15 0.09
Fraction of unintended births 0.17 0.15 0.40 0.34
Corr(wsp, k) 0.19 0.24 0.19 0.23
Corr(agech, k) 0.85 0.71 0.85 0.56
Corr(agechild, τ) -0.44 -0.69 -0.47 -0.71
Corr(w, k) 0.14 0.27 0.14 0.14
Corr(x, k) 0.38 0.50 0.37 0.28
Corr(agep, ki,t − kt−5) -0.08 -0.06 0.02 -0.01
Notes: Data is actual data from sample of non-college mothers with at least one
child in 2015.
Simulated is the model prediction at estimated parameters given above.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2014 interviews and 1967-
2015 core data.
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Table 1.12: Decomposition Exercise
Percent Change from Baseline
Exercise (1) Exercise (2) Exercise (3)
Mean test score at age 16 11.4 -0.8 -1.6
Child goods fixed ↓ ↓
Time investments fixed fixed ↓
Age at first birth (AFB) 22 22 22
Notes: This Table decomposes the maternal age effect on the child’s skill level into the negative health effect of the maternal aging
and the positive impact of higher child investments. College graduates are considered for this exercise.
Exercise 1: First, I lower the maternal age of each educated mother from the benchmark (the fitted simulated dataset in which the
mean AFB is 27) to age 22. Hence, Exercise 1 assumes that everyone conceives a child at age 22. But the investments are the same
as the benchmark (no reduction in investments as a result of a reduction in maternal age). Thus, investments are those investments
that older parents would make, but the maternal age is 22.
Exercise 2 assumes that everyone conceive a child at age 22, and child investments are reduced accordingly with respect to the
mother’s wages. Child good expenditures are reduced in proportion to the reduce in the mother’s wage if the mother would conceive
a child at age 22, which means that the wage is lower due to both lower work experience and the high depreciation rate at age 22 .
Exercise 3 is the same as Exercise 2, but this time the time investments are also reduced according to the results of Table (1.6).
Time investments are reduced by 3%.
Numbers in this Table show the average of percentage changes from the baseline over the children in the simulated data (first changes
are calculated for each individual, and then, the average change is calculated).
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Table 1.13: Counterfactual Maternity Leave Policies
Moment College Graduates Non-college
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unpaid Paid Paid (no dep) Unpaid Paid Paid (no dep)
Percent Change from Baseline
Age at first birth -6.40 -7.89 -7.91 -1.72 -3.04 -3.04
Fraction of births after 35 -51.92 -61.54 -67.31 -9.09 -36.36 -36.36
Mean test score at age 16 4.96 2.16 5.87 3.04 1.03 3.71
Mean time w/ child at age 6 of children -6.58 13.35 -6.59 -9.59 0.76 -9.75
Mean child expenditures at age 6 of children 13.95 -32.42 10.94 29.44 -5.44 27.41
Fraction who works at age 6 of children 20.53 -45.19 19.75 33.23 -4.27 33.84
Mean hours worked at age 6 of children 22.06 -44.76 22.09 32.04 -2.54 32.58
Mean leisure at age 6 of children -6.58 13.35 -6.59 -9.59 0.76 -9.75
Mean consumption at age 6 of children 13.94 -32.47 10.93 29.44 -5.44 27.41
Mean wage at age 6 of children 13.17 -49.25 10.01 31.54 -3.59 29.83
Mean experience at age 6 of children -30.08 -58.56 -34.00 6.33 -10.35 2.89
Notes: All values are the percentage change from the baseline values given in prior tables.
Unpaid maternity leave policy: Under the unpaid maternity leave policy, mothers can leave their job for 2 years.
They can return to their work while receiving the same wage as before the childbirth.
Paid maternity leave policy: Under this policy, mothers can leave their job for 2 years and receive their previous wage.
They can return to their work after 2 years. Their wages, however, might be lower when back due to depreciation.
Paid (no depreciation) maternity leave policy: Mothers leave their job for 2 years and receive their previous wage.
They can return to their work while receiving the same wage as before the childbirth (there is no depreciation).
Fraction of births after age 35 in the benchmark is equal to 0.13 and 0.04 for college grads and non-college grads, respectively.
For each policy, first changes are calculated for each individual, and then, the average change is calculated.
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Table 1.14: Counterfactual Childcare Subsidy Policy
Moment College Graduates Non-college Graduates
Subsidy rate 50% 75% 100% 50% 75% 100%
Percent Change from Baseline
Age at first birth -0.10 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.10
Fraction of births after 35 -5.77 -1.92 -5.77 0.00 0.00 -9.09
Mean test score at age 16 0.04 0.74 1.15 0.96 1.52 2.19
Mean time w/ child at age 6 of children -1.66 -6.49 -9.06 -3.39 -5.14 -7.18
Mean child expenditures at age 6 of children -1.00 10.53 15.43 6.50 10.72 16.22
Fraction who works at age 6 of children 9.22 31.99 45.73 14.94 26.52 40.15
Mean hours worked at age 6 of children 5.58 21.77 30.38 11.31 17.18 23.99
Mean leisure at age 6 of children -1.66 -6.49 -9.06 -3.39 -5.14 -7.18
Mean consumption at age 6 of children -0.99 10.54 15.44 6.50 10.72 16.22
Mean wage at age 6 of children -11.19 -5.82 -7.72 -1.94 -3.29 -4.06
Mean experience at age 6 of children -1.96 10.37 14.45 5.70 9.39 13.84
Mean utility 2.27 3.30 3.91 3.30 4.36 5.45
Notes: All values are the percentage change from the baseline values given in prior tables.
50% subsidy policy: Under this policy, the government provides 50% subsidy on the child care cost.
75% subsidy policy: Under this policy, the government provides 70% subsidy on the child care cost.
100% subsidy policy: Under this policy, the government provides 100% subsidy on the child care cost (free public child care system).
Fraction of births after age 35 in the benchmark is equal to 0.13 and 0.04 for college graduates and non-college graduates, respectively.
For each policy, first changes are calculated for each individual, and then, the average change is calculated.
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Table 1.15: Counterfactual Transfer Policy
Moment College Graduates Non-college Graduates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Untargeted Targeted Untargeted Targeted
Percent Change from Baseline
Age at first birth 0.68 -0.66 0.50 -0.37
Fraction of births after 35 -4.08 -24.49 0.00 0.00
Mean test score at age 16 1.97 11.97 4.40 15.75
Mean time w/ child at age 6 of children 6.31 0.50 10.83 0.80
Mean child expenditures at age 6 of children 6.77 198.78 8.91 269.76
Fraction who works at age 6 of children -5.45 -0.89 -14.38 -1.89
Mean hours worked at age 6 of children -14.74 -1.17 -27.08 -2.00
Mean leisure at age 6 of children 6.31 0.50 10.83 0.80
Mean consumption at age 6 of children 6.77 -2.41 8.91 -1.83
Mean wage at age 6 of children 1.80 -2.57 5.53 -1.20
Mean experience at age 6 of children -1.32 -2.47 -5.57 -2.47
Notes: All values are the percentage change from the baseline values given in prior tables.
Untargeted policy: a $250 transfer per week in form of nonlabor income to each family with a child during the development stage.
Targeted policy: a transfer targeted to children by providing 250 dollars worth of child goods to the household each week.
Fraction of births after age 35 in the benchmark is 0.13 and 0.04 for college graduates and non-college graduates, respectively.
For each policy, first changes are calculated for each individual, and then, the average change is calculated.
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Table 1.16: Regression Results- LW Test Score and Educational Attainment
Pooled OLS Fixed-effect using siblings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High school Bachelor High school Bachelor
Log LW test score 0.52*** 0.77*** 0.63*** 0.43***
(0.06) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13)
Mean dependent variable 0.94 0.30 0.94 0.30
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s education dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Maternal age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth order dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1354 1354 1354 1354
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.22 0.26 0.19
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: hsi,2014 = β1ln(LWi,16yrs) + αWi + ui,
collegei,2014 = β1ln(LWi,16yrs) + αWi + ui,
This Table shows the relationship between children’s Letter-Word (LW) test scores at age 16-18 and their
future educational attainment, 7 to 12 years later, i.e. when they were between 23 to 30 years of old.
The regressor in this Table is LW test score of children in CDS dataset. Children were between ages 16-18
when they took the LW test.
In the first column, the dependent variable, i.e. hsi,2014, is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual
has a high school degree, and 0 otherwise. In the second column, the dependent variable, i.e. collegei,2014,
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has a bachelor’s degree, and 0 otherwise. The dependent
variable is related to the individual’s educational status in year 2014, when the children were between 23
to 30 years of old.
The last two columns report the family fixed-effect regression results. I use the within-family variations
in educational attainments and LW test scores, i.e. the variations in LW test scores and educational
attainments between the siblings in a family, to examine the relationship between the LW-test score and
the educational attainment.
A one-percent increase in LW test score is associated with 0.52 or 0.63 percentage point increase in the
probability of getting a high school degree based on pooled OLS or fixed-effect, respectively.
A one-percent increase in LW test score is associated with 0.77 or 0.43 percentage point increase in the
probability of getting a bachelore’s degree based on pooled OLS or fixed-effect, respectively.
Source: CDS dataset (2002-2007) combined with TAS (2005-2007-2009-2011-2013-2015).
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Table 1.17: Regression Results- LW Test Score and Future Earnings
Pooled OLS Fixed-effect
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(earnings) Ln(earnings) Ln(earnings)
Log LW test score 0.75** 0.66** 0.98***
(0.31) (0.32) (0.50)
Gender Yes Yes Yes
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s education dummies Yes Yes Yes
Maternal age dummies Yes Yes Yes
Birth order dummies Yes Yes Yes
Education level No Yes Yes
Observations 408 408 408
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.12 0.77
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: ln(earningsi,2014) = β1ln(LWi,16yrs) + αWi + ui,
This Table shows the relationship between children’s Letter-Word (LW) test scores at age 16-18
and their future earnings, 7 to 12 years later, i.e. when they were between 23 to 30 years of old.
The regressor in this Table is LW test score of children in CDS dataset. Children were between
ages 16-18 when they took the LW test.
The dependent variable is the log annual earnings in all regressions. All earnings are related to year
2014, when the children were between 23 to 30 years of old.
The last two columns report the family fixed-effect regression results. I use the within-family
variations in educational attainments and LW test scores, i.e. the variations in LW test scores and
annual earnings between the siblings in a family, to examine the relationship between the LW-test
score and the annual earnings.
A one-percent increase in LW test score is associated with 0.66 or 0.98 % increase in the annual
earnings based on pooled OLS or fixed-effect regressions, respectively, and this is on top of the
impacts of LW test score on the annual earnings.
Source: CDS dataset (2002-2007) combined with TAS dataset (2015).
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Chapter 2
GENDER MIX OF CHILDREN, MOTHERS EARNINGS, AND THE GENDER
WAGE GAP
2.1 Introduction
The gender wage gap (GWG) has been extensively studied over the past few
decades. In accounting for the observed differences in earnings between males and
females, early approaches to explaining the GWG focused on the role of human capital
(schooling and work experience), the family division of labor, compensating wage
differentials, gender differences in occupations/industries, and discrimination (Blau
and Kahn (2017)). These studies emphasize the role of differences in preferences,
comparative advantage, and job characteristics. Some recent papers highlight the role
of motherhood in explaining the gender gap in pay (Kleven et al. (2018); Cukrowska-
Torzewska and Lovasz (2016); Adda et al. (2017)). Among these studies, Kleven et al.
(2018) show that the arrival of children creates a gap in earnings. They find that 80%
of the GWG in Denmark for the year 2013 can be attributed to the arrival of children.
Gallen (2018) studies the relationship between the gender productivity gap, the pay
gap, and motherhood in Denmark. The study finds that 75% of the GWG can be
accounted for by productivity differences between men and women. However, while
the earnings gap coincides with the productivity gap for mothers, the productivity
gap is so small that it cannot explain the GWG for young women without children,
suggesting there is a discrimination against young, non-mother female workers.1
1Researchers tend to use regression analysis to decompose the gap in pay into that
which can be attributed to observable differences between males and females workers
and a residual is usually perceived as discrimination; see Blau and Kahn (2017) for a
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If a sizable portion of the gap in pay between males and females is due to the arrival
of children as Kleven et al. (2018) find, or if it can be attributed to the decline in
future productivity of women expected for childbirth (and/or interruption of women’s
work as a consequence of childbearing), then one might ask the following question:
Assuming perfect foresight for individuals, how might this anticipated child penalty”
affect females’ decisions to invest in human capital, and thereby their earnings? Most
of the previous studies have focused on the ex-post effects of children given choices
made before arrival of children, and less is known about the ex-ante effects of fertility
plans on women’s earnings.2 In this paper, I aim to shed light on the influence of
female workers’ expectations regarding their future fertility behavior on their current
investment in human capital through on-the-job training. This study is designed to
investigate the extent to which there is a wage differential between female workers, if
any, based on their expectations about future fertility decisions. The question I ask is
For women at child-bearing ages, what is the effect of the anticipation of motherhood
in terms of earnings and other labor market outcomes?
In this paper, I utilize variation in the gender mix of children to investigate the
role of the female’s expectation regarding future fertility in guiding her human capital
investments and earnings. The genders of children are generally exogenously deter-
mined, i.e. their assignment is a quasi-random event. As soon as a second child is
born, the gender mix of children comes into play, and it exogenously changes the like-
lihood of future fertility. Parental preferences for variety in their children’s genders
make mothers of children of the same gender more likely to conceive another child.
This exogenous heterogeneity in the likelihood of further fertility helps me identify
survey of the literature.
2Adda et al. (2017) is an exception. They assess the contribution of fertility to the
gender wage gap within a dynamic model of career choice, human capital accumula-
tion, and labor supply decisions. However, they mainly focus on the effects of fertility
on occupational choices.
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the impacts of fertility expectation on a woman’s earnings.
I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1997 (NLSY97), and National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79)
datasets to investigate the role of anticipation of motherhood on females’ earnings. I
track females’ labor market decisions (i.e. labor force participation, hours of market
work, and occupations/industries) and their labor market outcomes (i.e, labor income
and hourly wages) over their life-cycle. The datasets also provide rich information on
each individual’s fertility-related behavior (such as the number of children, timing of
births, and the marital status), as well as each individual’s age, race, and educational
attainment. Thus, I observe how each individual’s labor market outcome changes over
time, both before and after each childbirth. I consider the gender mix of children as
a treatment, mothers with children of different genders as the control group, and
mothers of children of the same sex as the treatment group. Then, in an event study
framework, I investigate the effects of the quasi-random assignment of gender mix on
the treatment group.
I find that having two children of the same gender (two boys or two girls) is
associated with between 4% and 6% lower hourly wages for the mother after the
second birth compared to having two children of opposite sexes, regardless of the
number of children the mother will ultimately have. I find that parental preferences
for variety make having a third child about 12% more likely when the first two are of
the same gender. I argue that mothers with two boys or two girls perceive themselves
more likely to bear one more child, so are less attached to the labor market compared
to mothers with one boy and one girl. The wage differential between mothers of
same-gender children and opposite-gender children exists even for women who never
conceived a third child. Having a third child is probabilistic; women who will have
a third child do not know this fact beforehand with certainty. However, mothers
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who have two children of the same gender face a higher probability of conceiving a
third child. In other words, when it comes the the impact of sibling genders on their
mother’s earnings, the mother’s beliefs about the likelihood of future fertility matters,
not the actual future fertility. I also provide support for this hypothesis using data
on individuals’ beliefs concerning their future fertility plans.
In order to model the impact of a woman’s expectation regarding her future fer-
tility on human capital investments, I follow Polachek et al. (2008); I assume that in
each period, each individual maximizes her expected present value of life-time earn-
ings by allocating optimally her resources to human capital investments. In a given
period, actual earnings are potential earnings minus investment costs. Human capital
investments increase the individual’s human capital stock and future earnings power.
The expected lifetime labor force participation influences an individual’s human cap-
ital investments. The higher the expected labor force participation, the more gains
from investments in human capital, the higher the amount of investments, and higher
wages. Thus, the higher probability of future fertility, the lower expected life-time
labor force participation, the lower gains from investing in human capital, the lower
wages. This model explains how an exogenous shock to the probability of future fer-
tility, driven by the gender mix of the first two children, affects one’s human capital
investment decisions, so wages.
One might argue that the consequences of having a third child might not be as
significant of those of a first childbirth and therefore individual’s beliefs about the
likelihood of their future fertility are not relevant for their human capital investments.
To address this concern, using a difference-in-differences event study approach, I find
that labor force participation declines by about 30% right after a third childbirth
compared to the year before the third pregnancy. Also, for those who continue to
participate in the labor market after a their third childbirth, hours of market work
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decrease by about 30%. Hence, conceiving a third child is associated with sizable
reductions in labor force participation at both extensive and intensive margins, and
the higher the probability of a third childbirth, the higher is the probability of a
reduction in labor force participation in future. Anticipation of this discontinuous
labor force participation affects individuals’ decisions on human capital investment
and on-the-job training. Hence, on average, mothers of two children of the same
gender have less incentive to invest in their own human capital and face lower wages
compared to mothers of children with opposite genders.
Kuziemko et al. (2018) hypothesize that when women are making key human
capital decisions, they underestimate the impact of motherhood on their future labor
supply; they do not anticipate the substantial and persistent ”motherhood penalty”.
Results of this paper might suggest that women do anticipate the consequences of the
arrival of children. However, the results also might be reconciled with the findings of
Kuziemko et al. (2018) in the following sense: in this paper I use data on the gender
mix of children and therefore all women in my sample already have two children,
which means they have faced with the consequences of childbirth on their labor market
outcomes in the past and learned from it. Hence, they can anticipate the consequences
of an additional childbirth on their labor market outcomes.
Also, it is worth mentioning that the gender mix of children has been widely used
as an Instrumental Variable (IV) to study the effect of family size on labor market
outcomes. The results of this paper cast doubt on the validity of using this IV in
many applications within the literature.
2.2 Data
I utilize the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and four waves of its Child
Development Supplement (CDS). The PSID is a longitudinal survey of a nationally-
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representative sample of U.S. families. It was initiated in 1968 including about 4,800
families. Data was collected for those families and their descendants in different
waves over 49 years, through 2017. Currently, PSID collects information on almost
25000 individuals in more than 10000 families. The dataset includes characteristics
of parents such as their age at childbirth, education level, hours worked, accepted
wages, household income, and hours spent with children (see Dascola et al. (2015) for
the PSID Main Interview User Manual, and Hofferth et al. (1997) for the user’s guide
to the CDS.). I also use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97)
and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). The NLSY79 is a
nationally representative sample of 12,686 young men and women who were 14-22
years old when they were first surveyed in 1979. These individuals were interviewed
annually through 1994, and biennially thereafter. The NLSY97 consists of a nationally
representative sample of about 9,000 youths who were 12 to 16 years old in 1996. The
first wave was conducted in 1997. For this paper, I mainly use data from PSID in
the empirical analysis. I use the NLSY79 and NLSY97 datasets for robustness checks
with respect to the choice of dataset.
Table (2.1) provides summary statistics for the PSID data used throughout the
paper. Notably, the median number of children at age 40 for mothers whose first two
children have different genders is two, while the median is three for mothers whose
first two children have the same gender. More precisely, 53% of mothers with two
children of the same gender will rear another child, compared to 47% of mothers with
two children of different genders.
2.3 Evidence from the PSID
The question posed in the first section has implications for the gender mix of
children, which can be tested by observational data. Under three assumptions that:
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(1) parental preferences for variety make having a third child more likely when
the first two have the same gender, i.e. there is a desire to have at least one of each
gender;
(2) the gender of children is assigned exogenously; and
(3) females, while investing in their own human capital, might take their future
fertility decisions (and their consequences) into account,
I hypothesize that there might be a human capital differential between females with
two children of the same gender and females with two children of different genders,
and this differential could be reflected in their hourly wages.
I test the first assumption using the observatiobal data. Specifically, I test whether
or not the gender mix of children has predictive power for the total number of children
that a woman will have.
In Tables (2.2), I use different models to estimate the effect of having two children
of the same sex on the probability of having further children. The dependent variable
is an indicator variable, which is equal to one if the individual has her third child by
age 40, and zero otherwise. The first column of Table (2.2) shows the results from
a linear probability model. The coefficient of interest is positive and statistically
significant at the one percent confidence level. Mothers who have two children of the
same gender are about six percentage points (i.e. about 12%) more likely to have
further children by the end of their childbearing years, i.e. age 40. The second and
third columns show the results from using probit and logit models, respectively. The
coefficient of interest is again positive and statistically significant at the one percent
level. All told, these results show that the gender mix of children is informational
concerning the future fertility of women. Tables (B.1) in the Supplementary Appendix
show the results of using indicators for the gender of children when a mother has two
children with the same gender, i.e. having two boys might impact the probability of
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having further children differently than having two girls. The results suggest that the
effect of having two boys is similar to the effect of having two girls. Again, mothers
who have then children of the same gender are about 12% more likely to have further
children by the end of their childbearing age.3
Moreover, in the dataset that I use, the individuals are explicitly asked whether
they want to have more children in future. Hence, there is data on individuals’ beliefs
concerning their future fertility plans. Restricting the sample to mothers with exactly
two children, it can be seen that those with two children of the same sex are more
likely to show interest in having more children, and this is significantly different from
mothers of children with different genders. These results are reported in Tables (2.3).
Similar to the ex-post analysis in Table (2.2), I use linear probability, probit, and logit
models to investigate the effects of child gender on ex-ante fertility decisions.4 The
results from these models are similar to the ex-post analysis. However, the coefficients
of interest are bigger in ex-ante case.
The results in Tables (2.2) and (2.3) show that I can confirm the first assumption
based on both individuals’ actual fertility behavior and their beliefs regarding their
future fertility plans.
As the fertility rate has declined over the past four decades, one might expect that
nowadays, not many people decide to have more than two children. To address this
concern, I look at the distribution of family sizes in the US over the past four decades.
Figure (B.2) in the Supplementary Appendix shows that in 1976, 65% of mothers age
3Figure (B.1) in the Supplementary Appendix shows how the marginal effect of
the gender mix of children on future fertility decisions has changed over the past few
decades for different cohorts. All point estimates are significantly different from zero.
Overall, mothers who have two children of the same gender are 8 to 13% more likely
to have further children by the end of their childbearing age, compared to mothers
with children of different genders.
4Table (B.2) in the Supplementary Appendix shows the results from using different
indicators for mothers with two boys and mothers with two girls. The results are
similar to Table (2.3).
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40 to 44 had at least three children, while in 1994 and 2014 that became 36% and
38%, respectively. The highest frequency of children in 1976 was four, followed by
three, two, and one, and the median number of children was three. However, in the
mid-nineties the median number of children was two and the highest frequency is
two children, followed by three, one and four children. This pattern has remained
stable thereafter. Hence, it seems that four decades ago, the marginal mother was
deciding between having three or more children, while nowadays, the marginal mother
is deciding between having two or three children. Therefore, the gender mix of children
might play a larger role in determining the likelihood of rearing a third child.
Assuming that parents have no control over the gender of their child, I exploit ex-
ogenous variation in the gender mix of children to examine the effect of the likelihood
of future fertility on labor market outcomes.5
2.3.1 Regression Analysis
I use a Mincerian wage equation in order to investigate the impact of children
gender mix on mothers’ hourly wages:
log(wit) = β0 + β1potit + β2pot
2
it + β3dit + β4samei + it, (2.1)
where wit denotes the hourly wage of individual i at time t; potit is their potential
experience; dit is the education level measured as completed years of schooling; samei
is an indicator variable that is one if the first two children are of the same gender,
and zero otherwise; and it is a zero conditional mean error term, which is assumed
to be i.i.d., normally distributed over individuals, and time-invariant.6 I control for
year fixed-effects, race, etc. by adding dummy variables to the regression specified
5It is unlikely that they deliberately terminate pregnancies using abortion when
the gender of their child is realized. This is because abortion might have negative
impacts on both their health and their future fertility outcomes.
6The potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six.
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above. The coefficient of interest is β4, which captures the effect of children with the
same sex on their mother’s wages.
I also use a similar setting to examine the impact of the gender mix of children
on other aspects of mothers’ labor market outcomes, including labor force participa-
tion, labor income, and hours of market work. The results are reported in the next
subsection.
2.3.2 Results
Table (2.4) reports the regression results for Equation (2.1). The criteria used for
sample selection are as follows: I only use observations on women. The sample is
restricted to women in PSID who are of childbearing age (between ages 21 and 40). I
also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Then, the sample is selected based on the following time restrictions: at least two years
after the second childbirth and before a third childbirth. Hence, all observations on
wages are from women with two children where the age of the youngest child is greater
than two. These individuals might end up having two or three children, but I only use
observations corresponding to periods in which only two children exist.7 I also focus
on women with greater than high school education as these women are working in
positions that need some skills and doing tasks that require some knowledge, training,
and human capital. These individuals are more likely to improve their skills through
on-the-job training and investing in their human capital, the better to get promoted.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly wage. I control for age
effects using age-specific dummy variables. I also control for year fixed-effects in all
regressions. Moreover, I control for the number of children that they will have by age
7This is because I do not want the coefficient of the gender mix of children to pick
up the effects of a third child on female wages.
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40 as this number might reveal some information about their types. The coefficient
of interest, i.e. the coefficient on samei, is negative, statistically significant, and
sizable, -0.04. This coefficient does not change significantly as I control for additional
confounding factors. In column 2, the state fixed effects are controlled for. Column
3 reports the results when I control for occupation and industry fixed effects as well.
Hours of market work and ages at births are also controlled as confounding factors in
columns 4 and 5, respectively. As column 5 shows, after controlling for all confounding
factors, the coefficient of interest is -0.05, statistically significant at the five percent
level. This result is economically significant as the order of magnitude of the effect
is comparable to the return to one more additional year of schooling at college, i.e,
0.07 according to the results in column 5.
Table (B.3) in the Supplementary Appendix shows the results when I do not
control for the number of children that each individual ultimately will have. These
results are similar in magnitude to the results in Table (2.4), which might suggest that
women who will have a third child do not know this fact beforehand with certainty.
In other words, having a third child is probabilistic. However, mothers who have two
children of the same gender face a higher probability of conceiving a third child. I also
provide support for the hypothesis that a third child is probabilistic by restricting
the sample to individuals who end up having only two children as of age 40. Table
(2.5) reports the results, which still shows the gender mix effect.
Table (B.4) in the Supplementary Appendix reports the results when using differ-
ent indicators for having two boys versus having two girls. It seems that the effects
of these gender combinations are not significantly different.
Table (B.5) in the Supplementary Appendix reports the results when I select the
sample based on a narrower range of childbearing ages, i.e. individuals between age
21 and 35. In this case, the coefficient of interest increases (in absolute value) to
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-0.06, after controlling for all confounding factors in the last column. It is worth
mentioning that the coefficient is more precisely estimated in this case, and it is
statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns.
As explained earlier, in the dataset that I use, the individuals are explicitly asked
whether they want to have more children in future. I use the data on individuals’
beliefs concerning their future fertility plans along with their hourly wages to find the
impact of uncertainties about future fertility on hourly wages of these women. In the
survey, women are asked about their future fertility as follows: ”How sure are you
that you will not have any (more) children? (1) sure or very sure, (2) fairly sure or
hope not to, (3) will have a child/not sure/do not know”. I define dummy variables
corresponding to answers to this question regarding future fertility. Then, I use a
regression similar to equation (2.1), in which, instead of using gender mix of children,
I use dummy variables that indicate individual’s uncertainties about her future fer-
tility behavior. Table (2.6) shows the results. The benchmark in the regression, i.e.
omitted dummy variable, is when the individual has mentioned that she will have
a child in future, or she is not sure, or she does not know about her future fertility
plans (answer (3) to the question above). It turns out that after controlling for the
education level, race, year fixed-effect, state fixed-effect, and hours of market work,
individuals who are certain that they will not have any (more) children, on average,
have hourly wages 7% higher than those who are uncertain about having a child in
future. It is also interesting that individuals who are fairly sure that they will not
have a child in future, on average, have hourly wages 5% higher than those who are
uncertain about having a child in future. The coefficient for the latter group is not
significant however, which is probably due to small sample size. This finding lends
support to my previously-stated hypothesis that females, while investing in their own
human capital, might take their uncertainty about future fertility into account. Hu-
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man capital differential across females with different degrees of uncertainty is reflected
in their hourly wages.
2.3.3 Robustness Checks
Table (B.6) in the Supplementary Appendix shows the regression results of Equa-
tion (2.1) with the same sample selection criteria used for regression in Table (2.4),
except for one difference: I also include observations corresponding to periods with
three children while controlling for the number of children. The results are similar to
the previous results.
Table (B.7) in the Supplementary Appendix shows the regression results of Equa-
tion (2.1) when wage level, instead of log wage, is used as the dependent variable.
The coefficient of interest is still significant at the five percent level and is similar in
magnitude to those suggested by the regressions in Table (2.4).
Table (B.8) in the Supplementary Appendix shows the regression results of Equa-
tion (2.1) with the same sample selection criteria used for regression in Table (2.4),
except for one difference: I restrict the sample to males instead of females. In this
case, the coefficient of interest is almost zero in all regressions no matter which con-
founding factors are controlled for. This is consistent with my hypothesis regarding
the effect of fertility plans and the ex-ante effects of children on labor market out-
comes, as we know that females and not males are those usually affected in terms of
their labor market outcomes when rearing children.
I also have done a robustness check with respect to the choice of dataset: I use the
NLSY79 and NLSY97 datasets as alternatives and repeat the analysis. The results
of this set of robustness checks are presented in the Supplementary Appendix.
As another exercise, Table (B.9) in the Supplementary Appendix shows the re-
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gression results of Equation (2.1) with the same sample selection criteria used for
regression in Table (2.4), except for one difference: I restrict the sample to women
who completed their fertility period with two children. The results suggest that the
gender mix of children plays no role in terms of wages when uncertainty about future
fertility is resolved.
Then, I look for some potential explanations for the negative association between
the hourly wages of mothers and having children of the same gender. I look at
other aspects of the mothers’ labor market decisions to see if there is a significant
difference between mothers with children of the same gender and those of different
genders. Table (B.10) in the Supplementary Appendix, calculated using a probit
model, suggests that there is no difference between the two groups in labor force
participation at the extensive margin, i.e. whether to work or not. Moreover, Table
(B.11) in the Supplementary Appendix shows that, conditional on being working,
there is no significant difference between the two groups at the intensive margin, i.e.
hours of market work. It seems that when it comes to decide on whether to work and
how much to work, the gender mix of children plays no role. Also, Table (B.12) in
the Supplementary Appendix provides evidence that there is no significant difference
between the two groups in terms of the hours they spend with their children. Hence,
the wage differential across the two groups cannot be attributed to different decisions
on labor force participation at the extensive or intensive margins, and it also cannot
be attributed to how they spend their time while at home.
2.4 Model
Polachek et al. (2008) provides a theoretical framework in which anticipated dis-
continuous labor force participation affects individuals’ decisions on human capital
investment (see also Weiss and Gronau (1981)). In the case of an anticipated discon-
110
tinuous labor force participation, the present value of the marginal gain from a unit
of investment is initially lower. Moreover, investments do not need to decline mono-
tonically for the discontinuous worker. This implies that discontinuous workers not
only invest less over their lifetime, but also their investment need not monotonically
decline.
The objective function of each individual is as follows:
max J =
∫ T
0
[Nt − st]w(Kt)Kte−rtdt
subject to the following constraint on the rate of change of capital stock:
K˙ = Qt − δ(t,K)Kt = f [st, kt, xt]− δ(t,Kt)Kt = b0sb1t Kb2t Xb3t − δKt
where Kt denotes the amount of human capital at time t, w(Kt) is the wage rate per
unit of human capital, st denotes the percent of total available time spent investing
in human capital in period t, Nt is the percent of total available time spent in labor
force participation including the investment time, rt is the sum of the rate of discount
and rate of depreciation of human capital stock, xt denotes the goods used in the
production of human capital, and δ(t,Kt) is the annual rate of depreciation of capital
stock.
The Hamiltonian equation for this problem are as follows:
H = w0(Nt − st)e−rtKt + λb0sb1t Kb1t
The first order conditions for this problem is as follows:
∂H
∂st
= −w0Kte−rt + λb0b1sb1−1t kb1t = 0,
λ˙ = −w0(Nt − St)e−rt − λb0b1sb1t kb1−1t ,
K˙ = Qt = b0s
b1
t K
b1
t .
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It is worth mentioning that λt represents the marginal returns on human capital
investment in period t, and it can be shown that:
λ = [
w0
b0b1
]K1−b1t s
1−b1
t e
−rt,
λ˙ = −w0Nte−rt ≤ 0,
λ(t0) =
∫ T
0
w0Nτe
−rτdτ,
λ(t) =
∫ T
t
w0Nτe
−rtdτ.
In the continuous participation case, I would have: N(τ) = N(t) for all t ≤
τ ≤ T . However, when there is an anticipated discontinuous participation, N(t) is
changing over time, and the marginal benefit of investment in human capital is not
monotonically decreasing. Hence, if females with two children of the same gender
expect a higher likelihood of a further pregnancy, and so higher unemployment, then
their investment pattern could be different over their entire remaining life cycle from
mothers with two children of opposite genders, even before any actual childbearing.
In the next section, I use a Difference-In-Differences (DID) approach to show (1)
how the labor market outcomes of the mother will be affected by a third childbirth in
terms of labor force participation (at both intensive and extensive margins) and hourly
wages, and (2) how these anticipated changes in labor market outcomes following a
future third childbirth affect a woman’s human capital investments and wages today,
i.e. before a third childbirth is actually realized.
2.5 Empirical Approach
Following Kleven et al. (2018), I use an event study approach to identify post-child
effects after nonparametrically controlling for education level, time trends, and age
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effects. I denote by t = 0 the year in which the individual has her third child and
index all years relative to that year.
I follow individuals from four years before childbirth through ten years after. I
study labor market outcomes as a function of event time.
Yist =
∑
j 6=−2
αj.I[j = t] +
∑
k
βk.I[k = ageis] +
∑
y
γy.I[y = s] +
∑
e
θe.I[e = d] + vist,
(2.2)
where Yist is the labor market outcome of individual i at year s and at event time t.
Parameter αj, i.e. the event time coefficient, captures the effect of the third childbirth
on labor market outcomes in the j-1 year after the third pregnancy, βk captures the
age fixed effect when age is equal to k, βk represents the fixed effect of year k, and
θe’s parameters capture the effects of education level. I control for education level, d,
using dummy variables. Finally, vist is the zero conditional mean error term. Note
that the event time coefficients measure the impact of a third childbirth relative to
the year just before pregnancy.
2.6 Results
I use Equation (2.2) to find the impact of the third childbirth on a variety of labor
market outcomes. The results are reported in the following subsection.
2.6.1 Impacts of Third Childbirth on Labor Market Outcomes
Figure (2.1) depicts the impact on labor income of conceiving a third child. It is
clear that labor income tends to decrease during pregnancy and right after childbirth,
and it takes about five years for it to converge to the level before the pregnancy. The
reduction in labor income is huge; about 40% decrease in labor income relative to
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the year before the pregnancy occurs right after childbirth.8 To identify the driving
forces behind this reduction in labor income, I look at the changes in labor force
participation, hours worked, and hourly wages. Figure (2.2) shows the impact of
the third childbirth on labor market participation at the extensive margin. The
results suggest that the third childbirth is associated with a decrease of over 15
percentage points in the probability of working right after childbirth, relative to the
year just before the pregnancy, which is equivalent to about 25% reduction in labor
force participation.9 Moreover, if I restrict my attention to the intensive margin by
looking at women who work after childbirth or during pregnancy, it is clear that these
individuals work fewer relative to the years before pregnancy. As Figure (2.3) shows,
the third childbirth is associated with a reduction of about seven hours in market
work per week (about 20% decrease relative to the baseline) for individuals who
participated in the labor force, and it takes about seven years for them to converge
to their previous levels.10 Finally, Figure (2.4) shows that the third childbirth is
associated with a decrease in hourly wage rate that tends to be both sizable (between
10 to 20%) and persistent.11.12
8I excluded the observations corresponding to periods after a fourth childbirth. So
my estimates are not contaminated by introducing the effects of further childbearing
decisions.
9I excluded the observations corresponding to periods after a fourth childbirth so
that my estimates are not contaminated by introducing the effects of further child-
bearing decisions.
10Again, I excluded the observations corresponding to periods after a fourth child-
birth. So my estimates are not contaminated by introducing the effects of further
childbearing decisions.
11Again, I excluded the observations corresponding to periods after a fourth child-
birth so that my estimates are not contaminated by introducing the effects of further
childbearing decisions.
12These reductions in labor force participation at the intensive and extensive mar-
gins, and in hourly wages following childbirth might be due to discrimination against
mothers with infants, or it might be the case that mothers with a new-born child
optimally decide to drop out of the labor market or reduce the hours of market work
to take care of their child. I do not take a stand on any side here. I only assume that
they have perfect foresight over these changes in labor market outcomes following the
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2.6.2 DID approach
In order to get more precise estimates of the impact of third childbirth on the labor
market outcomes of mothers, I exploit a difference-in-differences (DID) event study
design that uses women who never conceived a third child. Following Kleven et al.
(2018), I assign a placebo third childbirth to women who did not actually rear a third
child, drawing from the distribution of age at third childbirth among individuals who
did have a third one.13 I follow a DID approach in which I treat those individuals with
an assigned placebo third childbirth as the control group, and the women with a third
child as the treatment group. Then, using the event study approach, I investigate the
effects of the third childbirth on mothers’ labor market outcomes by comparing the
changes in the variable of interest before and after the childbirth across the treatment
and control group.14 Figure (2.5) depicts labor income trends for the control group
and the treatment group before and after the third childbirth.15 The pre-treatment
trend is not common between the two groups, so the parallel trend assumption is
violated. Figure (2.6) depicts labor force participation rates for the control group
and the treatment group before and after the third childbirth. In this, the control
group and the treatment group share a common pre-treatment group.16 The results
suggest that bearing a third child is associated with a decrease of over 20 percentage
points in the labor force participation rate, which is a 30% decrease from the baseline.
third childbirth.
13I repeat this process 50 times.
14It is similar to what was described in the previous section; however, I do not
control for age effects, year fixed effects, or education level. This is because I take
advantage of using the DID approach; by differencing between the control group
and the treatment group, those fixed effects will be taken out (as long as parallel
pre-treatment trends exist).
15Figure (B.3) in the Supplementary Appendix shows the difference between the
control and the treatment group.
16Figure (B.4) in the Supplementary Appendix shows the difference between control
and treatment groups.
115
Figure (2.7) shows that the parallel pre-treatment trend between the treatment group
and the control group is maintained when the outcome variable is hours of market
work conditional on having worked.17 This suggests that bearing a third child is
associated with a decrease of over ten hours’ reduction in hours worked, which is
about a 30% decrease. Finally, Figure (2.8) shows the results when the outcome
variable is log hourly wage. Obviously, the pre-treatment trends are different across
groups, and it is not clear from these figures how wage rate changes with the third
childbirth18.19
2.6.3 Gender Mix of Children and Mothers’ Earnings
In this section, I follow the event study approach described using Equation (2.1)
to investigate the effects of the gender mix of children on the mothers’ labor market
outcomes, with modification. Here, I define t = 0 as the year in which the individual
has her second child and index all years relative to that year. Hence, I study the
outcome variables before and after the second childbirth, i.e. when the gender mix of
children is determined by the second childbirth. In fact, I assume that the gender of
the second child is exogenously determined, i.e. it is a quasi-random event. As soon
as the second child is born, the gender mix of children is realized (0 if the gender
of the second child is different from that of the first one, or 1 if the genders of the
two children match). I consider the gender mix of children as the treatment, mothers
with children of different genders as the control group, and mothers of children of the
same sex as the treatment group. Then, I investigate the effects of the quasi-random
17Figure (B.5) in the Supplementary Appendix shows the difference between control
and the treatment group.
18Figure (B.6) in the Supplementary Appendix shows the difference between control
and the treatment group.
19Based on what is said, one can conclude that the parallel trend assumption in
labor income analysis is violated due to there being different trends in wage rates
between the control group and the treatment group.
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treatment assignment on the treatment group.
Figure (2.9) depicts the results when the outcome variable is annual labor income,
which suggest that the treatment group tends to have lower labor income in the post-
treatment period. In order to identify the driving forces behind this pattern, I look
at the effect of treatment assignment on labor force participation, hours of market
work, and the wage rate.
With respect to attachment to the labor market, Figure (2.10) shows the results
when I focus on the effect of treatment on labor force participation. These results
suggest that the treatment has no significant effect on labor force participation. Also,
Figure (2.11) depicts the effect of treatment on hours worked; it suggests that there
is no significant effect. Overall, Figures (2.10) and (2.11) indicate that my treatment
does not affect the extent to which the treated individuals are attached to the labor
market.
Finally, Figure (2.12) shows the results when the outcome variable is log hourly
wages. While the wage rates are not significantly different between the control group
and the treatment group in the pre-treatment period, they are significantly different
in the post-treatment period. Mothers of children with the same sex tend to have
lower hourly wages. Note that in all analyses in this subsection, I exclude observations
after a third child is born. Hence, the wage differential between treatment and control
groups cannot be attributed to a difference in the number of children across the two
groups.
This result confirms the regression results presented earlier in Tables (2.4) and
(2.5). The wage differential is much more evident if I restrict the sample to individuals
with at least a high school degree. Figure (2.13) depicts this case. Mothers of children
with the same gender earn significantly less per hour of market work than those with
two children of different genders. This result lends support to my hypothesis regarding
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the effect of future fertility decisions on investment in human capital; as explained
before, I expect that the link between human capital and hourly wages is stronger for
those tasks that need knowledge, skill, and experience; and highly educated women
are more likely to work at positions that necessitate such tasks.
2.7 Implications for Gender Wage Gap
The above analysis suggests that the ex-ante effects of children on mothers’ wages
might be an important factor in the wage gap between men and women. Previous
literature has mostly have focused on the ex-post effects of children on mothers’
labor market outcomes. However, the evidence provided in this paper lends support
to the hypothesis that women’s perception of their likelihood of future fertility might
significantly contribute to the gender wage gap through decreasing incentives to invest
in their human capital.
Given the hypothesis, I expect the gender wage gap, driven by uncertainty about
future fertility, to be higher for individuals at prime childbearing ages. At the end of
the fertility period, the likelihood of future fertility goes down to zero,, the uncertainty
about future futility is resolved, and the degree of attachment to the labor market
increases, leading these individuals to invest more in their human capital; this can
reduce the gender wage gap. I test this hypothesis using separate linear regressions
for young workers (21 to 35 years old) and old workers (36 years or older). Tables
(2.7) and (2.8) show the results. While the gender wage gap in the first group is
between 22% and 24%, it decreases to between 18% and 19% for those who have
completed their fertility phase and resolved the uncertainty about future fertility.
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2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I documented the new finding of a statistically significant relation-
ship between the gender mix of children and their mother’s wage. Specifically, having
two children of the same gender (two boys or two girls) is associated with between 4%
and 6% lower hourly wages for the mother compared to having two children of the
opposite sex. My results passed various alternative specifications. I discussed several
potential explanations that could explain the relationship I observed in the data.
Moreover, I used exogenous variation in the gender mix of children to study the ef-
fect of future fertility decisions on current investment in human capital, and thereby
wage rates. I showed that if the two first children are of the same sex, then the
likelihood of conceiving a third child is significantly higher, which is consistent with
the findings of previous papers. This increase might be due to parental preference
for variety in child genders. I found that right after a third childbirth labor force
participation rate declines by about 30% compared to the year before the third preg-
nancy. Also, for those who continue to participate in the labor market after their
third childbirth, hours of market work decrease by about 30%. Hence, conceiving a
third child is associated with sizable reductions in labor force participation at both
extensive and intensive margins, and the higher the probability of a third childbirth,
the higher probability of reduced labor force participation in future. I used a theo-
retical framework to illustrate that this anticipated reduced attachment to the labor
market, perceived by mothers with children of the same sex, leads them to invest less
in their human capital using on-the-job training, compared to mothers of children of
different genders; this lower investments in human capital will be reflected in their
wage rates. My Difference-In-Differences analysis showed that the exogenous gender
mix of children has a sizable impact on female wages per se, i.e. not only through the
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impacts on family size (the number of children) but also probably through different
investments in human capital due to differential likelihood of future fertility.
One important implication of the findings of this paper is that the ex-ante effects
of fertility decisions on the gender wage gap are greater than previously thought.
Previous papers have focused on the impact of motherhood on women’s labor market
outcomes while neglecting the impact of anticipated fertility decisions on human
capital investments. The results of this paper suggest that women’s expectation
regarding their future fertility might play an important role in their human capital
accumulation.
It is worth mentioning that since Angrist and Evans (1996), the gender mix of
children has been widely used as an IV to study the effect of family size on labor
market outcomes. However, the results of this paper cast doubt on the validity of
using this IV in that context and in many other applications within the labor market
literature.
Future work should address the welfare and policy implications of the findings
of this paper. From a policy perspective, it is interesting to study how individuals’
human capital investments might be affected by provision of a high quality publicly
subsidized day care. Implementing a childcare subsidy program might help females to
remain in the labor force after childbirth. Knowing that they can take advantage of
childcare services for their child, women perceive themselves as being more attached
to the labor market in the future, so they have incentive to invest more in their
human capital long before any actual childbirth is realized. Moreover, the return to
human capital investments potentially depends on education level. The impact of a
subsidized childcare policy might be heterogeneous across women depending on their
education levels. Hence, it would also be interesting to investigate how implementing
a childcare policy might change women’s educational decisions.
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.1: Arrival of a Third Child and Mother’s Labor Income
Third Childbirth
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Notes: This figure shows event time coefficients estimated from equation (2.1), 5 years before the
third childbirth, and 10 years after.
The outcome of interest, i.e. the dependent variable, is the annual income. Cohort fixed-effect, age
effect, race effect, and education effects are controlled using dummy variables.
Event time coefficients measure the impact of the third childbirth relative to the year just before
pregnancy in terms of percentage changes.
The 95% confidence intervals, shown by vertical line around each point, are based on robust standard
errors.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History
(1985-2015).
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Figure 2.2: Arrival of a Third Child and Mother’s Participation
Childbirth
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Notes: This figure shows event time coefficients estimated from equation (2.1), 5 years before the
third childbirth, and 10 years after.
The outcome of interest, i.e. the dependent variable, is the labor force participation status. Cohort
fixed-effect, age effect, race effect, and education effects are controlled using dummy variables.
Event time coefficients measure the impact of the third childbirth relative to the year just before
pregnancy in terms of percentage point changes.
The 95% confidence intervals, shown by vertical line around each point, are based on robust standard
errors.
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Figure 2.3: Arrival of a Third Child and Mother’s Work Hours
Third Childbirth
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Notes: This figure shows event time coefficients estimated from equation (2.1), 5 years before the
third childbirth, and 10 years after.
The outcome of interest, i.e. the dependent variable, is the hours of market work conditional on
participating in the labor market. Cohort fixed-effect, age effect, race effect, and education effects
are controlled using dummy variables.
Event time coefficients measure the impact of the third childbirth relative to the year just before
pregnancy in terms of hours of work per week.
The 95% confidence intervals, shown by vertical line around each point, are based on robust
standard errors.
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Figure 2.4: Arrival of a Third Child and Mother’s Wage Rate
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Notes: This figure shows event time coefficients estimated from equation (2.1), 5 years before the
third childbirth, and 10 years after.
The outcome of interest, i.e. the dependent variable, is the hourly wage conditional on participating
in the labor market. Cohort fixed-effect, age effect, race effect, and education effects are controlled
using dummy variables.
Event time coefficients measure the impact of the third childbirth relative to the year just before
pregnancy in terms of fraction of changes.
The 95% confidence intervals, shown by vertical line around each point, are based on robust standard
errors.
124
Figure 2.5: Arrival of a Third Child and Mother’s Labor Income (Placebo Control)
Third Childbirth
9.
4
9.
6
9.
8
10
La
bo
r I
nc
om
e 
R
el
at
iv
e 
to
 E
ve
nt
 T
im
e 
-2
 (%
)
-5 0 5 10
Event Time (years)
Three-Child Mothers Two-Child Mothers
Impact of Third Child on Labor Income
Notes: This figure shows event time coefficients estimated from equation (2.1), 5 years before the
third childbirth, and 10 years after.
The outcome of interest, i.e. the dependent variable, is the log annual income.
Here, I run the specification (2.1) separately for mothers with two children and mothers with three,
while assigning placebo birth date for the third childbirth to the first group. The placebo birth time
is randomly assigned based on the distribution of observed timing of third birth among women with
three children.
The 95% confidence intervals, shown by vertical line around each point, are based on robust standard
errors.
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Figure 2.6: Arrival of a Third Child and Mother’s Participation (Placebo Control)
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Notes: This figure shows event time coefficients estimated from equation (2.1), 5 years before the
third childbirth, and 10 years after.
The outcome of interest, i.e. the dependent variable, is the percentage of participants in the labor
market.
Here, I run the specification (2.1) separately for mothers with two children and mothers with three,
while assigning placebo birth date for the third childbirth to the first group. The placebo birth time
is randomly assigned based on the distribution of observed timing of third birth among women with
three children.
The 95% confidence intervals, shown by vertical line around each point, are based on robust standard
errors.
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Figure 2.7: Arrival of a Third Child and Mother’s Work Hours (Placebo Control)
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Notes: This figure shows event time coefficients estimated from equation (2.1), 5 years before the
third childbirth, and 10 years after.
The outcome of interest, i.e. the dependent variable, is the mean hours of market work per week
conditional on participating in the labor market.
Here, I run the specification (2.1) separately for mothers with two children and mothers with three,
while assigning placebo birth date for the third childbirth to the first group. The placebo birth time
is randomly assigned based on the distribution of observed timing of third birth among women with
three children.
The 95% confidence intervals, shown by vertical line around each point, are based on robust standard
errors.
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Figure 2.8: Arrival of a Third Child and Mother’s Wage Rate (Placebo Control)
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Notes: This figure shows event time coefficients estimated from equation (2.1), 5 years before the
third childbirth, and 10 years after.
The outcome of interest, i.e. the dependent variable, is the log hourly wage conditional on
participating in the labor market.
Here, I run the specification (2.1) separately for mothers with two children and mothers with three,
while assigning placebo birth date for the third childbirth to the first group. The placebo birth
time is randomly assigned based on the distribution of observed timing of third birth among women
with three children.
The 95% confidence intervals, shown by vertical line around each point, are based on robust
standard errors.
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Figure 2.9: Gender Mix of Children and Mother’s Labor Income
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Notes: This figure shows event time coefficients estimated from equation (2.1), 5 years before the
second childbirth, and 10 years after.
The outcome of interest, i.e. the dependent variable, is the difference in log annual income relative
to the year before the second pregnancy, conditional on participating in the labor market.
The 95% confidence intervals, shown by vertical line around each point, are based on robust standard
errors.
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Figure 2.10: Gender Mix of Children and Mother’s Participation
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Notes: This figure shows event time coefficients estimated from equation (2.1), 5 years before the
second childbirth, and 10 years after.
The outcome of interest, i.e. the dependent variable, is the difference in the labor force participation
rate relative to the year before the second pregnancy, conditional on participating in the labor
market.
The 95% confidence intervals, shown by vertical line around each point, are based on robust standard
errors.
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Figure 2.11: Gender Mix of Children and Mother’s Work Hours
2nd Childbirth
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Notes: This figure shows event time coefficients estimated from equation (2.1), 5 years before the
second childbirth, and 10 years after.
The outcome of interest, i.e. the dependent variable, is the difference in the hours of work (per week)
relative to the year before the second pregnancy, conditional on participating in the labor market.
The 95% confidence intervals, shown by vertical line around each point, are based on robust standard
errors.
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Figure 2.12: Gender Mix of Children and Mother’s Wage Rate
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Notes: This figure shows event time coefficients estimated from equation (2.1), 5 years before the
second childbirth, and 10 years after.
The outcome of interest, i.e. the dependent variable, is the difference in log hourly wage relative to
the year before the second pregnancy, conditional on participating in the labor market.
The 95% confidence intervals, shown by vertical line around each point, are based on robust standard
errors.
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Figure 2.13: Gender Mix of Children and Mother’s Wage (High School Graduates)
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Notes: This figure shows event time coefficients estimated from equation (2.1), 5 years before the
second childbirth, and 10 years after.
The outcome of interest, i.e. the dependent variable, is the difference in log hourly wage relative to
the year before the second pregnancy, conditional on participating in the labor market.
Sample is restricted to women who completed high school education.
The 95% confidence intervals, shown by vertical line around each point, are based on robust standard
errors.
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2.10 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics- Year 2015
Variable Statistic All Same sexes Opposite p-value
Years of schooling Mean: 13.13 13.14 13.12 0.66
Median: 13.00 13.00 13.00
Std Dev: (2.56) (2.54) (2.59)
Labor force participation Mean: 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.31
Median: 1.00 1.00 1.00
Std Dev: (0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
Hours worked (per week) Mean: 21.16 21.07 21.28 0.71
Median: 22.88 22.62 23.00
Std Dev: (18.38) (18.38) (18.39)
Time with child (hr/week) Mean: 28.83 27.70 29.83 0.25
Median: 27.04 24.92 28.42
Std Dev: (20.29) (20.15) (20.39)
Hourly wage ($) Mean: 16.85 16.98 16.71 0.56
Median: 13.47 13.54 13.22
Std Dev: (11.20) (11.66) (10.72)
Annual Labor income ($) Mean: 15.17 15.18 15.16 0.97
Median: 9.85 10.06 9.15
Std Dev: (17.78) (17.89) (17.66)
Mother’s age Mean: 49.88 50.12 49.63 0.02
Median: 51.00 51.00 51.00
Std Dev: (13.25) (13.16) (13.33)
Mother’s age at 1st birth Mean: 22.11 22.12 22.09 0.65
Median: 21.00 21.00 21.00
Std Dev: (4.63) (4.63) (4.62)
Mother’s age at 2nd birth Mean: 25.62 25.64 25.61 0.74
Median: 25.00 25.00 25.00
Std Dev: (5.15) (5.16) (5.14)
Mother’s age at 3rd birth Mean: 27.40 27.47 27.30 0.16
Median: 27.00 27.00 27.00
Std Dev: (5.19) (5.22) (5.15)
Marital status Mean: 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.09
Median: 1.00 1.00 1.00
Std Dev: (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Number of children Mean: 2.87 2.88 2.85 0.11
Median: 3.00 3.00 2.00
Std Dev: (1.15) (1.13) (1.18)
Same genders Mean: 0.51
Median: 1.00
Std Dev: (0.50)
Fraction with 3 children Mean: 0.51 53 47
Number of observations 14486 7365 7095
Notes: Income and wages are normalized to 2000 dollar.
Sample restricted to females with at least two children at 2015.
Income and wages are normalized to 2000 dollar.
Incomes above $100000 are dropped. Hourly wages less than $7 are dropped.
Table 2.2: The Gender Mix of Children and (Ex Post) Fertility Behavior
Third child Third child Third child
(OLS) (Probit) (Logit)
(1) (2) (3)
Same gender 0.06*** 0.14*** 0.23***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.05)
Constant 0.81*** 1.09** 1.89*
(0.09) (0.53) (1.04)
Observations 7601 7601 7601
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.03 0.03
Race Y Y Y
Education Level Y Y Y
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Sample have been restricted to individuals older than 40 years of old at
2014.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who have at least two children.
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Table 2.3: The Gender Mix of Children and (Ex Ante) Fertility Decisions
Third child Third child Third child
(OLS) (Probit) (Logit)
(1) (2) (3)
Same Gender 0.08*** 0.35*** 0.61***
(0.03) (0.12) (0.22)
Constant 0.03 -2.62*** -4.88***
(0.09) (0.61) (1.32)
Observations 1249 1249 1249
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.15 0.15
Age Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y
Education Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y
The question is asked from females in PSID between 1969 to 1972 & 1976.
Dependent variables take 1 if the individual expects more children, 0 otherwise.
The Sample is restricted to women in PSID between age 21 and 40 with 2 children.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses in all specifications.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.4: Mincerian Wage Equation- OLS Results
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Potential experience 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Potential experience square -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Same sex -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 1.10*** 0.90*** 1.55*** 1.62*** 1.41***
(0.25) (0.26) (0.28) (0.29) (0.32)
Observations 4871 4753 4561 4561 4540
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.23 0.30 0.31 0.33
Age Y Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
State N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six.
The Sample is restricted to women in PSID between age 21 and 40.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to two years after the second childbirth and before a third childbirth.
I control for the number of children that each individual will have in all regressions.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than high school.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.5: Mincerian Wage Equation- OLS Results
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Potential experience 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Potential experience square -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Same sex -0.04* -0.04* -0.04** -0.04* -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 1.26*** 1.19*** 1.67*** 1.70*** 1.49***
(0.19) (0.21) (0.28) (0.29) (0.31)
Observations 4501 4390 4218 4218 4198
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.34
Age Y Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
State N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six.
The Sample is restricted to women in PSID between age 21 and 40.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to individuals who will end up having two children.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than high school.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.6: Regression Results Using Beliefs about Future Fertility
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Potential experience 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.057***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Potential experience square -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1-No more child (sure/very sure) 0.098*** 0.100*** 0.069* 0.066* 0.074**
(0.032) (0.031) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035)
2-No more child (fairly sure/hope not to) 0.082 0.081 0.041 0.029 0.055
(0.061) (0.061) (0.065) (0.067) (0.063)
Constant 1.886*** 1.808*** 1.790*** 1.686*** 1.916***
(0.050) (0.105) (0.106) (0.131) (0.246)
Observations 611 611 611 611 611
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.38
Education Y Y Y Y Y
Race N Y Y Y Y
Year N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
State N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six.
This table shows the impact of uncertainty about future fertility on hourly wages of women.
Women are asked about their future fertility: ”How sure are you that you will not have any (more) children?”
(1) sure or very sure, (2) fairly sure or hope not to, (3) will have a child/not sure/do not know.
The benchmark in the above regression, i.e. omitted dummy, is the last choice, i.e. (3).
The Sample is restricted to women in PSID younger than 40.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.7: Mincerian Wage Equation- OLS Results for Older Individuals
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.19***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Potential experience -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Potential experience square 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 3.20*** 3.10*** 2.49** 2.54**
(1.24) (1.17) (1.18) (1.19)
Observations 4279 4174 3809 3809
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.15 0.23 0.23
Age Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y
Region N Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six.
The Sample restricted to people older than 35 years of old in PSID.
Sample restricted to individuals whose education levels are higher than high school.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.8: Mincerian Wage Equation- OLS Results for Younger Individuals
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.24***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Potential experience -0.00 -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Potential experience square 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 1.52*** 1.53*** 1.86*** 2.06***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12)
Observations 19772 19189 18140 18140
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.21 0.27 0.28
Age Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y
Region N Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six.
The Sample restricted to individuals in PSID between age 21 and 35.
Sample restricted to individuals whose education levels are higher than high school.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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A.1 Extra Figures
Figure A.1: Distribution of First-birth Age for Women with No Child at Age 18
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Notes: This graph shows the distribution of age at first birth for women aged 40 or above in 2015
whose first birth was after age 18.
High school level is defined as 12 completed years of schooling or less. College graduates are defined
as 16 completed years of schooling or more.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History
(1985-2015).
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Figure A.2: Distribution of Completed Years of Schooling
Source: PSID-CDS.
Notes: This graph shows the distribution of years of schooling for women aged 40 or above in 2015
whose first birth was after age 18.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History
(1985-2015).
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Figure A.3: Maternal Age at Delivery and Prob. of Low Birthweight (LBW)
Notes: Low birthweight (LBW) indicates that the baby is born weighing less than 5 pounds, 8
ounces (i.e. 88 ounces, or 2500 grams).
The binned scatterplot is shown here. The plot shows the regression in column (1) of Table (1.2),
binned into 20 bins.
The probability of low birthweight is controlled for paternal age, infant’s gender, race, mother’s
education and marital status at birth, and year fixed effects.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History
(1985-2015).
154
Figure A.4: LBW and Maternal Age, by Education Level (Quadratic From)
Notes: Low birthweight indicates that the baby is born weighing less than 5 pounds, 8 ounces (i.e.
88 ounces, or 2500 grams).
The binned scatterplot is shown here. The plot shows the regression in columns (1) and (2) of of
Panel A of Table (A.5), binned into 20 bins.
The probability of low birthweight is controlled for the infant’s gender, race, and year fixed effects.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History
(1985-2015).
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Figure A.5: LBW and Maternal Age, by Education Level (Linear Form)
Notes: Low birthweight indicates that the baby is born weighing less than 5 pounds, 8 ounces (i.e.
88 ounces, or 2500 grams).
The binned scatterplot is shown here. The plot shows the regression in columns (1) and (2) of of
Panel A of Table (A.6), binned into 20 bins.
The probability of low birthweight is controlled for the infant’s gender, race, and year fixed effects.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History
(1985-2015).
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Figure A.6: LBW and Maternal Age, by Income Level (Quadratic From)
Notes: Low birthweight indicates that the baby is born weighing less than 5 pounds, 8 ounces (i.e.
88 ounces, or 2500 grams).
The binned scatterplot is shown here. The plot shows the regression in columns (1) and (2) of of
Panel B of Table (A.5), binned into 20 bins.
The probability of low birthweight is controlled for the infant’s gender, race, and year fixed effects.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History
(1985-2015).
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Figure A.7: LBW and Maternal Age, by Income Level (Linear From)
Notes: Low birthweight indicates that the baby is born weighing less than 5 pounds, 8 ounces (i.e.
88 ounces, or 2500 grams).
The binned scatterplot is shown here. The plot shows the regression in columns (1) and (2) of of
Panel B of Table (A.5), binned into 20 bins.
The probability of low birthweight is controlled for the infant’s gender, race, and year fixed effects.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History
(1985-2015).
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Figure A.8: Mother’s Age at First Birth and the Log Birthweight of the Infant
Notes: The binned scatterplot is shown here. The plot shows the regression in column (1) of Table
(A.7), binned into 20 bins.
The dependent variable, i.e, log birthweight, is controlled for paternal age, infant’s gender, race,
mother’s education and marital status at birth, and year fixed effects.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History
(1985-2015).
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Figure A.9: Conception Probability over the Life-cycle
Notes: This graph shows how the conception probability declines over a female’s age.
Source: Rosenthal and Khatamee (2002)
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Figure A.10: Estimated Productivity Parameters by Child Age
Notes: This graphs estimated productivity of the child by mother’s age at childbirth (from Table
(1.8)). All values for college graduates are normalized to the child’s productivity of the maternal
age 22, and all values for non-college graduates are normalized to the child’s productivity of the
maternal age 18.
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Figure A.11: The Letter-Word Test Score and Future Hourly Wages
Notes:This Graph shows the relationship between children’s Letter-Word (LW) test scores at age
16-18 and their future wages, 7 to 12 years later, i.e. when they were between 23 to 30 years of old.
The x-axis variable is LW test score of children in CDS dataset. Children were between ages 16-18
when they took the LW test.
The y-axis variable is the predicted hourly wage in 2014, when the children were between 23 to 30
years of old.
The binned scatterplot is shown here. Observations are binned into 20 bins.
Source: CDS dataset (2002-2007) combined with TAS dataset (2015).
162
Figure A.12: Maternal Age and the Risk of Autism
Notes: The odds ratios are controlled for paternal age, birth order, gender, race, education, gesta-
tional age, and birthweight.
The odds ratios are normalized with respect to the benchmark group, which is maternal age between
25-29.
Source: Durkin et al. (2008)
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A.2 Extra Tables
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Non-college Grads College Grads
Variable Mean Mean
First child LW test score 34.7 37.8
(15.5) (15.5)
First child’s age 10.3 10.3
(4.1) (4.1)
Mother’s age at first birth 22.2 25.8
(4.8) (5.5)
Mother’s Completed years of schooling 11.6 15.4
(1.49) (1.2)
Father’s hourly wage ($) 17.9 23
(10.7) (15.4)
Mother’s Hourly wage ($) 13.5 17.9
(8.7) (11.6)
Mother’s Hours worked (per week) 24.8 27.8
(29.9) (22.8)
Father’s hours worked (per week) 40.7 40.5
(28.4) (20.8)
Moms’ total time with child (hrs/week) 35.1 36.4
(20.0) (18.9)
Note: This Table shows summary statistics of the data before dropping women
whose age at first birth were before 18.
Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2014 interviews
and 1968-2015 PSID core data.
164
Table A.2: Mean and Median Age at First Birth over Education Level
Mean Median Std Fraction after 27
0-12 years of schooling 22.4 21 4.2 0.13
14 years of schooling 23.8 23 4.6 0.21
16 years of schooling 26.7 27 4.9 0.47
Graduate degree 27.9 28 5.0 0.59
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2014
interviews and 1968-2015 PSID core data.
Table A.3: Regression Results for Low Birthweight (LBW), Fixed-Effect
(1) (2)
Mother’s age at birth 0.66* 0.66*
(0.38) (0.37)
Child’s gender dummy Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Marital status dummies Yes Yes
Birth order Yes Yes
Family income No Yes
Observations 6153 6153
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.02
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: These results are obtained using a fixed effect regression, in which the varia-
tion in maternal ages between sibling is used to estimate the impact of the mother’s
age at birth on the risk of LBW.
100∗LBWi,j = β1agepi,j+β2αWj+ui,j , where i denotes mothers and j denotes children
of mother i.
Low birthweight (LBW) indicates that the baby is born weighing less than 5 pounds,
8 ounces (i.e. 88 ounces, or 2500 grams).
Income levels are measured at the year in which the birth occurs.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adop-
tion History (1985-2015)
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Table A.4: Linear Regression of Low Birthweight (LBW) on Maternal Age
Prob. of LBW (%)
Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother’s age at first birth (agepi ) -2.16** 0.47*** -2.47* 1.15***
(1.00) (0.16) (1.47) (0.23)
Age square (agepi
2) 0.05** – 0.06** –
(0.02) – (0.02) –
Child’s gender dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education level dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Paternal age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marital status dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family income No No Yes Yes
Observations 3169 3169 1600 1600
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: 100 ∗ LBWi = β1agepi + β2agepi 2 + αWi + ui, for the quadratic specification in columns (1)
and (3)
100 ∗ LBWi = β1agepi + αWi + ui, for linear specification in columns (2) and (4)
Low birthweight (LBW) indicates that the baby is born weighing less than 5 pounds, 8 ounces (i.e.
88 ounces, or 2500 grams).
Income levels are measured at the year in which the first child is born.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History (1985-
2015)
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Table A.5: Linear Regression of LBW on Maternal Age, Quadratic Specification
Panel A: By Education Level
Non-college College Graduates
Prob. of LBW (%) Prob. of LBW (%)
Mother’s age at 1st birth (agepi ) -4.10* -1.79
(2.17) (1.40)
Age square 0.09** 0.04
(0.04) (0.02)
Observations 777 1898
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.03
Panel B: By Income Level
Below-Median Above-Median
Prob. of LBW (%) Prob. of LBW (%)
Mother’s age at 1st birth (agepi ) -5.26** -0.85
(2.45) (2.35)
Age square 0.12*** 0.02
(0.05) (0.04)
Child’s gender dummy Yes Yes
Race dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Education dummies Yes Yes
Observations 800 800
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.05
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: 100 ∗ LBWi = β1agepi + β2agepi 2 + αWi + ui,
Low birthweight (LBW) indicates that the baby is born weighing less than 5 pounds, 8 ounces
(i.e. 88 ounces, or 2500 grams). Estimates in Panel A are controlled for family income, and esti-
mates in Panel B are controlled for education level.
Income levels are measured at the year in which the first child is born.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History
(1985-2015).
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Table A.6: Linear Regression of LBW on Maternal Age
Panel A: By Education Level
Non-college College Graduates
Prob. of LBW (%) Prob. of LBW (%)
Mother’s age at 1st birth 0.45 0.42**
(0.33) (0.20)
Observations 777 1898
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.02
Panel B: By Income Level
Below-Median Above-Median
Prob. of LBW (%) Prob. of LBW (%)
Mother’s age at first birth 1.12*** 1.06***
(0.39) (0.31)
Child’s gender dummy Yes Yes
Race dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Education dummies Yes Yes
Observations 800 800
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.05
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: 100 ∗ LBWi = β1agepi + αWi + ui,
Low birthweight (LBW) indicates that the baby is born weighing less than 5 pounds, 8 ounces
(i.e. 88 ounces, or 2500 grams). Estimates in Panel A are controlled for family income, and esti-
mates in Panel B are controlled for education level.
Income levels are measured at the year in which the first child is born.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and Adoption History
(1985-2015).
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Table A.7: Linear Regression of Log Birthweight (BW) on Maternal Age
Log BW Log BW
Mother’s age at first birth -0.004* -0.008**
(0.001) (0.002)
Child’s gender dummy Yes Yes
Race dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Education Level dummies Yes Yes
Paternal Age dummies Yes Yes
Marital Status dummies Yes Yes
Income No Yes
Observations 2758 1609
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.04
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Income levels are measured at the year in which the first child is
born.
ln(BW )i = β1age
p
i + αWi + ui, for linear specification in column (2).
Birthweights are measured in ounces.
Source: PSID Family-level Data (1967-2015) combined with Childbirth and
Adoption History (1985-2015).
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Table A.8: Regression Results Including Only One-child Families
ln(Score) ln(Score) ln(Score)
Mother’s age at 1st birth (agepit) 0.009*** 0.006** -0.014**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Mother’s years of schooling 0.023*** 0.030**
(0.008) (0.015)
Father’s years of schooling 0.019** -0.001
(0.008) (0.014)
Father’s hourly wage 0.007**
(0.003)
Father’s hours worked (per week) 0.005**
(0.002)
Mother’s hourly wage 0.006*
(0.003)
Mother’s hours worked (per week) -0.003
(0.002)
Child’s age dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes
Marital status dummies No No Yes
Paternal age dummies No No Yes
Child’s gender dummy No No Yes
Observations 832 543 206
Adjusted R2 0.86 0.87 0.89
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: ln(scorei,t) = β1age
p
i + γZi,t + αWi + ui,t,
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Letter-Word Identification Test
score. I only use the data on the first child of mothers.
Child’s age is controlled in all above equations using age-specific dummy variables.
The number of observations is not constant across columns due to missing data on
wages and education levels.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2014 interviews.
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Table A.9: Regression Results Including All Households (Constant # of Obs.)
ln(Score) ln(Score) ln(Score)
Mother’s age at 1st birth (agep) 0.007*** 0.004* -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Mother’s years of schooling 0.013** 0.014**
(0.006) (0.006)
Father’s years of schooling 0.016*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.005)
Father’s hourly wage 0.002
(0.001)
Father’s hours worked (per week) 0.000
(0.001)
Mother’s hourly wage -0.000
(0.002)
Hours worked (per week) -0.001*
(0.001)
Child’s age dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of children dummies Yes Yes Yes
Marital status dummies No No Yes
Paternal age dummies No No Yes
Child’s gender dummy No No Yes
Observations 762 762 762
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.86 0.86
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: ln(scorei,t) = β1age
p
i + γZi,t + αWi + ui,t,
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Letter-Word Identification Test
score. I only use the data on the first child of mothers.
Child’s age is controlled in all above equations using age-specific dummy variables.
The number of observations is held constant across columns.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2014 interviews.
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Table A.10: Regression Results Including All Households
ln(Score) ln(Score) ln(Score)
Mother’s age at 1st birth (agepi ) 0.011*** 0.006*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Mother’s years of schooling 0.014*** 0.014**
(0.004) (0.006)
Father’s years of schooling 0.017*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.005)
Father’s hourly wage 0.002
(0.001)
Father’s hours worked (per week) 0.000
(0.001)
Mother’s hourly wage -0.000
(0.002)
Hours worked (per week) -0.001*
(0.001)
Child’s age dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of children dummies Yes Yes Yes
Marital status dummies No No Yes
Paternal age dummies No No Yes
Child’s gender dummy No No Yes
Observations 3077 2117 762
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.86 0.86
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: ln(scorei,t) = β1age
p
i + γZi,t + αWi + ui,t,
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Letter-Word Identification Test
score. I only use the data on the first child of mothers.
Child’s age is controlled in all above equations using age-specific dummy variables.
The number of observations is not constant across columns due to missing data on
wages and education levels.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2014 interviews.
Table A.11: Percentage of Births Intended at Conception, by Education of Mother
Statistics Percentage
Less than high school diploma 59
High school diploma 60
College degree 83
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012
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Table A.12: Linear Regression of Work Experience
Years of Work Experience
Potential Experience 0.601***
(0.006)
Years of Schooling 0.651***
(0.013)
1. Family size -0.664***
(0.076)
2. Family size -1.790***
(0.100)
3. Family size -3.121***
(0.145)
4. Family size -4.772***
(0.217)
5. Family size -7.001***
(0.284)
Race dummies Yes
Birth year dummies Yes
Marital status dummies Yes
Demographics Yes
Observations 166076
Adjusted R2 0.64
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Income levels are measured at the year in which the first child is born.
Source: Source: NLSY79 (1979-2015) combined with NLSY97 (1997-2015).
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Table A.13: Regression Results Using the Simulated Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Score) ln(Score) ln(Score) ln(Score)
Mother’s age at 1st birth (agepi ) -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s years of schooling 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.029***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mother’s hourly wage 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000)
Mother’s hours worked (per week) -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
Child’s age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marital status dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family income at age 2 of the child No Yes Yes Yes
Father’s hourly wage No No Yes Yes
Child investments in past periods No No No Yes
Observations 3300 3300 3300 3300
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.65 0.71 0.77
Notes: Ln(score)i,t = β1age
p
i + γZi,t + αWi + ηIi,t′ + ui,t,
where Ii,t′ denotes the vector of past investments.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Letter-Word Identification Test
score.
Child’s age is controlled in all above equations using age-specific dummy variables.
Source: The simulated dataset is used for this exercise.
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Table A.14: Regression of Child IQ at 36 Months on Independent Variables
Child IQ Child IQ Child IQ Child IQ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Maternal IQ 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.33*** 0.26***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08)
Maternal Age -0.02 -0.24* -0.24*
(0.19) (0.14) (0.14)
Family Income 0.40*** 0.35***
(0.05) (0.05)
Quality of Home 0.60***
(0.14)
Constant 47.70*** 47.97*** 56.60*** 43.04***
(3.19) (4.05) (4.08) (4.18)
Observations 453 453 453 453
R2 0.28 0.28 0.36 0.38
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The sample restricted to preterm low-birth-weight
children.
Source: Bacharach and Baumeister (1998)
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Table A.15: Risk of Down Syndrome and Chromosomal Abnormalities at Live Birth
Maternal age Risk of Risk of Any
at delivery (yr) Down Syndrome Chromosomal Abnormality
20 1
1667
1
526
25 1
1200
1
476
30 1
952
1
385
35 1
378
1
192
40 1
106
1
66
45 1
30
1
21
Source: Heffner (2004)
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A.3 Literature Review on Biological Impacts of Maternal Age
There are many potential negative consequences of postponement of childbirth
on child outcomes, which are documented in previous papers. The risks of Down
syndrome, childhood cancer, and autism increase with the maternal age (Durkin et al.
(2008); Johnson et al. (2009); Yip et al. (2006)). A ten-year increase in maternal age
is associated with a 20% to 30% increase in Autism Spectrum Disorder risk. Also,
the risk of a low birthweight infant increases with maternal age (Restrepo-Me´ndez
et al. (2015); Goisis and Sigle-Rushton (2014)). Delayed motherhood is associated
with a higher risk of diabetes in the child (Byrnes (2001); Cardwell et al. (2009), after
reviewing 30 observational studies, conclude that, on average, a five-year increase in
maternal age is associated with a 5% to 10% increase in the risk of childhood type
1 diabetes. Older maternal age has also been linked with mental retardation in the
absence of Down syndrome but accompanied by other neurologic conditions such as
epilepsy, cerebral palsy, or birth defects affecting the central nervous system (Tearne
(2015); Yeargin-Allsopp et al. (1995); Drews et al. (1995)).
Postponing childbirth is associated with reduced intelligence in the child (Bacharach
and Baumeister (1998)). Table (A.14) shows the results of Bacharach and Baumeister
(1998). After controlling for the maternal IQ, the family income, and the quality of
home, there is a significant negative association between the maternal age at delivery
and the child’s IQ at 36 months, suggesting that postponing childbirth is associated
with reduced intelligence in the child. Since they directly control for the mother’s IQ
in their regressions, one might be less worry about the role of selection in timing of
births based on the innate ability of mothers.
With respect to the risk of Down syndrome, Table (A.15) in the Supplementary
Appendix shows how the risk of Down syndrome and the risk of any chromosomal
abnormality increase with maternal ages. The statistics are based on the crude fre-
quency of the chromosomal abnormality in live births (see Heffner (2004)).
Figure (A.12) is depicted based on the regression results reported by Durkin et al.
(2008). It shows the positive association between maternal age at delivery and the
risk of autism after controlling for the paternal age, race, birth order, and gender of
the child, mothers’ education level, gestational age, and birthweight. Based on these
results, the risk of autism increases by maternal age at delivery by a sizable amount.
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B.1 Robustness Checks
In this appendix, I use other datasets to investigate whether my regression results
in Table (2.4) are robust to my choice of dataset. I use NLSY79 and NLSY97 as
alternative datasets and follow a similar approach presented in section 3.1. However,
using these mentioned alternative datasets, I take advantage of having more precise
information on the work experience of individuals and their cognitive ability as well.
The latter is because I observe the AFQT score for each individual. Hence, the
regression used for the analysis using these alternative datasets is as follows:
log(wit) = β0 + β1AFQTi + β2expit + β3exp
2
it + β4dit + β5samei + it, (B.1)
where wit denotes hourly wage of individual i at at time t, AFQTi denotes the in-
dividual’s AFQT percentile score, expit is the years of work experience
1, dit is the
education level measured as completed years of schooling, samei is an indicator vari-
able which is one if the first two children are of the same gender, and zero otherwise,
and it is a zero conditional mean error term, which is assumed to be i.i.d and nor-
mally distributed over individuals and assumed to be time-invariant. I control for
year fixed effects, race, etc by adding dummy variables to the regression specified
above. The coefficient of interest is β5, which captures the effect of children with the
same sex on their mother’s wages.
Results are presented in Tables (B.14) through (B.17) when I use different criteria
for the sample selection procedure.
The results are less robust compared to my original analysis using PSID data. I
conjecture that this is due to the sample size issue as the number of observations is
considerably lower compared to the baseline dataset, and this makes my estimate less
precise. However, in general, the results provide some evidence for the effects on the
mother’s hourly wage of the gender mix of her children.
1It is calculated as the number of years (since age 18) in which the individual has worked at least
for 1500 hours.
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B.2 Extra Figures
Figure B.1: Gender Mix of Children and Observer Fertility Rate over Time
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Notes: This figure reports the marginal effect of having two children of the same gender on future
fertility based on ex post fertility outcomes.
Notes: A probit model, similar to column 2 of Table (2.2) has been used to estimate the marginal
effect of having same-gender children on future fertility.
Notes: A probit model, similar to column 2 of Table (2.2) has been used to estimate the marginal
effect of having same-gender children on future fertility.
Notes: In order to estimate the marginal effect, for each year, I use the fertility outcomes of all
women above 40 years old in that year.
Notes: The abrupt increase in 1997 might be due to the refresher sample added to the PSID data
set in 1997.
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Figure B.2: Family Size Distribution in the US
Source: Livingston (2015)
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Figure B.3: Impact of Arrival of a Third Child on Mother’s Labor Income
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Notes: This figure shows the difference between the control group and the treatment group in Figure
(2.5) 5 years before the third childbirth, and 10 years after.
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Figure B.4: Impact of Arrival of a Third Child on Mother’s Participation
Third Childbirth
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Notes: This figure shows the difference between the control group and the treatment group in Figure
(2.6) 5 years before the third childbirth, and 10 years after.
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Figure B.5: Impact of Arrival of a Third Child on Mother’s Work Hours
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Notes: This figure shows the difference between the control group and the treatment group in Figure
(2.7) 5 years before the third childbirth, and 10 years after.
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Figure B.6: Impact of Arrival of a Third Child on Mother’s Wage Rate
Third Childbirth
-.1
5
-.1
-.0
5
0
.0
5
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 L
og
 W
ag
e
-5 0 5 10 15
Event Time (years)
Impact of Third Child on Wage Rate
Notes: This figure shows the difference between the control group and the treatment group in Figure
(2.8) 5 years before the third childbirth, and 10 years after.
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B.3 Extra Tables
Table B.1: The Gender Mix of Children and (Ex Post) Fertility Behavior
Third child Third child Third child
(OLS) (Probit) (Logit)
(1) (2) (3)
Two boys 0.05*** 0.14*** 0.22***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.06)
Two girls 0.06*** 0.15*** 0.25***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.06)
Constant 0.81*** 1.09** 1.89*
(0.09) (0.53) (1.04)
Observations 7601 7601 7601
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.03 0.03
Race Y Y Y
Education Level Y Y Y
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Sample have been restricted to individuals older than 40 years of old at 2014.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who have two children.
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Table B.2: The Gender Mix of Children and (Ex Ante) Fertility Decisions
Third child Third child Third child
(OLS) (Probit) (Logit)
(1) (2) (3)
Two boys 0.08** 0.35** 0.63**
(0.03) (0.14) (0.26)
Two girls 0.07** 0.34** 0.59**
(0.04) (0.15) (0.27)
Constant 0.03 -2.62*** -4.88***
(0.09) (0.61) (1.32)
Observations 1249 1249 1249
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.15 0.15
Age Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y
Education Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The question is asked from females in PSID between 1969-1972 & 1976.
Dependent variables take 1 if the agent expects more children, 0 otherwise.
The Sample is restricted to women between age 21 and 40 with 2 children.
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Table B.3: Mincerian Wage Equation- OLS Results
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Potential experience 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Potential experience square -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Same sex -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 1.12*** 0.91*** 1.56*** 1.63*** 1.43***
(0.24) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.31)
Observations 4871 4753 4561 4561 4540
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.23 0.30 0.31 0.33
Age Y Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
State N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six.
The Sample is restricted to women in PSID between age 21 and 40.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to two years after the second childbirth and before a third childbirth.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than high school.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.4: Mincerian Wage Equation- OLS Results
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Potential experience 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Potential experience square -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Two boys -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Two girls -0.04 -0.04* -0.05** -0.04** -0.05**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 1.09*** 0.91*** 1.56*** 1.62*** 1.42***
(0.25) (0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.32)
Observations 4871 4753 4561 4561 4540
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.23 0.30 0.31 0.33
Age Y Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
State N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six.
The Sample is restricted to women in PSID between age 21 and 40.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to two years after the second childbirth and before a third childbirth.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than high school.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.5: Mincerian Wage Equation- OLS Results (A Narrower Range of Ages)
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Potential experience 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Potential experience square -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.04** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Same sex -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 1.56*** 1.18*** 1.77*** 1.91*** 1.85***
(0.31) (0.32) (0.36) (0.36) (0.40)
Observations 2551 2489 2368 2368 2633
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.21 0.29 0.29 0.30
Age Y Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
State N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six.
The Sample restricted to women in PSID between age 21 and 35.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to two years after the second childbirth and before a third childbirth.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than high school.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.6: Mincerian Wage Equation- OLS Results
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Potential experience 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Potential experience square -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Same sex -0.04** -0.05** -0.04** -0.04** -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.92*** 0.50*** 0.89*** 1.03*** 1.11***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28)
Observations 3732 3640 3444 3444 3422
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.19 0.27 0.27 0.29
Age Y Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
State N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six.
The Sample restricted to women in PSID between age 21 and 35.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample includes observations after a third child while controlling for the number of children.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than high school.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.7: Mincerian Wage Equation- A Robustness Check
Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Potential experience 1.63*** 1.49*** 1.41*** 1.40*** 1.24***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Potential experience square -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Years of schooling 1.43*** 1.45*** 1.03*** 1.07*** 1.05***
(0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21)
Same sex -0.71** -0.71** -0.72** -0.69** -0.80**
(0.35) (0.34) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32)
Constant -10.06*** -13.06*** -2.83 -1.42 -2.54
(3.35) (3.54) (4.65) (4.80) (5.43)
Observations 4871 4753 4561 4561 4540
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.22 0.28 0.29 0.33
Age Y Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
State N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six.
The Sample restricted to women in PSID between age 21 and 35.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to two years after the second childbirth and before a third childbirth.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than high school.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.8: Mincerian Wage Equation- OLS Results (Males)
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.07*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age square -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Same gender -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.02 0.22 0.76 0.73 1.40**
(0.49) (0.51) (0.57) (0.59) (0.65)
Observations 4535 4391 4137 3829 3826
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.24
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
State N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The Sample restricted to males in PSID between age 21 and 40.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of males who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to two years after the second childbirth and before a third childbirth.
Sample restricted to men whose education levels are higher than high school.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.9: OLS Mincerian Regressions - When Fertility Period Completed
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Potential experience -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Potential experience square 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Same sex 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.55 0.28 0.67 0.51 1.31**
(0.54) (0.56) (0.55) (0.57) (0.56)
Observations 6098 5934 5696 5696 5656
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.18 0.26 0.28 0.30
Age Y Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Family size Y Y Y Y Y
State N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six.
The Sample restricted to women in PSID between older than 40 years of old.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who have two children.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than high school.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.10: Probit Model of Labor Force Participation
LFP LFP LFP LFP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.02 -0.04 -0.15 -0.17
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.14)
Age square 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.03 0.05** 0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Same gender -0.08 -0.11* -0.04 -0.00
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant -0.13 -0.18 3.95* 4.10*
(1.11) (1.19) (2.09) (2.33)
Observations 8692 8420 6073 5969
Race Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y
Family size Y Y Y Y
State N Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y
Age at births N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The Sample restricted to women in PSID between age 21 and 40.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to two years after the second childbirth and before a 3rd one.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than high school.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.11: OLS Regressions of Hours Worked (per week)
Hours Hours Hours Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.19
(0.41) (0.43) (0.42) (0.46)
Age square 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Years of schooling -0.23 -0.28** -0.33** -0.16
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Same gender 0.45 0.39 0.23 0.30
(0.32) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31)
Constant 36.20*** 37.28*** 40.58*** 31.88***
(7.67) (7.52) (7.65) (7.93)
Observations 5557 5424 5153 5131
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08
Race Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y
Family size Y Y Y Y
State N Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y
Age at births N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The Sample restricted to women in PSID between age 21 and 40.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to two years after the second childbirth and before a third childbirth.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than high school.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.12: OLS Regression of Time Spent with Children (Hours per week)
Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 7.01 6.04 3.89 2.56 -4.38
(4.26) (4.57) (8.53) (9.35) (35.04)
Age square -0.09 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 0.19
(0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13) (0.27)
Years of schooling 0.54 0.68 -0.26 0.27 1.21
(0.85) (0.93) (2.01) (2.26) (2.62)
Same gender 0.12 0.46 1.62 0.67 -0.98
(1.83) (1.98) (4.86) (5.45) (9.31)
Constant -96.48 -83.49 -36.52 -20.77 7.26
(72.81) (79.39) (147.43) (163.75) (713.93)
Observations 373 363 132 125 125
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.11 -0.17 -0.30 -0.07
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Age of Child Y Y Y Y Y
State N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The Sample restricted to women in PSID between age 21 and 40.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to two years after the second childbirth and before a third childbirth.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than high school.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.13: Mincerian Wage Equation- OLS Results
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AFQT 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience 0.05** 0.04* 0.05** 0.06** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Experience square -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Same gender -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 2.05*** 2.72*** 2.05*** 1.85*** 1.58***
(0.39) (0.50) (0.62) (0.61) (0.56)
Observations 1152 960 951 951 947
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.21 0.32 0.34 0.39
Age Y Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Region N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The Sample restricted to women in NLSY79 and NLSY97 between age 21 and 40.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to two years after the second childbirth and before a third childbirth.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than 15 years of schooling.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.14: Mincerian Wage Equation- OLS Results
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AFQT 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience 0.04*** 0.03** 0.04** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience square -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Same gender -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 1.20*** 1.25*** 1.32*** 1.33*** 0.89**
(0.16) (0.21) (0.29) (0.30) (0.36)
Observations 1845 1570 1549 1549 1544
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.24 0.35 0.36 0.39
Age Y Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Region N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The Sample restricted to women in NLSY79 and NLSY97 between age 21 and 40.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to two years after the second childbirth and before a third childbirth.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than 14 years of schooling.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
199
Table B.15: Mincerian Wage Equation- OLS Results
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AFQT 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience 0.02* 0.02** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience square 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Same gender -0.06 -0.08* -0.07* -0.07* -0.09**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 1.83*** 2.43*** 2.39*** 2.36*** 1.84***
(0.36) (0.38) (0.50) (0.52) (0.51)
Observations 2331 2134 2104 2104 2100
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.22 0.33 0.34 0.38
Age Y Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Region N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The Sample restricted to women in NLSY79 and NLSY97 between age 21 and 50.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to two years after the second childbirth and before a third childbirth.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than 15 years of schooling.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.16: Mincerian Wage Equation- OLS Results
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AFQT 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience square 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Same gender -0.08* -0.09* -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.13***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 1.22*** 1.31*** 2.35*** 2.52*** 1.80***
(0.35) (0.34) (0.36) (0.41) (0.48)
Observations 1607 1600 1572 1572 1572
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.19 0.34 0.35 0.40
Age Y Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Region N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The Sample restricted to women in NLSY79 and NLSY97 between age 40 and 60.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to two years after the second childbirth and before a third childbirth.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than 15 years of schooling.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.17: Mincerian Wage Equation- OLS Results
Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w) Log(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AFQT 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience square 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of schooling 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Same gender -0.06 -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.09**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 1.64*** 2.21*** 2.30*** 2.31*** 1.83***
(0.39) (0.40) (0.51) (0.55) (0.52)
Observations 2660 2461 2425 2425 2421
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.21 0.33 0.33 0.38
Age Y Y Y Y Y
Race Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Region N Y Y Y Y
Occupation N N Y Y Y
Hours worked N N N Y Y
Age at births N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses
The Sample restricted to women in NLSY79 and NLSY97 between age 21 and 60.
I also restrict the analysis to the subsample of women who already have two children.
Sample is restricted to two years after the second childbirth and before a third childbirth.
Sample restricted to women whose education levels are higher than 15 years of schooling.
Sample restricted to individuals who work at least 20 hours per week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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